SOUTH CAROLINA MASS CASUALTY PLAN BASIC PLAN by South Carolina Emergency Management Division
SOUTH CAROLINA MASS CASUALTY PLAN 
BASIC PLAN 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. The South Carolina Mass Casualty Plan is Appendix 5 to the South 
Carolina Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP).  State government must 
be organized and responsive after the occurrence of an event that would 
generate large numbers of casualties.  This plan establishes a framework 
for mass casualty incident response and pre-assigns responsibilities and 
actions to state agencies and organizations. 
 
B. Natural and man-made hazards to the citizens of South Carolina have the 
potential to generate large numbers of casualties.  South Carolina is 
vulnerable in varying probability to hurricanes, earthquakes and dam 
failure.  The potential also exists for a radiological disaster, a criminal act 
releasing a weapon of mass destruction, or a hazardous chemical release.  
Additionally, certain communicable diseases have the potential to spread 
among the population and cause illness and fatality in such large numbers 
that the current capacity of our medical infrastructure could be 
overwhelmed.   
 
C. Under the direction of the State Department of Health and Environmental 
Control, eight public health regions serve the citizens of South Carolina. 
Each health region has developed a mass casualty plan in cooperation with 
county and local government officials, health care providers and the first 
responder community.  Under the direction of the South Carolina 
Emergency Management Division, the state level response to a mass 
casualty-producing event would primarily involve coordination of the 
response among the health regions and arranging for support from state 
and federal assets as needed. 
 
D. Authority for operations in response to a mass casualty-producing incident 
is derived from four main sources.  The first are the powers conferred 
upon the Governor to declare a state of emergency and to direct the State’s 
response to such emergencies, including S.C. Code of Laws, Sections 1-3-
410 to -490 and Section 25-1-440.  The second is the State of South 
Carolina Executive Order Number 2003-12, which authorizes emergency 
operations under the State Emergency Operations Plan.  The third 
authority has its basis in the traditional Health Powers held by the 
Commissioner of the Department of Health and Environmental Control. 
Those powers include the ability to declare a Public Health Emergency 
and issue Public Health Orders under traditional public health authority.  
Fourth, after a mass casualty-producing incident, the Governor may 
invoke the Emergency Health Powers Act.  The Emergency Health 
Powers Act gives extraordinary powers to the Commissioner of the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control so that he may issue 
extraordinary Public Health orders, including ordering quarantine, 
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isolation, school closings, and cancellation of public gatherings in order to 
protect the public from disease or other public health threats. 
 
E. Mission: 
 
This plan provides operational concepts unique to mass casualty response, 
assigns responsibilities to state agencies and coordinates response efforts 
in order to meet the needs of local governments following a mass casualty-
producing incident. 
 
II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
A. Situation 
 
1. A detailed discussion of South Carolina’s situation is available in 
the Basic Plan of the South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan.  
The following is a summary re-statement of that section, which 
identifies facts pertinent to mass-casualty producing threats.  South 
Carolina's population was estimated 4,198,000 in July 2004 (US 
Bureau of Census). The population is projected to be close to 4.5 
million by July 1, 2010. In addition to the permanent residential 
population, millions of tourists visit the state each year. As the 
twenty-sixth most populated state in the nation, combined with 
such a huge tourist population, South Carolina can experience a 
loss of life and property of catastrophic proportion due to an array 
of hazards.  
 
2. The following statistics illustrate the vulnerability of the state's 
population:  
 
a. Forty-one (41) percent (1,670,000) of the state's total 
population resides in the 23 coastal and low country 
counties. 
b.  Twenty (20) percent (867,000) of the state's total 
population resided in mobile homes in 2003. 
c.  Twelve (12) percent (488,000) of the state's total 
population is 65 years of age and over. 
d. Tens of thousands of persons have special medical or 
dietary needs requiring special sheltering assistance. 
e. Approximately one million of the state’s residents live 
within a mile of an active railway. 
f.  Over 30 million tourists visit the state annually. 
  
3. South Carolina is situated on the east coast of the United States and 
is subject to tropical storm and hurricane activity generated in the 
Atlantic Ocean from June through November of each year.  
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Current forecasting models from the National Hurricane Center 
predict more active than average storm seasons for the next ten to 
twenty years. 
 
4. South Carolina is also home to the Middleton Place-Summerville 
Seismic Zone, which was the epicenter of the 1886 Charleston 
earthquake.  The 1886 earthquake is estimated to have been a 
magnitude 7.3 event.  The 1886 Charleston earthquake was the 
most damaging earthquake to occur in the Eastern United States.  
Movement was felt over 2.5 million square miles (from Cuba to 
New York and from Bermuda to the Mississippi River).   
 
5. Eight Fixed Nuclear Facilities affect South Carolina, five of which 
are physically located in the state.  Each of the facilities follows 
strict regulatory guidelines and partners with state and local 
agencies to protect the public from radiation hazards.   
 
6. South Carolina has over 50,000 dams throughout the state.  Most 
of these dams are small and are used primarily for recreation.  
Larger dams are used for the production of hydroelectricity, water 
supply, and flood control.  The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, in combination with various power companies and 
municipalities, regulate thirty-two hydroelectric dams affecting 
South Carolina.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers regulates five 
dams, dikes, and locks along the Savannah River and one in the 
Santee River Basin.  At any given time, any of these dams may be 
threatened by upstream flash floods, earthquakes, neglect, or any 
combination of the above, which can cause personal injury or 
death, significant high water damage to property or additional 
failures to dams located downstream. 
 
B. Assumptions 
 
1. The plan assumptions stated in the Basic Plan of the South 
Carolina Emergency Operations Plan are valid for this Mass 
Casualty Plan. 
 
2. Mass casualty-producing events will overwhelm local, county, and 
state resources. 
 
3. Mass casualty-producing events will have the potential to generate 
mass fatalities. 
 
III. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
A. General 
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Departments and agencies within the state government will conduct 
emergency operations in accordance with direction and guidance 
published in the Basic Plan of the South Carolina Emergency Operations 
Plan.  Additional specific responsibilities are identified throughout this 
Mass Casualty Plan and its Annexes. 
 
B. County 
 
County emergency operations are discussed in detail in the South Carolina 
Emergency Operations Plan.  Specific county response activities to mass 
casualty-producing events are also identified in Regional Mass Casualty 
Plans. 
 
C. Region 
 
1. In cooperation with local hospitals and county emergency 
management organizations, Regional Public Health offices of the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control have 
coordinated the development of Regional Mass Casualty Plans. 
 
2. There is no regional form of government, and there are no regional 
executive bodies in the State of South Carolina.  Therefore, 
Regional Mass Casualty Plans coordinate response among counties 
without requiring or expecting the formation of a regional 
emergency operations structure. 
 
3. Standard Operating Procedures developed to support Regional 
Mass Casualty Plans are expected to be developed in local and 
county units, recognizing that emergency operations in the state are 
built on the county unit and that counties make requests for 
resources through mutual aid from other counties or directly to 
South Carolina Emergency Management. 
 
D. State 
 
State organization and assignment of responsibilities are discussed 
throughout the South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan.  Specific 
responsibilities in response to a mass casualty-producing incident are 
identified in this Mass Casualty Plan and its supporting documents. 
 
E. Federal 
 
The Department of Health and Human Services is the principal Federal 
agency for protecting the health of all Americans.  State response 
operations will interface with Federal response assets through ESF-8 and 
through liaison between the State Department of Health and 
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Environmental Control and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention as well as with the Federal Emergency Management Agency.  
Liaison between the State Emergency Operations Center and the 
Department of Homeland Security will provide access to additional 
Federal health and medical assets. 
 
IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
 
A. Local response to a mass casualty-producing incident involves triage, 
transport, treatment, and logistics support.  At the state level, three 
approaches will be used to support the local response to a mass casualty-
producing incident.  The first approach will involve expansion of the 
capacities in medical treatment facilities to accept critical patients.  The 
second approach is to transport victims to outlying unaffected areas.  The 
third is to receive deployable medical assets in the affected area and 
establish off-site treatment facilities.  The techniques are not listed in the 
order they would necessarily occur and may be used simultaneously. 
 
1. Medical treatment facilities will expand their capacities by 
canceling or rescheduling elective surgical procedures, discharging 
non-critical patients, and diverting non-critical patients to other 
facilities.  Additional specialized transportation assets will likely 
be required to support the discharge/diversion/transfer of patients. 
 
2. Victims will also be transported to outlying areas that have not 
been affected by the mass casualty-producing event.  
Communication of critical information and use of the bed capacity 
website will be necessary in addition to transportation assets. 
 
3. Deployable medical assets from within the state will be sent to the 
affected area.  Federal assets, if available, will be received and 
supported in the state.  Assets may also come to South Carolina 
through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.  In any 
of these cases, the assets will be used to establish additional off-
site treatment facilities to augment what is already in place and 
overburdened by patient influx. 
 
B. Activation  
 
1. Activation of this plan will occur as a mass casualty-producing 
incident exceeds local response capabilities.  Depending on the 
nature of the incident, it may gradually increase in demand on 
response resources, or it may be such that certain local and state 
resources are quickly overwhelmed.   
 
  SC Mass Casualty Plan 
December 2006 5 
Basic Plan 
2. In the case of an incident that gradually increases in resource 
demands, the Incident Commander or local Emergency Operations 
Center may activate local mutual aid agreements to obtain access 
to additional resources.  Regionally, Emergency Medical Services 
and hospital systems have established procedures to handle a 
certain level of increased patient load by transferring less critical 
patients to other treatment facilities, canceling elective procedures, 
and expanding to surge capacity. 
 
3. When hospital surge capacity is exceeded regionally, and when 
other resource shortfalls exist to overwhelm regional capability, 
the local Emergency Operations Center may contact South 
Carolina Emergency Management Division to request resources 
through Emergency Support Function 8.  The Department of 
Health and Environmental Control will, through Emergency 
Support Function 8, coordinate the response of health and medical 
resources statewide.   
 
4. Incidents that exceed both local and state resources will result in 
requests for Federal assets as discussed in the South Carolina 
Emergency Operations Plan and in Section III E. of this plan. 
 
C. Response Operations 
 
1. The Governor will be asked to declare a State of Emergency and 
request a Presidential Declaration. 
 
2. The Governor, in consultation with the Public Health Emergency 
Plan Committee, may implement the Emergency Health Powers 
Act.  A mass casualty incident may not necessarily constitute a 
Public Health Emergency. 
 
3. The Commissioner of the Department of Health and 
Environmental Control may declare that a Public Health 
Emergency exists and invoke traditional Health Powers. 
 
4. State Emergency Response Team representatives will report any 
disaster intelligence to the State Emergency Response Team 
Operations Group by whatever communication is available.   
 
5. Because some or all of the state-level resources may quickly be 
exhausted, State Emergency Response Team Operations Group 
will request assistance from the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, the National Disaster Medical System, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Homeland 
SC Mass Casualty Plan 
 6 December 2006 
Basic Plan 
  
Security, and other states through the Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact as required. 
 
6. Rapid Response Teams will conduct operations in the following 
functional areas: 
 
a. ESF-8 Midlands Medical Response Team: provide medical 
aid to victims. 
 
b. ESF-9 Search and Rescue South Carolina Emergency 
Response Task Force 1:  provides robust search and rescue 
capabilities. 
 
c. ESF-10 Emergency Response Team (ERT) for HAZMAT: 
may be needed to respond if a Hazardous Materials release 
is involved.   
 
d. Chemical Ordnance Biological Radiological (COBRA) 
Teams: may be deployed to support the response effort. 
 
e. 43rd Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team: 
may be deployed to support the response effort. 
 
D. Response Specifics 
 
1. State Emergency Response Team Executive Group will establish 
response priorities because of limited available resources, and 
establish state-coordinated resource allocation.  Life-saving 
operations will be the first priority.  The recommended response 
priorities in support of life-saving operations are: 
  
a. Search and Rescue Operations (if necessary) 
 
b. Health and Medical 
 
c. Basic Human Needs / Mass Care 
 
d. Hazardous Materials 
 
e. Preliminary Damage Assessment 
 
f. Public Safety 
 
g. Public Information 
 
h. Counseling services to mitigate psychosocial effects 
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i. Mass Fatality Management 
 
2.  State Emergency Response Team representatives will ensure that 
response activities within their respective areas are coordinated 
between the various Emergency Support Functions and State 
Emergency Response Team Operations Group and that they are in 
concert with the priorities and policies established by the State 
Emergency Response Team Executive Group.  
 
3.  Search and Rescue Operations (if necessary) 
 
a.  Certain incidents may make search and rescue operations 
necessary.  Initial search and rescue response will be a local 
effort, with priorities set by local government. ESF-9 will 
coordinate to provide additional search and rescue teams 
and equipment to include South Carolina Emergency 
Response Task Force 1 into any damage-affected areas.  
 
b.  Federal Emergency Management Agency Urban Search 
and Rescue (US&R) task forces may be needed to support 
search and rescue operations.  Labor, Licensing and 
Regulation, Division of Fire and Life Safety (LLR) will 
coordinate staging areas for Federal Emergency 
Management Agency Urban Search and Rescue task forces 
to support the state’s efforts. Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s Urban Search and Rescue assets 
and needs are outlined in the ESF-9 Standard Operating 
Procedure. Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
Urban Search and Rescue teams expected time of arrival is 
48 hours after notification.   
 
4. Health and Medical  
 
a. If appropriate, the South Carolina Department of Health 
and Environmental Control will coordinate the deployment 
of the Midlands Medical Response Team to assist in 
providing medical care in the affected areas. Consisting of 
doctors and nurses with light equipment, the team will 
stage from the South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control main office.  
 
b. Each of South Carolina’s Public Health Regions has 
developed a regional plan for expanding health care system 
capacity in response to a mass casualty incident.  ESF-8 
will coordinate among the regions to organize the response 
statewide.   
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c.   Public Health Region Epidemiology Surveillance and 
Response Staff will deploy in response to certain 
communicable diseases and conduct case and contact 
investigations.  State-level Epidemiology and Surveillance 
staff will support both Public Health Regions and the State 
Emergency Response Team through ESF-8. 
 
d. ESF-8 will coordinate medical logistics to include 
deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile when 
necessary, which is discussed in detail in Annex 1 of this 
plan. 
 
e. ESF-8 will coordinate with Labor, Licensing, and 
Regulation and Department of Health and Environmental 
Control, Health Regulations to allow medical students, 
pharmacy students, Emergency Medical Technician 
students, paramedic students, and nursing students on a 
case-by-case basis to practice prior to the completion of 
their licensing requirements. 
 
f. ESF-8 will coordinate identification and credential 
verification of medical volunteers through the Emergency 
System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health 
Professionals (ESAR-VHP) system.  The current ESAR-
VHP registration database on the internet for South 
Carolina is South Carolina’s Statewide Electronic Registry 
of Volunteers (SC-SERV).  South Carolina plans to 
transition to the use of REACH SC as the volunteer 
registration database for health professionals. 
 
g. ESF-8 will request The National Disaster Medical System 
(NDMS) to assist in the response. National Disaster 
Medical System consists of the Disaster Medical 
Assistance Team, the Disaster Mortuary Operational 
Response Team, Medical Support Unit, Mental Health and 
Stress Management teams, and the Veterinary Medical 
Assistance Team.  
 
h.  ESF-8 will coordinate with ESF-19 for the activation of SC 
Air National Guard Medical Squadron to provide additional 
care for victims. The squadron consists of physicians, 
nurses, paramedics, Emergency Medical Technicians, 
Public Health Technicians, Bioenvironmental Technicians 
and Engineers, Dentists, and a Veterinarian Public Health 
Officer.  
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i.  ESF-8 will identify staging areas before the event for 
medical personnel. If during post-event, the pre-identified 
staging areas are unusable, ESF-8 will re-assign its staging 
area locations. ESF-8 will coordinate the establishment of 
mobile field hospitals as needed. Disaster Medical 
Assistance Teams, along with other medical professionals 
on scene, will triage to provide medical stabilization, and 
continued monitoring and care for patients until they can be 
transported to more functioning facilities.  
 
j.  If roads are passable and ground transport assets available, 
patients will be evacuated via ground transportation. 
Otherwise, ESF-8 will coordinate with ESF-1 to select 
airfields to transport critical injured patients to the nearest 
functional treatment facilities. The need for air 
transportation will be determined at the triage scene, and 
priority for aircraft and other evacuation resources will be 
coordinated with State Emergency Response Team.  
 
5.  Mass Care  
 
The two strategies for sheltering following a large-scale disaster 
are initial emergency shelters and long-term emergency shelters.  
Depending on the nature of the mass casualty incident, one or both 
types may be needed.   An increased demand on Special Medical 
Needs Shelters may develop and alternate staffing for Special 
Medical Needs Shelters may be needed since Health Care workers 
may be otherwise tasked. 
 
6.  Hazardous Materials Response  
 
If required by the situation, the initial Hazardous Materials 
response will be a local effort, with priorities set by local incident 
command. Due to the potential of large-scale hazardous materials 
release in certain incidents, ESF-10 may deploy its response assets 
to the damage-affected areas to assess the hazardous materials 
situation and coordinate technical assistance.  
 
7.  Preliminary Damage Assessment / Preliminary Impact Assessment 
The State Assessment Team(s) will be available to deploy as soon 
as possible and conduct preliminary damage and needs assessment, 
and report results immediately to ESF-5. State Assessment Team 
reports will enable State Emergency Response Team Operations 
Group to analyze, process, and prepare damage reports.  
SC Mass Casualty Plan 
 10 December 2006 
Basic Plan 
  
Epidemiologists and other Public Health Personnel will be 
available through ESF-8 to support the State Assessment Team. 
 
8.  Public Safety  
 
a.  ESF-13 will deploy law enforcement / security personnel 
for public safety operations to support response activities.  
Law Enforcement personnel may be needed to assist in 
enforcement of Public Health Orders to include quarantine 
or isolation of patients.  Law Enforcement personnel will 
also be asked to support the movement of response 
vehicles, equipment, and personnel as necessary. 
 
b. In coordination with State Emergency Response Team 
Operations Group, ESF-16 will control the disaster 
response priority flow along Main Supply Routes into and 
out of the disaster area.   
 
9.  Public Information  
 
a. Mass casualty event public information will be 
disseminated in accordance with public information 
provisions in Annex 15 (Public Information) of the all-
hazards South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan. To 
prevent or minimize loss of life, damage to property, and 
harm to the environment in South Carolina, government on 
all levels will provide consistent, coordinated, accurate, and 
timely information to the at-risk public. The information 
flow will begin as early as possible, be maintained 
throughout the event and continue well after the event ends.  
 
b. The public will be made aware of potential adverse effects 
and of actions recommended to safeguard lives and 
property.  Information regarding prudent protective actions 
will be conveyed to the public as time allows during a real 
event, and will continue into the recovery stage.  
 
c.  State government information of greatest public interest 
during and immediately following a mass casualty incident 
may include, but may not be limited to: quarantine and 
isolation issues; medical-care issues, including listings of 
available functional hospitals and health-care facilities; 
family assistance services; pet and livestock care issues; 
traffic management; law enforcement; transportation issues, 
including road closures; shelter locations; air quality; water 
quality and water-borne disease; and nursing home issues; 
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bridge closures; urban search and rescue issues; state office 
closings, state park closures; insurance issues; power 
outages; telephone service; and lodging availability.  
 
d.  In general, state government news releases will be issued to 
the mass news media statewide and to national and 
international media as appropriate, with priority 
consideration given to the media most able to effectively 
communicate with the at-risk population. 
 
10. Counseling services to mitigate psychosocial effects: ESF-8 will 
work to mitigate the psychosocial impact of any mass casualty 
incident in coordination with the Department of Mental Health and 
the American Red Cross utilizing available professionals, 
volunteer counselors and religious organizations. 
 
11. Mass fatality management will be coordinated among the incident 
command structures involved in the response, Coroners in affected 
counties, and the Vital Records representatives of the Department 
of Health and Environmental Control.  Federal assistance for mass 
fatalities management is primarily available through Disaster 
Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORT).  DMORT and 
other assistance resources external to South Carolina are 
coordinated through state Emergency Support Function 8 at the 
State Emergency Operations Center. 
 
V. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS 
 
 See SCEOP as updated. 
 
VI. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE 
 
A. This plan has been developed under the guidance and direction of the 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control in full 
coordination with South Carolina Emergency Management Division. 
 
B. Heads of State Departments and Agencies should review this plan 
annually and update assigned annexes and Standard Operating Procedures 
to meet current department policy and organization. Revisions must be 
compatible with the policies set forth in the South Carolina Emergency 
Operations Plan basic plan. Two copies of the revised annexes shall be 
forwarded to the Director, South Carolina Emergency Management 
Division, when completed. 
 
C. Annual review and update of the South Carolina Mass Casualty Plan will 
be conducted by the South Carolina Department of Health and 
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Environmental Control, Office of Public Health Preparedness in 
coordination with South Carolina Emergency Management Division. 
 
VII. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES 
 
 See SCEOP as updated. 
 
VIII. APPENDICES 
  
 Appendix 1:  Emergency Health Powers 
 
 Appendix 2:  Public Health Hazard Vulnerability Assessment 
 
IX. ANNEXES 
 
 Annex 1: Strategic National Stockpile 
  Attachment A – CHEMPACK  
  Attachment B – Federal Medical Stations (To be published) 
 
Annex 2: Pandemic Influenza 
 
 Annex 3: Smallpox  
 
 Annex 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction / Agents of Mass Effect  
 (To be published) 
 
Regional Mass Casualty Response Plans (To be published) 
 
Part 1 – Region 1 Plan (Abbeville, Anderson, Edgefield, Greenwood, Laurens, 
McCormick, Oconee, and Saluda counties) 
 
Part 2 – Region 2 Plan (Cherokee, Greenville, Pickens, Spartanburg, and Union counties) 
 
Part 3 – Region 3 Plan (Chester, Fairfield, Lancaster, Lexington, Newberry, Richland, 
and York counties) 
 
Part 4 – Region 4 Plan (Chesterfield, Clarendon, Darlington, Dillon, Florence, Kershaw, 
Lee, Marion, Marlboro, and Sumter counties) 
 
Part 5 – Region 5 Plan (Aiken, Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Calhoun, and Orangeburg 
counties) 
  
Part 6 – Region 6 Plan (Georgetown, Horry, and Williamsburg counties) 
 
Part 7 – Region 7 Plan (Berkeley, Charleston, and Dorchester counties) 
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Part 8 – Region 8 Plan (Beaufort, Colleton, Hampton, and Jasper counties) 
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South Carolina Homeland Security Act – DHEC’s Role 
 
Proclamation of emergency by the Governor 
 
Section 1-3-420. The Governor, when in his opinion the facts warrant, shall, by 
proclamation, declare that, because of unlawful assemblage, violence or threats of violence, or a 
public health emergency, as defined in Section 44-4-130, a danger exists to the person or property of 
any citizen and that the peace and tranquility of the State, or any political subdivision thereof, or any 
particular area of the State designated by him, is threatened, and because thereof an emergency, with 
reference to such threats and danger, exists. 
The Governor, upon the issuance of a proclamation as provided for in this section, must 
immediately file the proclamation in the Office of the Secretary of State, which proclamation is 
effective upon issuance and remain in full force and effect until revoked by the Governor. 
 
Additional powers and duties of governor during declared emergency.  
 
Section 25-1-440.  (a) The Governor, when an emergency has been declared, as the 
elected Chief Executive of the State, is responsible for the safety, security, and welfare of the State 
and is empowered with the following additional authority to adequately discharge this responsibility:  
(1) issue emergency proclamations and regulations and amend or rescind them. These 
proclamations and regulations have the force and effect of law as long as the emergency exists;  
(2) declare a state of emergency for all or part of the State if he finds a disaster or a public 
health emergency, as defined in Section 44-4-130, has occurred, or that the threat thereof is 
imminent, and extraordinary measures are considered necessary to cope with the existing or 
anticipated situation. A declared state of emergency shall not continue for a period of more than 
fifteen days without the consent of the General Assembly;  
(3) suspend provisions of existing regulations prescribing procedures for conduct of state 
business if strict compliance with the provisions thereof would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay 
necessary action in coping with the emergency;  
(4) utilize all available resources of state government as reasonably necessary to cope with 
the emergency;  
(5) transfer the direction, personnel, or functions of state departments, agencies and 
commissions, or units thereof, for purposes of facilitating or performing emergency services as 
necessary or desirable;  
(6) compel performance by elected and appointed state, county, and municipal officials and 
employees of the emergency duties and functions assigned them in the State Emergency Plan or by 
Executive Order;  
(7) direct and compel evacuation of all or part of the populace from any stricken or 
threatened area if this action is considered necessary for the preservation of life or other emergency 
mitigation, response, or recovery;  to prescribe routes, modes of transportation and destination in 
connection with evacuation;  and to control ingress and egress at an emergency area, the movement 
Appendix 1 
 
SC Mass Casualty Plan 
      Appendix 1-2     December 2006 
of persons within the area, and the occupancy of premises therein;  
(8) within the limits of any applicable constitutional requirements and when a major disaster 
or emergency has been declared by the President to exist in this State:  
(i) request and accept a grant by the federal government to fund financial assistance 
to individuals and families adversely affected by a major disaster, subject to terms and 
conditions as may be imposed upon the grant but only upon his determination that the 
financial assistance is essential to meet disaster-related expenses or serious needs that may 
not be met otherwise from other means of assistance;  
(ii) enter into an agreement with the federal government, through an officer or agency 
thereof, pledging the State to participate in the funding of the financial assistance authorized 
in subitem (i) of this item, under a ratio not to exceed twenty-five percent of the assistance;  
(iii) make financial grants to meet disaster related necessary expenses or serious 
needs of individuals or families adversely affected by a major disaster which may not 
otherwise be adequately met from other means of assistance. No individual or family may 
receive grants aggregating more than ten thousand dollars with respect to any single major 
disaster subject to the limitations contained in subitem (ii) of this item. The ten thousand 
dollar limit must annually be adjusted to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index for All 
Urban Consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States 
Department of Labor;  and  
(iv) promulgate necessary regulations for carrying out the purposes of this item.  
(b) The Governor is responsible for the development and coordination of a system of 
Comprehensive Emergency Management which must include provisions for mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery in anticipated and actual emergency situations.  
(c)(1) Any person who fraudulently or wilfully makes a misstatement of fact in connection 
with an application for financial assistance made available pursuant to item (8) of subsection (a) 
upon conviction of each offense, must be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned for 
not more than one year, or both.  
(2) Any person who knowingly violates any regulation promulgated pursuant to item (8) of 
subsection (a) is subject to a civil penalty of not more than two thousand dollars for each violation.  
(3) A grant recipient who misapplies financial assistance made available by item (8) of 
subsection (a) is subject to a civil penalty in an amount equal to one hundred fifty percent of the 
original grant amount.  
(d)(1) The Governor must appoint the Public Health Emergency Plan Committee, consisting 
of representatives of all state agencies relevant to public health emergency preparedness, and, in 
addition, a licensed physician from the private sector specializing in infectious diseases, a hospital 
infection control practitioner, a medical examiner, a coroner from an urban county or the coroner’s 
designee, a member of the judiciary, and other members as may be considered appropriate.  
(2) Prior to the declaration of a public health emergency, the Governor must consult with the 
Public Health Planning Committee, and may consult with any public health agency and other experts 
as necessary. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit the Governor’s authority to act without such 
consultation when the situation calls for prompt and timely action.  
(e) The state of public health emergency must be declared by an executive order that 
Appendix 1 
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indicates the nature of the public health emergency, the areas that are or may be threatened, and the 
conditions that have brought about the public health emergency. In addition to the powers and duties 
provided in this article and in Article 7, Chapter 3, Title 1, the declaration of a state of public health 
emergency authorizes implementation of the provisions of Chapter 4, Title 44, the Emergency 
Health Powers Act. The declaration authorizes the deployment and use of any resources and 
personnel including, but not limited to, local officers and employees qualified as first responders, to 
which the plans apply and the use or distribution of any supplies, equipment, and materials and 
facilities assembled, stockpiled, or arranged to be made available pursuant to this act.  
 
Duties of DHEC Board as to communicable or epidemic diseases 
 
Section 44-1-80.  (A) The Board of Health and Environmental Control or its 
designated agents must investigate the reported causes of communicable or epidemic disease and 
must enforce or prescribe these preventive measures as may be needed to suppress or prevent the 
spread of these diseases by proper quarantine or other measures of prevention, as may be necessary 
to protect the citizens of the State.  The Board of Health and Environmental Control or its designated 
agents shall declare, when the facts justify it, any place as infected and, in case of hydrophobia or 
other diseases transmitted from animals to man, must declare such animal or animals quarantined, 
and must place all such restrictions upon ingress and egress of persons or animals therefrom as may 
be, in its judgment, necessary to prevent the spread of disease from the infected locality. 
(B)(1) Whenever the board learns of a case of a reportable illness or health condition, an 
unusual cluster, or a suspicious event that it reasonably believes has the potential to cause a public 
health emergency, as defined in Section 44-4-130, it is authorized to notify the appropriate public 
safety authority, tribal authorities, and federal health and public safety authorities. 
(2) The sharing of information on reportable illnesses, health conditions, unusual 
clusters, or suspicious events between authorized personnel must be restricted to information 
necessary for the treatment, control, investigation, and prevention of a public health emergency.  
Restriction of access to this information to those authorized personnel for the protection of public 
health ensures compliance with all state and federal health information privacy laws. 
(3) The board and its agents must have full access to medical records and 
nonmedical records when necessary to investigate the causes, character, and means of preventing the 
spread of a qualifying health event or public health emergency. For purposes of this item, 
“nonmedical records” mean records of entities, including businesses, health facilities, and 
pharmacies, which are needed to adequately identify and locate persons believed to have been 
potentially exposed or known to have been infected with a contagious disease. 
(4) An order of the board given to effectuate the purposes of this subsection is 
enforceable immediately by the public safety authority. 
(5) For purposes of this subsection, the terms qualifying health event, public 
health emergency, and public safety authority have the same meanings as provided in Section 
44-4-130. 
Duties of Department in regard to public health, in general 
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Section 44-1-110 The Department of Health and Environmental Control is invested with 
all the rights and charged with all the duties pertaining to organizations of like character and is the 
sole advisor of the State in all questions involving the protection of the public health within its 
limits.  
It shall, through its representatives, investigate the causes, character, and means of 
preventing the epidemic and endemic diseases as the State is liable to suffer from and the influence 
of climate, location, and occupations, habits, drainage, scavengering, water supply, heating, and 
ventilation.  It shall have, upon request, full access to the medical records, tumor registries, and other 
special disease record systems maintained by physicians, hospitals, and other health facilities as 
necessary to carry out its investigation of these diseases.  No physician, hospital, or health facility, or 
person in charge of these records is liable in any action-at-law for permitting the examination or 
review.  Patient-identifying information elicited from these records and registries must be kept 
confidential by the department and it is exempt from the provisions of Chapter 4 of Title 30.  It shall 
supervise and control the quarantine system of the State.  It may establish quarantine both by land 
and sea.  
 
Assistance from peace and health officers 
 
Section 44-1-100. All sheriffs and constables in the several counties of this State and 
police officers and health officers of cities and towns must aid and assist the Director of the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control and must carry out and obey his orders, or those of 
the Department of Health and Environmental Control, to enforce and carry out any and all restrictive 
measures and quarantine regulations that may be prescribed.  During a state of public health 
emergency, as defined in Section 44-4-130, the director may request assistance in enforcing orders 
issued pursuant to this chapter and pursuant to Chapter 4, Title 44, from the public safety authority, 
as defined in Section 44-4-130, other state law enforcement authorities, and local law enforcement.  
The public safety authority may request assistance from the South Carolina National Guard in 
enforcing orders made pursuant to this chapter or pursuant to Chapter 4, Title 44. 
 
Emergency Health Powers Act 
Article 1 
 
General Provisions 
 
Section 44-4-100. This act may be cited as the “Emergency Health Powers Act.” 
 
Section 44-4-110. The General Assembly finds that: 
(1) the government must do more to protect the health, safety, and general well being of our 
citizens; 
(2) new and emerging dangers, including emergent and resurgent infectious diseases and 
incidents of civilian mass casualties, pose serious and immediate threats; 
(3) a renewed focus on the prevention, detection, management, and containment of public health 
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emergencies is called for; 
(4) emergency health threats, including those caused by chemical terrorism, radiological 
terrorism, bioterrorism, and epidemics, require the exercise of extraordinary government functions.  
Chemical terrorism and bioterrorism pose especial threats to the food supply of the State; 
(5) this State must have the ability to respond, rapidly and effectively, to potential or actual 
public health emergencies; 
(6) the exercise of emergency health powers must promote the common good; 
(7) emergency health powers must be grounded in a thorough scientific understanding of public 
health threats and disease transmission; 
(8) guided by principles of justice, it is the duty of this State to act with fairness and tolerance 
toward individuals and groups; 
(9) the rights of people to liberty, bodily integrity, and privacy must be respected to the fullest 
extent possible consistent with the overriding importance of the public’s health and security; and 
(10) this act is necessary to protect the health and safety of the citizens of this State. 
 
Section 44-4-120. The purposes of this act are: 
(1) to authorize the collection of data and records, the control of property, the management of 
persons, and access to communications as may be strictly necessary to accomplish the purposes of 
this act; 
(2) to facilitate the early detection of a qualifying health event or public health emergency, and 
allow for immediate investigation of such an emergency by granting access to individuals’ health 
information under specified circumstances; 
(3) to grant state officials the authority to use and appropriate property as necessary for the care, 
treatment, and housing of patients, and for the destruction or decontamination of contaminated 
materials; 
(4) to grant state officials the authority to provide care and treatment to persons who are ill or 
who have been exposed to infection, and to separate affected individuals from the population at large 
for the purpose of interrupting the transmission of infectious disease; 
(5) to ensure that the needs of infected or exposed persons will be addressed to the fullest extent 
possible, given the primary goal of controlling serious health threats; 
(6) to provide state officials with the ability to prevent, detect, manage, and contain emergency 
health threats without unduly interfering with civil rights and liberties; and 
(7) to require the development of a comprehensive plan to provide for a coordinated, appropriate 
response in the event of a public health emergency. 
 
Section 44-4-130. As used in the chapter: 
(A) “Biological agent” means a microorganism, virus, infectious substance, naturally occurring 
or bioengineered product, or other biological material that could cause death, disease, or other harm 
to a human, animal, a plant, or another living organism. 
(B) “Bioterrorism” means the intentional use or threatened use of a biological agent to harm or 
endanger members of the public. 
(C) “Chemical agent” means a poisonous chemical agent that has the capacity to cause death, 
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disease, or other harm to a human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism. 
(D) “Chemical terrorism” means the intentional use or threatened use of a chemical agent to harm 
or endanger members of the public. 
(E) “Chain of custody” means the methodology of tracking specimens for the purpose of 
maintaining control and accountability from initial collection to final disposition of the specimens 
and providing for accountability at each stage of collecting, handling, testing, storing, and 
transporting the specimens and reporting test results. 
(F) “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of the Department of Health and Environmental 
Control. 
(G) “Contagious disease” is an infectious disease that can be transmitted from person to person, 
animal to person, or insect to person. 
(H) “Coroners, medical examiners, and funeral directors” have the same meanings as provided in 
Sections 17-5-5 and 40-19-10, respectively. 
(I) “DHEC” means the Department of Health and Environmental Control or any person 
authorized to act on behalf of the Department of Health and Environmental Control. 
(J) “Facility” means any real property, building, structure, or other improvement to real property 
or any motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, watercraft, or other means of transportation. 
(K) “Health care facility” means any nonfederal institution, building, or agency or portion 
thereof, whether public or private (for-profit or nonprofit) that is used, operated, or designed to 
provide health services, medical treatment, or nursing, rehabilitative, or preventive care to any 
person or persons.  This includes, but is not limited to, ambulatory surgical facilities, health 
maintenance organizations, home health agencies, hospices, hospitals, infirmaries, intermediate care 
facilities, kidney treatment centers, long-term care facilities, medical assistance facilities, mental 
health centers, outpatient facilities, public health centers, rehabilitation facilities, residential 
treatment facilities, skilled nursing facilities, and adult daycare centers.  The term also includes, but 
is not limited to, the following related property when used for or in connection with the foregoing:  
laboratories, research facilities, pharmacies, laundry facilities, health personnel training and lodging 
facilities, and patient, guest, and health personnel food service facilities, and offices and office 
buildings for persons engaged in health care professions or services. 
(L) “Health care provider” means any person or entity who provides health care services 
including, but not limited to, hospitals, medical clinics and offices, special care facilities, medical 
laboratories, physicians, pharmacists, dentists, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, registered 
and other nurses, paramedics, firefighters who provide emergency medical care, emergency medical 
or laboratory technicians, and ambulance and emergency medical workers.  This includes 
out-of-state medical laboratories, provided that such laboratories have agreed to the reporting 
requirements of South Carolina.  Results must be reported by the laboratory that performs the test, 
but an in-state laboratory that sends specimens to an out-of-state laboratory is also responsible for 
reporting results. 
(M) “Infectious disease” is a disease caused by a living organism or virus.  An infectious disease 
may, or may not, be transmissible from person to person, animal to person, or insect to person. 
(N) “Isolation” and “quarantine” mean the compulsory physical separation (including the 
restriction of movement or confinement) of individuals and/or groups believed to have been exposed 
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to or known to have been infected with a contagious disease from individuals who are believed not 
to have been exposed or infected, in order to prevent or limit the transmission of the disease to 
others; if the context so requires, “quarantine” means compulsory physical separation, including 
restriction of movement, of populations or groups of healthy people who have been potentially 
exposed to a contagious disease, or to efforts to segregate these persons within specified geographic 
areas.  “Isolation” means the separation and confinement of individuals known or suspected (via 
signs, symptoms, or laboratory criteria) to be infected with a contagious disease to prevent them 
from transmitting disease to others. 
(O) “Protected health information” means any information, whether oral, written, electronic, 
visual, pictorial, physical, or any other form, that relates to an individual’s past, present, or future 
physical or mental health status, condition, treatment, service, products purchased, or provision of 
care, and that reveals the identity of the individual whose health care is the subject of the 
information, or where there is a reasonable basis to believe such information could be utilized (either 
alone or with other information that is, or reasonably should be known to be, available to predictable 
recipients of such information) to reveal the identity of that individual. 
(P) “Public health emergency” means the occurrence or imminent risk of a qualifying health 
condition. 
(Q) “Public safety authority” means the Department of Public Safety, the State Law Enforcement 
Division, or designated persons authorized to act on behalf of the Department of Public Safety, the 
State Law Enforcement Division including, but not limited to, local governmental agencies that act 
principally to protect or preserve the public safety, or full-time commissioned law enforcement 
persons. 
(R) “Qualifying health condition” means an illness or health condition that may be caused by 
terrorism, epidemic or pandemic disease, or a novel infectious agent or biological or chemical agent 
and that poses a substantial risk of a significant number of human fatalities, widespread illness, or 
serious economic impact to the agricultural sector, including food supply. 
(S) “Radioactive material” means a radioactive substance that has the capacity to cause bodily 
injury or death to a human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism. 
(T) “Radiological terrorism” means the intentional use or threatened use of a radioactive material 
to harm or endanger members of the public. 
(U) “Specimens” include, but are not limited to, blood, sputum, urine, stool, other bodily fluids, 
wastes, tissues, and cultures necessary to perform required tests, and environmental samples or other 
samples needed to diagnose potential chemical, biological, or radiological contamination. 
(V) “Tests” include, but are not limited to, any diagnostic or investigative analyses necessary to 
prevent the spread of disease or protect the public’s health, safety, and welfare. 
(W) “Trial court” is the circuit court for the county in which the isolation or quarantine is to occur 
or to the circuit court for county in which a public health emergency has been declared. 
Article 3 
 
Special Powers During State Of Public Health Emergency: 
Control of Property 
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Section 44-4-300. After the declaration of a state of public health emergency, DHEC may 
exercise, in coordination with state agencies, local governments, and other organizations responsible 
for implementation of the emergency support functions in the State Emergency Operations Plan for 
handling dangerous facilities and materials, for such period as the state of public health emergency 
exists, the following powers over dangerous facilities or materials: 
(1) to close, direct and compel the evacuation of, or to decontaminate or cause to be 
decontaminated, any facility of which there is reasonable cause to believe that it may endanger the 
public health; and 
(2) to decontaminate or cause to be decontaminated, any material of which there is reasonable 
cause to believe that it may endanger the public health. 
 
Section 44-4-310. DHEC, in coordination with the guidelines of the State Emergency 
Operations Plan, may, for such period as the state of public health emergency exists and as may be 
reasonable and necessary for emergency response, require a health care facility to provide services 
or the use of its facility if the services are reasonable and necessary to respond to the public health 
emergency as a condition of licensure, authorization, or the ability to continue doing business in the 
State as a health care facility.  When DHEC needs the use or services of the facility to isolate or 
quarantine individuals during a public health emergency, the management and supervision of the 
health care facility must be coordinated with DHEC to ensure protection of existing patients and 
compliance with the terms of this act. 
 
Section 44-4-320. (A) DHEC must coordinate with coroners, medical examiners, and 
funeral directors, for such period as the state of public health emergency exists, to exercise, in 
addition to existing powers, the following powers regarding the safe disposal of human remains: 
(1) to take possession or control of any human remains which cannot be safely handled 
otherwise; 
(2) to order the disposal of human remains of a person who has died of an infectious disease 
through burial or cremation within twenty-four hours after death; 
(3) to require any business or facility authorized to embalm, bury, cremate, inter, disinter, 
transport, and dispose of human remains under the laws of this State to accept any human remains or 
provide the use of its business or facility if these actions are reasonable and necessary for emergency 
response.  When necessary during the period of time of the public health emergency, DHEC must 
coordinate with the business or facility on the management or supervision of the business or facility; 
and 
(4) to procure, by order or otherwise, any business or facility authorized to embalm, bury, 
cremate, inter, disinter, transport, and dispose of human remains under the laws of this State as may 
be reasonable and necessary for emergency response, with the right to take immediate possession 
thereof. 
(B) Where possible, existing provisions set forth in the State Operations Plan for the safe 
disposal of human remains must be used in a public health emergency.  Where the State Operations 
Plan is not sufficient to handle the safe disposal of human remains for a public health emergency, 
DHEC, in coordination with coroners, medical examiners and funeral directors, must adopt and 
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enforce measures to provide for the safe disposal of human remains as may be reasonable and 
necessary for emergency response.  These measures may include, but are not limited to, the 
embalming, burial, cremation, interment, disinterment, transportation, and disposal of human 
remains. 
(C) All human remains prior to disposal must be clearly labeled with all available information to 
identify the decedent and the circumstances of death.  Any human remains of a deceased person with 
an infectious disease must have an external, clearly visible tag indicating that the human remains are 
infected and, if known, the infectious disease. 
(D) Every person in charge of disposing of any human remains must maintain a written record of 
each set of human remains and all available information to identify the decedent and the 
circumstances of death and disposal.  If the human remains cannot be identified, prior to disposal, a 
qualified person must, to the extent possible, take fingerprints and one or more photographs of the 
human remains, and collect a DNA specimen.  All information gathered under this paragraph must 
be promptly forwarded to DHEC.  Identification must be handled by the agencies that have 
laboratories suitable for DNA identification. 
 
Section 44-4-330. (A) After the declaration of a public health emergency, DHEC may 
purchase and distribute antitoxins, serums, vaccines, immunizing agents, antibiotics, and other 
pharmaceutical agents or medical supplies that it considers advisable in the interest of preparing for 
or controlling a public health emergency, without any additional legislative authorization. 
(B)(1) If a state of public health emergency results in a statewide or regional shortage or 
threatened shortage of any product covered by subsection (a), whether or not such product has been 
purchased by DHEC, DHEC may control, restrict, and regulate by rationing and using quotas, 
prohibitions on shipments, price fixing, allocation or other means, the use, sale, dispensing, 
distribution, or transportation of the relevant product necessary to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of the people of the State.  In making rationing or other supply and distribution decisions, 
DHEC must give preference to health care providers, disaster response personnel, and mortuary 
staff. 
(2) During a state of public health emergency, DHEC may procure, store, or distribute any 
antitoxins, serums, vaccines, immunizing agents, antibiotics, and other pharmaceutical agents or 
medical supplies located within the State as may be reasonable and necessary for emergency 
response, with the right to take immediate possession thereof. 
(3) If a public health emergency simultaneously affects more than one state, nothing in this 
section shall be construed to allow DHEC to obtain antitoxins, serums, vaccines, immunizing agents, 
antibiotics, and other pharmaceutical agents or medical supplies for the primary purpose of hoarding 
such items or preventing their fair and equitable distribution among affected states. 
 
Section 44-4-340. To the extent practicable and consistent with the protection of public 
health, prior to the destruction of any property under this article, DHEC in coordination with the 
applicable law enforcement agency must institute appropriate civil proceedings against the property 
to be destroyed in accordance with the existing laws and rules of the courts of this State or any such 
rules that may be developed by the courts for use during a state of public health emergency.  Any 
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property acquired by DHEC through such proceedings must, after entry of the decree, be disposed of 
by destruction as the court may direct. 
 
Article 5 
 
Special Powers During State Of Public Health Emergency: 
Control of Persons 
 
Section 44-4-500. During a state of public health emergency, DHEC must use every 
available means to prevent the transmission of infectious disease and to ensure that all cases of 
infectious disease are subject to proper control and treatment. 
 
Section 44-4-510. (A)(1) During a state of public health emergency, DHEC may perform 
voluntary physical examinations or tests as necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of individuals. 
(2) DHEC may isolate or quarantine, pursuant to the sections of this act and its existing powers 
under Section 44-1-140, any person whose refusal of physical examination or testing results in 
uncertainty regarding whether he or she has been exposed to or is infected with a contagious or 
possibly contagious disease or otherwise poses a danger to public health. 
(B)(1) Physical examinations or tests may be performed by any qualified person authorized 
to do so by DHEC. 
(2) Physical examinations or tests must not be reasonably likely to result in serious harm to the 
affected individual. 
 
Section 44-4-520. (A) During a state of public health emergency, DHEC may exercise 
the following emergency powers, in addition to its existing powers, over persons as necessary to 
address the public health emergency: 
(1) to vaccinate persons as protection against infectious disease and to prevent the spread of 
contagious or possibly contagious disease; 
(2) to treat persons exposed to or infected with disease; and 
(3) to prevent the spread of contagious or possibly contagious disease, DHEC may isolate or 
quarantine, pursuant to the applicable sections of this act, persons who are unable or unwilling for 
any reason (including, but not limited to health, religion, or conscience) to undergo vaccination or 
treatment pursuant to this section. 
(B) Vaccinations or treatment, or both, must be provided only to those individuals who agree to 
the vaccinations or treatment, or both. 
(C)(1) Vaccination may be performed by any qualified person authorized by DHEC. 
(2) To be administered pursuant to this section, a vaccine must not be such as is reasonably 
likely to lead to serious harm to the affected individual. 
(D)(1) Treatment must be administered by any qualified person authorized to do so by 
DHEC. 
(2) Treatment must not be such as is reasonably likely to lead to serious harm to the affected 
individual. 
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Section 44-4-530. (A) During a public health emergency, DHEC may isolate or 
quarantine an individual or groups of individuals.  This includes individuals or groups who have not 
been vaccinated, treated, tested, or examined pursuant to Sections 44-4-510 and 44-4-520.  DHEC 
may also establish and maintain places of isolation and quarantine, and set rules and make orders. 
(B) DHEC must adhere to the following conditions and principles when isolating or quarantining 
individuals or groups of individuals: 
(1) isolation and quarantine must be by the least restrictive means necessary to prevent the 
spread of a contagious or possibly contagious disease to others and may include, but are not limited 
to, confinement to private homes or other private and public premises; 
(2) individuals isolated because of objective evidence of infection or contagious disease must be 
confined separately from quarantined asymptomatic individuals; 
(3) the health status of isolated and quarantined individuals must be monitored regularly to 
determine if they require isolation or quarantine; 
(4) if a quarantined individual becomes infected or is reasonably believed to be infected with a 
contagious or possibly contagious disease, he or she must be promptly removed to isolation; 
(5) isolated and quarantined individuals must be immediately released when they pose no 
substantial risk of transmitting a contagious or possibly contagious disease to others; 
(6) the needs of persons isolated and quarantined must be addressed in a systematic and 
competent fashion including, but not limited to, providing adequate food, clothing, shelter, means of 
communication with those in isolation or quarantine and outside these settings, medication, and 
competent medical care; 
(7) premises used for isolation and quarantine must be maintained in a safe and hygienic manner 
and be designed to minimize the likelihood of further transmission of infection or other harms to 
persons isolated or quarantined; and 
(8) to the extent possible, cultural and religious beliefs must be considered in addressing the 
needs of the individuals and establishing and maintaining isolation and quarantine premises. 
(C) Persons subject to isolation or quarantine must comply with DHEC’s rules and orders, and 
must not go beyond the isolation or quarantine premises.  Failure to comply with these provisions 
constitutes a misdemeanor. 
(D)(1) DHEC may authorize physicians, health care workers, or others access to individuals 
in isolation or quarantine as necessary to meet the needs of isolated or quarantined individuals. 
(2) No person, other than a person authorized by DHEC, shall enter isolation or quarantine 
premises.  Failure to comply with this provision constitutes a misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person entering an isolation or quarantine premises with or without authorization of 
DHEC may be isolated or quarantined as provided for in this act. 
 
Section 44-4-540. (A) During a public health emergency, the isolation and quarantine 
of an individual or groups of individuals must be undertaken in accordance with the procedures 
provided in this section. 
(B)(1) DHEC may temporarily isolate or quarantine an individual or groups of individuals 
through an emergency order signed by the commissioner or his designee, if delay in imposing the 
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isolation or quarantine would significantly jeopardize DHEC’s ability to prevent or limit the 
transmission of a contagious or possibly contagious disease to others. 
(2) The emergency order must specify the following: (i) the identity of the individual or groups 
of individuals subject to isolation or quarantine; (ii) the premises subject to isolation or quarantine; 
(iii) the date and time at which isolation or quarantine commences; (iv) the suspected contagious 
disease, if known; and (v) a copy of Article V of this act and relevant definitions of this act. 
(3) A copy of the emergency order must be given to the individual(s) or groups of individuals to 
be isolated or quarantined, or if impractical to be given to a group of individuals, it may be posted in 
a conspicuous place in the isolation or quarantine premises. 
(4) Within ten days after issuing the emergency order, DHEC must file a petition pursuant to 
subsection (C) of this section for a court order authorizing the continued isolation or quarantine of 
the isolated or quarantined individual or groups of individuals. 
(C)(1) DHEC may make a written petition to the trial court for an order authorizing the 
isolation or quarantine of an individual or groups of individuals. 
(2) A petition under subsection (C)(1) must specify the following:  (i) the identity of the 
individual or groups of individuals subject to isolation or quarantine; (ii) the premises subject to 
isolation or quarantine; (iii) the date and time at which isolation or quarantine commences; (iv) the 
suspected contagious disease, if known; and (v) a statement of compliance with the conditions and 
principles for isolation or quarantine of Section 44-4-530(B); and (vi) a statement of the basis upon 
which isolation or quarantine is justified in compliance with this article.  The petition must be 
accompanied by a sworn affidavit of DHEC attesting to the facts asserted in the petition, together 
with any further information that may be relevant and material to the court’s consideration. 
(3) Notice to individuals or groups of individuals identified in the petition must be accomplished 
within twenty-four hours in accordance with the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.  If notice 
by mail or fax is not possible, notice must be made by personal service. 
(4) A hearing must be held on any petition filed pursuant to this subsection within five days of 
filing of the petition.  In extraordinary circumstances and for good cause shown, DHEC may apply 
to continue the hearing date on a petition filed pursuant to this section for up to ten days, which 
continuance the court may grant in its discretion giving due regard to the rights of the affected 
individuals, the protection of the public’s health, the severity of the emergency, and the availability 
of necessary witnesses and evidence. 
(5)(a) The court must grant the petition if, by a preponderance of the evidence, isolation or 
quarantine is shown to be reasonably necessary to prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious 
or possibly contagious disease. 
(b) An order authorizing isolation or quarantine may do so for a period not to exceed 
thirty days. 
(c) The order must (i) identify the isolated or quarantined individuals or groups of 
individuals by name or shared or similar characteristics or circumstances; (ii) specify factual 
findings warranting isolation or quarantine pursuant to this act; (iii) include any conditions necessary 
to ensure that isolation or quarantine is carried out within the stated purposes and restrictions of this 
act; and (iv) served on affected individuals or groups of individuals in accordance with the South 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.  If notice by mail or fax is not possible, notice must be made by 
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personal service. 
(d) Prior to the expiration of an order issued pursuant to this item, DHEC may move to 
continue the isolation or quarantine for additional periods not to exceed thirty days each. The court 
must consider the motion in accordance with standards set forth in this item. 
(D)(1) An individual or group of individuals isolated or quarantined pursuant to this act may 
apply to the trial court for an order to show cause why the individual or group of individuals should 
not be released.  The court must rule on the application to show cause within forty-eight hours of its 
filing.  If the court grants the application, the court must schedule a hearing on the order to show 
cause within twenty-four hours from issuance of the order to show cause.  The issuance of the order 
to show cause does not stay or enjoin the isolation or quarantine order. 
(2)(a) An individual or group of individuals isolated or quarantined pursuant to this act may 
request a hearing in the trial court for remedies regarding breaches to the conditions of isolation or 
quarantine.  A request for a hearing does not stay or enjoin the isolation or quarantine order. 
(b) Upon receipt of a request under this subsection alleging extraordinary circumstances 
justifying the immediate granting of relief, the court must fix a date for hearing on the matters 
alleged not more than twenty-four hours from receipt of the request. 
(c) Otherwise, upon receipt of a request under this subsection, the court must fix a date 
for hearing on the matters alleged within five days from receipt of the request. 
(3) In any proceedings brought for relief under this subsection, in extraordinary circumstances 
and for good cause shown, DHEC may move the court to extend the time for a hearing, which 
extension the court in its discretion may grant giving due regard to the rights of the affected 
individuals, the protection of the public’s health, the severity of the emergency, and the availability 
of the necessary witnesses and evidence. 
(E) A record of the proceedings pursuant to this section must be made and retained.  In the event 
that, given a state of public health emergency, parties cannot personally appear before the court, 
proceedings may be conducted by their authorized representatives and be held via any means that 
allow all parties to fully participate. 
(F) The court must appoint counsel to represent individuals or groups of individuals who are or 
who are about to be isolated or quarantined pursuant to the provisions of this act and who are not 
otherwise represented by counsel.  Payment for these appointments must be made in accordance 
with other appointments for legal representation in actions arising outside of matters in this act, and 
is not the responsibility of any one state agency.  Appointments last throughout the duration of the 
isolation or quarantine of the individual or groups of individuals.  DHEC must provide adequate 
means of communication between such individuals or groups of individuals and their counsel.  
Where necessary, additional counsel for DHEC from other state agencies or from private attorneys 
appointed to represent state agencies, must be appointed to provide adequate representation for the 
agency and to allow timely hearings of the petitions and motions specified in this section. 
(G) In any proceedings brought pursuant to this section, to promote the fair and efficient 
operation of justice and having given due regard to the rights of the affected individuals, the 
protection of the public’s health, the severity of the emergency, and the availability of necessary 
witnesses and evidence, the court may order the consolidation of individual claims into groups of 
claims where: 
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(1) the number of individuals involved or to be affected is so large as to render individual 
participation impractical; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the individual claims or rights to be determined; 
(3) the group claims or rights to be determined are typical of the affected individuals” claims or 
rights; and 
(4) the entire group will be adequately represented in the consolidation. 
 
Section 44-4-550. (A)(1) DHEC may, for such period as the state of public health 
emergency exists, collect or cause to be collected specimens and perform tests on any person or 
animal, living or deceased, and acquire any previously collected specimens or test results that are 
reasonable and necessary to respond to the public health emergency. 
(2) Specimens shall be collected only from those individuals who agree to have specimens 
collected or who agree to have tests performed. 
(3) All specimens must be clearly marked. 
(4) Specimen collection, handling, storage, and transport to the testing site must be performed in 
a manner that will reasonably preclude specimen contamination or adulteration and provide for the 
safe collection, storage, handling, and transport of the specimen. 
(5) Any person authorized to collect specimens or perform tests must use chain of custody 
procedures to ensure proper recordkeeping, handling, labeling, and identification of specimens to be 
tested.  This requirement applies to all specimens, including specimens collected using on-site 
testing kits. 
(B) Any business, facility, or agency authorized to collect specimens or perform tests must 
provide such support as is reasonable and necessary to aid in a relevant criminal investigation. 
 
Section 44-4-560. (A) Access to protected health information of persons who have 
participated in medical testing, treatment, vaccination, isolation, or quarantine programs or efforts by 
DHEC during a public health emergency is limited to those persons having a legitimate need to: 
(1) provide treatment to the individual who is the subject of the health information; 
(2) conduct epidemiological research; or 
(3) investigate the causes of transmission. 
(B) Protected health information held by DHEC must not be disclosed to others without 
individual specific informed authorization except for disclosures made: 
(1) directly to the individual; 
(2) to the individual’s immediate family members or life partners; 
(3) to appropriate state or federal agencies or authorities when necessary to protect public health; 
(4) to health care personnel where needed to protect the health or life of the individual who is the 
subject of the information; 
(5) pursuant to a court order or executive order of the Governor to avert a clear danger to an 
individual or the public health; or 
(6) to coroners, medical examiners, or funeral directors or others dealing with human remains to 
identify a deceased individual or determine the manner or cause of death. 
 
Appendix 1 
 
SC Mass Casualty Plan 
December 2006    Appendix 1-15 
Section 44-4-570. (A) The appropriate licensing authority, in coordination with 
DHEC and the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, may exercise, for such period as the 
state of public health emergency exists, in addition to existing emergency powers, the following 
emergency powers regarding licensing of health personnel: 
(1) to require in-state health care providers to assist in the performance of vaccination, treatment, 
examination, or testing of any individual as a condition of licensure, authorization, or the ability to 
continue to function as a health care provider in this State; 
(2) to appoint and prescribe the duties of such out-of-state emergency health care providers as 
may be reasonable and necessary for emergency response; and 
(3) to authorize the medical examiner or coroner to appoint and prescribe the duties of such 
emergency assistant medical examiners or coroners as may be required for the proper performance 
of the duties of the office. 
(B)(1) The appointment of out-of-state emergency health care providers pursuant to this 
section may be for a limited or unlimited time, but must not exceed the termination of the state of 
public health emergency.  The appropriate licensing authority may terminate the out-of-state 
appointments at any time or for any reason provided that any termination will not jeopardize the 
health, safety, and welfare of the people of this State. 
(2) The appropriate licensing authority may waive any or all licensing requirements, permits, or 
fees required by law and applicable orders, rules, or regulations for health care providers from other 
jurisdictions to practice in this State. 
(3) Any out-of-state emergency health care provider appointed pursuant to this section shall not 
be held liable for any civil damages as a result of medical care or treatment related to the emergency 
response unless the damages result from providing, or failing to provide, medical care or treatment 
under circumstances demonstrating a reckless disregard for the consequences so as to affect the life 
or health of the patient. 
(C)(1) The appointment of emergency assistant medical examiners or coroners pursuant to 
this section may be for a limited or unlimited time, but must not exceed the termination of the state 
of public health emergency.  The medical examiner or coroner may terminate the emergency 
appointments at any time or for any reason, provided that any such termination will not impede the 
performance of the duties of the office. 
(2) The medical examiner or coroner may waive any or all licensing requirements, permits, or 
fees required by law and applicable orders, rules, or regulations for the performance of these duties. 
(D) Any person appointed pursuant to this section who in good faith performs the assigned duties 
is not liable for any civil damages for any personal injury as the result of any act or omission, except 
acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. 
 
Reporting of contagious and infectious diseases 
 
Section 44-29-10. (A) In all cases of known or suspected contagious or infectious 
diseases occurring within this State the attending physician must report these diseases to the county 
health department within twenty-four hours, stating the name and address of the patient and the 
nature of the disease.  The county health department must report to the Department of Health and 
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Environmental Control all such cases of infectious and contagious diseases as have been reported 
during the preceding month, these reports to be made upon blanks furnished by the Department of 
Health and Environmental Control.  The Department of Health and Environmental Control must 
designate the diseases it considers contagious and infectious.  The Department of Health and 
Environmental Control may also designate other diseases for mandatory reporting by physicians.  
Any physician who fails to comply with the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor 
and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than one hundred dollars or be imprisoned for a period 
not exceeding thirty days. 
(B) A health care provider, coroner, medical examiner, or any person or entity that maintains a 
database containing health care data must report all cases of persons who harbor any illness or health 
condition that may be caused by chemical terrorism, bioterrorism, radiological terrorism, epidemic 
or pandemic disease, or novel and highly fatal infectious agents and might pose a substantial risk of 
a significant number of human fatalities or incidents of permanent or long-term disability.  The 
Department of Health and Environmental Control must designate reportable illnesses and health 
conditions as set forth in subsection (A). 
(C) A pharmacist must report any unusual or increased prescription rates, unusual types of 
prescriptions, or unusual trends in pharmacy visits that may be caused by chemical terrorism, 
bioterrorism, radiological terrorism, epidemic or pandemic disease, or novel and highly fatal 
infectious agents and might pose a substantial risk of a significant number of human fatalities or 
incidents of permanent or long-term disability.  Prescription-related events that require a report 
include, but are not limited to: 
(1) an unusual increase in the number of prescriptions to treat fever, respiratory, or 
gastrointestinal complaints; 
(2) an unusual increase in the number of prescriptions for antibiotics; 
(3) an unusual increase in the number of requests for information on over-the-counter 
pharmaceuticals to treat fever, respiratory, or gastrointestinal complaints; and 
(4) any prescription that treats a disease that is relatively uncommon and has bioterrorism 
potential. 
(D) The reports of conditions must be made in the form and manner as prescribed by DHEC in 
regulations concerning infectious diseases.  The reports must be made to the Bureau of Disease 
Control in the manner required in the regulations.  When available, clinical information supporting 
the diagnoses, including results of specific diagnostic tests, must be included. 
(E) For purposes of this section, the terms chemical terrorism, bioterrorism, and radiological 
terrorism have the same meanings as provided in Section 44-4-130. 
 
DHEC powers in infectious waste management 
 
Section 44-93-40.  (A) To carry out the provisions and purposes of this chapter, the 
department may establish and collect registration and permit fees in connection with the provisions 
of this chapter; conduct inspections, investigations, obtain samples, and conduct research with 
respect to the operation and maintenance of a site or facility in which infectious waste is generated 
or managed; and issue, deny, revoke, suspend, or modify registration, permits, or orders under such 
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conditions as it may prescribe for the operation of infectious waste treatment facilities or sites.  No 
permit or registration may be revoked without first providing an opportunity for a hearing as 
provided pursuant to Article 3, Chapter 23 of Title 1, the Administrative Procedures Act. 
(B) After the declaration of a public health emergency, as defined in Section 44-4-130, the 
department may exercise, for such period as the state of public health emergency exists, the 
following powers, in addition to any existing powers it has, for the safe disposal of infectious waste: 
(1) to adopt and enforce measures to provide for the safe disposal of infectious waste as may be 
reasonable and necessary for emergency response.  These measures may include, but are not limited 
to, the collection, storage, handling, destruction, treatment, transportation, and disposal of infectious 
waste; 
(2) to require any business or facility authorized to collect, store, handle, destroy, treat, transport, 
and dispose of infectious waste under the laws of this State, and any landfill business or other such 
property, to accept infectious waste or provide services or the use of the business, facility, or 
emergency. When necessary during the state of the public health emergency, the business or facility 
must coordinate with the department on the management or supervision of the business or facility; 
and 
(3) to procure, by order or otherwise, any business or facility authorized to collect, store, handle, 
destroy, treat, transport, and dispose of infectious waste under the laws of this State and any landfill 
business or other such property as may be reasonable and necessary for emergency response, with 
the right to take immediate possession thereof. 
 
Reporting of animal disease, infection, or terrorism 
 
Section 46-7-100.  Every veterinarian, livestock owner, veterinary diagnostic laboratory 
director, or other person having the care of animals must report animals having or suspected of 
having any disease that may be caused by chemical terrorism, bioterrorism, radiological terrorism, 
epidemic or pandemic disease, or novel and highly fatal infectious agents and might pose a 
substantial risk of a significant number of human or animal fatalities or incidents of permanent or 
long-term disability.  The report must be made by telephone, in writing, or by compatible electronic 
format within twenty-four hours to the State Veterinarian and must include as much of the following 
information as is available: the geographical location of the animal or the exposure, the name and 
address of any known owner, and the name and address of the reporting individual.  The State 
Veterinarian must report to the Department of Health and Environmental Control any incidents 
which affect public health, or which create a public health emergency, as defined in Section 
44-4-130. For purposes of this section, the terms chemical terrorism, bioterrorism, and radiological 
terrorism have the same meanings as provided in Section 44-4-130. 
 
Reporting of crop disease, pests, or terrorism 
 
Section 46-9-120.  Every farmer, agriculturalist, county extension agent, agricultural 
products processor, crop advisor, or other person working in agriculture, or person having 
responsibility for agricultural production or processing must report agricultural products having or 
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suspected of having any disease or infection from any crop pest whatsoever that may be caused by 
chemical terrorism, bioterrorism, radiological terrorism, epidemic or pandemic disease, or novel and 
highly infectious agents and which might cause serious agricultural threat to the State.  The report 
must be made by telephone, in writing, or by compatible electronic format within twenty-four hours 
to the Director, Regulatory and Public Service Programs, Clemson University, and must include as 
much of the following information as is available:  the geographic location of the agricultural 
product and/or its origin; the name and address of any known owner, the name and address of any 
known shipper; the name and address of the owner of the point of origin; and the name and address 
of the reporting individual.  The director must report to the Department of Health and Environmental 
Control any incidents which affect public health, or which create a public health emergency, as 
defined in Section 44-4-130. For purposes of this section, the terms chemical terrorism, bioterrorism, 
and radiological terrorism have the same meanings as provided in Section 44-4-130. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
A. This analysis of South Carolina’s vulnerabilities to both man-made and natural 
hazards uses draft version 20.2 of the National Planning Scenarios, dated April 2005 
as a tool to represent “all hazards.”  The focus throughout this document is South 
Carolina’s specific situation in relation to the fifteen planning scenarios, with an 
emphasis on the public health impact of the scenarios.  Discussion of the probability 
of occurrence of the various scenarios is presented at a basic level.  The real focus of 
this document assumes that the scenario is plausible, and discusses the vulnerabilities 
we are aware of based on historical data and the best available computer-aided 
modeling.   
 
B. South Carolina's population was estimated to be 4,198,000 in July 2004 (US Bureau 
of Census). The population is projected to be close to 4.5 million by July 1, 2010. In 
addition to the permanent residential population, millions of tourists visit the state 
each year. As the twenty-sixth most populated state in the nation, combined with 
such a huge tourist population, South Carolina can experience a loss of life and 
property of catastrophic proportion due to an array of hazards.  
 
C. The following statistics illustrate the vulnerability of the state's population:  
 
1. Forty-one (41) percent (1,670,000) of the state's total population resides in 
the 23 coastal and low country counties. 
2. Twenty (20) percent (867,000) of the state's total population resided in 
mobile homes in 2003. 
3. Twelve (12) percent (488,000) of the state's total population is 65 years of 
age and over. 
4. Tens of thousands of persons have special medical or dietary needs requiring 
special sheltering assistance. 
5. Approximately one million of the state’s residents live within a mile of an 
active railway. 
6. Over 30 million tourists visit the state annually. 
  
D. South Carolina is situated on the east coast of the United States and is subject to 
tropical storm and hurricane activity generated in the Atlantic Ocean from June 
through November of each year.  Current forecasting models from the National 
Hurricane Center predict more active than average storm seasons for the next ten to 
twenty years. 
 
E. South Carolina is also home to the Middleton Place-Summerville Seismic Zone, 
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which was the epicenter of the 1886 Charleston earthquake.  The 1886 earthquake is 
estimated to have been a magnitude 7.3 event.  The 1886 Charleston earthquake was 
the most damaging earthquake to occur in the Eastern United States.  Movement was 
felt over 2.5 million square miles (from Cuba to New York and from Bermuda to the 
Mississippi River).   
 
F. Eight Fixed Nuclear Facilities affect South Carolina, five of which are physically 
located in the state.  Each of the facilities follows strict regulatory guidelines and 
partners with state and local agencies to protect the public from radiation hazards.   
 
G. South Carolina has over 50,000 dams throughout the state.  Most of these dams are 
small and are used primarily for recreation.  Larger dams are used for the production 
of hydroelectricity, water supply, and flood control.  The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, in combination with various power companies and municipalities, 
regulate thirty-two hydroelectric dams affecting South Carolina.  The U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers regulates five dams, dikes, and locks along the Savannah River 
and one in the Santee River Basin.  At any given time, any of these dams may be 
threatened by upstream flash floods, earthquakes, neglect, or any combination of the 
above, which can cause personal injury or death, significant high water damage to 
property or additional failures to dams located downstream. 
 
H. South Carolina is also home to vital military facilities, including: Shaw Air Force 
Base; Fort Jackson; Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island; Charleston Naval 
Weapons Station and Charleston Naval Shipyard. 
 
I. South Carolina’s first response community is comprised of local law enforcement 
(municipal police, county sheriff departments, and municipal public safety 
departments); fire services including both paid and volunteer fire services (the vast 
majority of these being volunteer departments); and both public and private 
ambulance services. 
 
II. HAZARD PROFILES 
 
A. Nuclear Detonation – 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device  
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
None 
 
 b. High 
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Anderson, Berkeley, Charleston, Greenville, Lexington, Richland, 
Spartanburg, Sumter 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
Aiken, Barnwell, Beaufort, Darlington, Fairfield, Florence, Horry, 
Oconee, Pickens, York 
 
 d. Limited 
 
Abbeville, Allendale, Bamberg, Calhoun, Cherokee, Chester, 
Chesterfield, Clarendon, Colleton, Dillon, Dorchester, Edgefield, 
Georgetown, Hampton, Jasper, Kershaw, Lancaster, Laurens, Lee, 
Marion, Marlboro, McCormick, Newberry, Orangeburg, Saluda, 
Union, Williamsburg 
 
 e. Low 
 
None 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
South Carolina’s potential vulnerability to a terrorist attack using an 
improvised nuclear weapon with an explosive yield equivalent to 10,000 tons 
of TNT (10 kiloton device) is based on its inventory of high-value targets.  
One scenario for the deployment of an improvised 10 kiloton device has it 
hidden in a standard shipping container.  The Port of Charleston is one of the 
largest on the East Coast, handling the equivalent of 1.7 million 20-foot 
shipping containers in 2004.   
 
A 10 kiloton explosion in or near one of the container terminals would 
destroy much of the port infrastructure, downtown Charleston, and the 
Charleston Neck; damage to the Ravenel Bridge could block the shipping 
channel.  Charleston Air Force Base and Naval Weapon Station Charleston 
would be extensively damaged.  There are a number of other potential targets 
with military, industrial, and economic value. 
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
No events of this type have occurred in the United States.  The probability of 
such an event is difficult to assess. 
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4. Severity 
 
If a nuclear device with explosive yield equivalent to 10,000 tons of TNT (10 
kiloton) detonated anywhere in South Carolina the results would be locally 
devastating; a 10 kiloton device detonated at ground level could be expected 
to cause massive destruction and injury within one to three miles, extensive 
damage and injuries within five miles, and long-term contamination within 
30 to 50 miles.  Even a device detonated outside South Carolina, but upwind, 
would be expected to cause extensive contamination within South Carolina. 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
 
No events of this type have occurred in the U.S. The only historic data 
available is based on the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
Japan, in 1945. 
 
B. Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax  
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
None 
 
 b. High 
 
Anderson, Berkeley, Charleston, Darlington, Dorchester, Greenville, 
Lexington, Richland, Spartanburg, Sumter, York 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
Aiken, Calhoun, Cherokee, Chester, Clarendon, Colleton, Dillon, 
Edgefield, Fairfield, Florence, Hampton, Jasper, Kershaw, Laurens, 
Lee, Marlboro, Newberry, Orangeburg 
 
 d. Limited 
 
Abbeville, Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Beaufort, Chesterfield, 
Georgetown, Greenwood, Horry, Lancaster, Marion, McCormick, 
Oconee, Pickens, Saluda, Union, Williamsburg 
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 e. Low 
 
None 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
South Carolina has four areas with high population density, major airports, 
and large sports and recreation venues.  None of the four areas draws 
significant commuting population from across the borders with North 
Carolina or Georgia; however, three of the areas conduct significant 
interstate commerce by road, rail, and air.  Additionally, Charleston is one of 
the busiest port facilities on the east coast of the United States.  A portion of 
Charlotte, North Carolina’s workforce lives in northern South Carolina, and a 
number of people employed in Augusta, Georgia, live in communities around 
Aiken and North Augusta, South Carolina. 
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
No events of this type have occurred in the United States.  Similar events 
have occurred: the distribution of threat letters with small quantities of 
weapons-grade anthrax through the United States Postal Service in 2001, and 
the release of aerosol anthrax from a facility and subsequent disease outbreak 
in Sverdlovsk, USSR in 1979.  The probability of such an event is difficult to 
assess. 
 
4. Severity 
 
An event as described in the planning scenario would require extensive 
testing to detect contamination.  Decontamination requirements would be 
extensive but would be overshadowed by the need to identify exposed 
persons and provide them with prophylaxis medications.  There would also 
be a significant requirement for the monitoring and care of infected persons.  
Additionally, there would be potential impact on tourism and commerce if 
the interstate corridors were restricted after an incident.  Long-term impact 
on the state could result because of loss of interest from international 
businesses that operate facilities in the state. 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
 
In 2001, a small number of letters that contained anthrax were sent through 
the US postal system.  As a result of very small, localized releases of anthrax 
from those letters, entire postal facilities were shut down.  Senate office 
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buildings were closed, as well as the offices of a Florida-based newspaper.  
Some of the individuals who were infected by the anthrax died as a result.  
Senate office buildings in Washington, D.C. were shut down and extensive 
decontamination procedures were conducted for facilities that had been 
contaminated. 
 
C. Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza 
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
Aiken, Anderson, Beaufort, Berkeley, Charleston, Cherokee, Chester, 
Chesterfield, Colleton, Darlington, Dorchester, Florence, 
Georgetown, Greenville, Greenwood, Horry, Kershaw, Lancaster, 
Laurens, Lexington, Marion, Newberry, Oconee, Orangeburg, 
Pickens, Richland, Spartanburg, Sumter, Williamsburg, York 
 
 b. High 
 
Abbeville, Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Calhoun, Clarendon, 
Dillon, Edgefield, Fairfield, Hampton, Jasper, Lee, Marlboro, 
McCormick, Saluda, Union 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
None 
 
 d. Limited 
 
None 
 
 e. Low 
 
None 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
The majority of South Carolina’s seventy-five hospitals are located in the 
four most populous counties.  South Carolina’s medical infrastructure also 
includes 46 county health departments, 20 community health centers, 
approximately 1700 private physicians’ offices (primarily pediatric 
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practices), birthing hospitals, and universities with health centers and/or 
schools of medicine and/or nursing. 
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
Influenza pandemics have occurred three times in the last hundred years.  
Each of the three Influenza A subtypes spread worldwide within a year of 
being detected.  Considering the current cases of avian influenza in the 
world, and documented cases of bird to human transmission of the avian 
influenza, there is a high probability of a novel strain developing with the 
ability to spread readily from human to human. 
 
4. Severity 
 
Based on a population attack rate of 15-35%, South Carolina could anticipate 
between 560,000 and 1.32 million cases of influenza during the peak 
transmission period.  Outpatient visits due to influenza are projected to reach 
almost 533,000 (range 320,000-750,000), which translate to over 25 extra 
patients per day during the peak transmission period for every primary care 
physician in the state.  Hospitalizations due to influenza and influenza–
related complications may reach 12,000 (range 7,200 – 16,800 persons).  
South Carolina is expected to experience almost 3,600 deaths from pandemic 
influenza (range 2,200-5000) during the peak transmission period (nearly 
double the state’s typical expected deaths). 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
 
1918-19, "Spanish flu," [A (H1N1)], caused the highest number of known 
influenza deaths: more than 500,000 people died in the United States, and up 
to 50 million people may have died worldwide. Many people died within the 
first few days after infection, and others died of complications later. Nearly 
half of those who died were young, healthy adults.  Troops at Camp Jackson, 
South Carolina, suffered many fatalities. 
 
1957-58, "Asian flu," [A (H2N2)], caused about 70,000 deaths in the United 
States. First identified in China in late February 1957, the Asian flu spread to 
the US by June 1957.   
 
1968-69, " Hong Kong flu," [A (H3N2)], caused about 34,000 deaths in the 
United States. 
 
D. Biological Attack – Pneumonic Plague  
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1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
Charleston, Greenville, Horry, Lexington, Pickens, Richland, 
Spartanburg 
 
 b. High 
 
Aiken, Anderson, Beaufort, Berkeley, Florence, Sumter, York 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
Cherokee, Greenwood, Orangeburg 
 
 d. Limited 
 
Abbeville, Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Calhoun, Chester, 
Chesterfield, Clarendon, Colleton, Darlington, Dillon, Dorchester, 
Edgefield, Fairfield, Georgetown, Hampton, Jasper, Kershaw, 
Lancaster, Laurens, Lee, Marion, Marlboro, McCormick, Newberry, 
Oconee, Saluda, Union, Williamsburg 
 
 e. Low 
 
None 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
South Carolina has four areas with high population density, major airports, 
and large sports and recreation venues.  None of the areas has a subway 
system.  Other means of public transportation are not very robust; however, 
there are many indoor and outdoor shopping malls that have significant 
pedestrian traffic densities, particularly during seasonal shopping.  The areas 
of high population density also include certain tourist populations throughout 
the year, including international visitors.  Indoor sports arenas in Columbia, 
Greenville, North Charleston and Myrtle Beach each have capacities between 
10,000 and 20,000. 
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
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Although plague is endemic in the Western states, there are no known 
incidences of naturally occurring plague in South Carolina.  There are no 
known incidences of deliberate spread of plague in the U.S.  The probability 
of such an event is difficult to assess. 
 
4. Severity 
 
One to six days after becoming infected with the bacteria, people would 
develop pneumonic plague. Once people have the disease, the bacteria can 
spread to others who have close contact with them. Because of the delay 
between being exposed to the bacteria and becoming sick, people could 
travel over a large area before becoming contagious and possibly infecting 
others.  Vector control would not play the same role at the outset of an 
intentional release as it does in a natural outbreak; however, vector control 
issues would increase as the rodent population becomes infected and carries 
the disease.  Any intentional release would result in loss of facility use and 
would also have a significant negative impact on public confidence in their 
personal security. 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
 
Historically, there have been naturally occurring outbreaks of plague in the 
United States.  It is difficult to equate the loss and impact from a naturally 
occurring outbreak with one that is the result of intentional infection.   
 
E. Chemical Attack – Blister Agent  
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
Anderson, Beaufort, Charleston, Darlington, Georgetown, Greenville, 
Florence, Horry, Kershaw, Pickens, Richland 
 
 b. High 
 
Florence, Greenwood, Lexington, Orangeburg, Spartanburg, Sumter 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
Aiken, Berkeley, Cherokee, Chester, Chesterfield, Colleton, 
Dorchester, Lancaster, Laurens, Marion, Newberry, Oconee, 
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Williamsburg, York 
 
 d. Limited 
 
Abbeville, Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Calhoun, Clarendon, 
Dillon, Edgefield, Fairfield, Hampton, Jasper, Lee, Marlboro, 
McCormick, Saluda, Union 
 
 e. Low 
 
None 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
South Carolina has a number of outdoor venues that are vulnerable to a line 
source release of agent.  The stadium at the University of South Carolina and 
the stadium at Clemson each have a seating capacity in excess of 80,000.  
When a University of South Carolina football game is held during the South 
Carolina State Fair, there are typically 130,000 people in the vicinity of the 
stadium and fairgrounds.  Darlington Raceway has a capacity of over 60,000. 
 The beaches along the coastline of South Carolina attract many visitors and 
would also present a vulnerable target.  The Spoleto, USA festival attracts 
approximately 250,000 people to the downtown Charleston area over a 
period of seventeen days. 
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
No events of this type have occurred in the United States.  The probability of 
such an event is difficult to assess. 
 
4. Severity 
 
An aerial spray-release that resulted in 70,000 victims requiring 
hospitalization and 150 fatalities would completely overwhelm the 
capabilities of the state.  A no-notice evacuation of 100,000 people and a 
sheltering requirement for 15,000 contaminated victims would be extremely 
challenging considering our current capabilities.  In order for appropriate 
care to be given to 70,000 victims, our current system would have to expand 
to include off-site medical care in non-traditional facilities, and evacuation of 
victims to other capable facilities throughout the United States.  There would 
be a devastating impact on tourism, commerce, and industry in the state.  
Additionally, there would be a requirement for long-term follow up to 
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monitor those exposed for chronic disease due to the carcinogenicity of most 
blister agents. 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
 
Blister agents were used in World War II and various studies have been 
conducted regarding their field effects and their medical effects.  It is difficult 
to correlate existing data on battlefield effects of blister agent munitions to 
the scenario.  The results of such an attack would be devastating. 
 
F. Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
Charleston, Florence, Greenville, Spartanburg 
 
 b. High 
 
Cherokee, Colleton, Fairfield, Hampton, Laurens, Lexington, 
Orangeburg, Sumter 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
Aiken, Anderson, Beaufort, Berkeley, Chester, Dillon, Edgefield, 
Georgetown, Horry, Kershaw, Lee, Marion, Marlboro, Newberry, 
Oconee, Richland, York 
 
 d. Limited 
 
Bamberg, Barnwell, Chesterfield, Greenwood, Lancaster, Pickens, 
Union, Williamsburg 
 
 e. Low 
 
Abbeville, Allendale, Calhoun, Clarendon, Darlington, Dorchester, 
Jasper, McCormick, Saluda 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
Significant volumes of industrial chemicals are used in various locations 
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throughout the state, to include the Greenville/Spartanburg area, the 
Richland/Lexington area, and the Charleston area.  While there are no fixed 
facility petroleum refineries in the state, there are various bulk chemical and 
fuel storage sites that have similar vulnerabilities.  The port facility at 
Charleston is one of the busiest in the United States and is critical to the 
nation’s commerce. 
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
Accidental releases of chemicals such as anhydrous ammonia, chlorine, 
hydrogen sulfide, phosphorus trioxide, and sulfur dioxide have occurred in 
the last ten years.  While there are no reported incidents of intentional attacks 
on chemical storage facilities in the state, the potential still exists for such an 
event to occur. 
 
4. Severity 
 
Many factors determine the severity of a toxic industrial chemical release.  
Chemical plants that maintain certain inventory levels of toxic chemicals 
must conduct an offsite consequence analysis of the worst-case release 
scenario.  In South Carolina, there are four facilities that report that there is 
the potential to expose more than 10,000 people in an offsite release.  There 
are an additional 28 facilities that report the potential to expose between 
1,000 and 10,000 people in an offsite release. 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
 
The release of ammonia from a single 10,000-gallon railcar in the Hartsville, 
SC area on September 29, 2003 necessitated the evacuation of 30 homes.  
The October, 1999 fire involving a 17,000-gallon tank of phosphorus trioxide 
included the release of 5000 pounds of material. 
 
G. Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent 
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
Charleston, Greenville, Horry, Lexington, Pickens, Richland, 
Spartanburg 
 
 b. High 
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Aiken, Anderson, Beaufort, Berkeley, Florence, Sumter, York 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
Cherokee, Greenwood, Orangeburg 
 
 d. Limited 
 
Abbeville, Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Calhoun, Chester, 
Chesterfield, Clarendon, Colleton, Darlington, Dillon, Dorchester, 
Edgefield, Fairfield, Georgetown, Hampton, Jasper, Kershaw, 
Lancaster, Laurens, Lee, Marion, Marlboro, McCormick, Newberry, 
Oconee, Saluda, Union, Williamsburg 
 
 e. Low 
 
None 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
There are few urban areas in South Carolina with large numbers of multi-
story buildings; however, there are many indoor shopping malls, large high 
schools, and sports venues that would be a vulnerable target for nerve agent 
attack.  COBRA team assets throughout the state and Metropolitan Medical 
Response System (MMRS) assets in Columbia provide a basic capability to 
respond to victims of nerve agent poisoning.  First responder training and 
equipment for law enforcement personnel, firefighters, and Emergency 
Medical Services personnel have prepared communities throughout the state 
to identify and respond to a nerve agent release.   
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
There are no documented multi-victim organophosphate poisonings in South 
Carolina.   The probability of such an event is difficult to assess. 
 
4. Severity 
 
Training, equipment, and pharmaceuticals are available in South Carolina to 
support the response to a nerve agent release; however, a release of any scale 
would overwhelm the current response capacity.   
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5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
 
The July 2005 theft of 720 pounds of stored insecticides in Edgefield County, 
South Carolina called attention to the fact that organophosphate-based 
pesticides have similar negative health effects.  No incidents have occurred in 
South Carolina; however, the March 1995 release of impure Sarin by Aum 
Shinrikyo in a Tokyo, Japan subway killed 12 people and affected 
approximately 5,000 other passengers.  That incident also highlighted the 
susceptibility of hospital emergency rooms to contamination by self-
reporting victims of an attack.  The deadly properties of nerve agents are also 
showcased by the 1969 accidental release of 20 pounds of VX from a 
military aircraft.  That release resulted in the death of approximately 6,000 
sheep in Skull Valley, Utah. 
 
H. Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion  
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
Charleston, Florence, Greenville, Hampton, Laurens, Lexington, 
Orangeburg, Spartanburg 
 
 b. High 
 
Aiken, Anderson, Beaufort, Berkeley, Colleton, Edgefield, Fairfield, 
Georgetown, Horry, Kershaw, Lee, Marlboro, Newberry, York 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
Barnwell, Calhoun, Cherokee, Chester, Chesterfield, Clarendon, 
Darlington, Dillon, Dorchester, Greenwood, Jasper, Lancaster, 
Marion, Oconee, Pickens, Richland, Sumter, Union, Williamsburg 
 
 d. Limited 
 
Abbeville, Allendale, Bamberg, McCormick, Saluda 
 
 e. Low 
 
None 
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2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
There are seventy-five facilities that reported stored quantities of chlorine in 
excess of 100 pounds.  Two of the facilities have local populations of 20,000 
within ¾ of a mile.  Additionally, tank loads of chlorine are transported 
throughout the state by way of truck and rail daily. 
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
The planning scenario describes the intentional rupture of a chlorine tank by 
an adversary using an explosive to cause the release of chlorine.  No events 
of this sort are recorded in South Carolina; however, the large quantities of 
chlorine moved by truck and rail and stored in various facilities statewide 
make this a possible scenario.  Also, there is the potential for accidental 
releases such as the one that occurred because of a train derailment in 
Graniteville, South Carolina in January 2005. 
 
4. Severity 
 
Chlorine is extremely corrosive and damages structures as well as having the 
potential to injure or kill exposed people.  Chlorine stays low to the ground 
and displaces breathable air, which makes releases particularly dangerous. 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
 
The most recent example of a Chlorine release with a public health impact is 
the Graniteville, South Carolina train derailment.  The derailment resulted in 
a release of approximately 60 tons of chlorine from a single rail car.  5,400 
residents were evacuated from their homes.  538 people were seen in 
hospitals or private clinics as outpatients, 73 people were admitted to the 
hospital for care, and there were nine fatalities.  Within 24 hours of the 
incident, 272 incident-related emergency department visits occurred in 
Georgia and South Carolina.  During the response to the derailment, the 
potential need to evacuate the 230-bed Aiken Regional Medical Center was 
discussed since it was within three miles of the incident site. 
 
I. Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake  
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
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Charleston, Greenville, Horry, Richland, Spartanburg 
 
 b. High 
 
Beaufort, Cherokee, Chesterfield, Clarendon, Colleton, Darlington, 
Dorchester, Georgetown, Greenwood, Lancaster, Laurens, Marlboro, 
Oconee, Pickens, Saluda, Williamsburg, York 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
Aiken, Anderson, Berkeley, Lexington, Florence, Orangeburg, 
Sumter 
 
 d. Limited 
 
Abbeville, Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Chester, Dillon, Fairfield, 
Hampton, Jasper, Kershaw, Lee, McCormick, Newberry, Union 
 
 e. Low 
 
Calhoun, Edgefield, Marion 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
Although a catastrophic earthquake has not occurred in South Carolina since 
1886, there is as much potential for a large earthquake to kill or injure people 
and cause damage in South Carolina as there is in California.  Two 
significant earthquakes in State include the 1886 Charleston earthquake 
(estimated at M 7.3) and the 1913 Union County earthquake (estimated at M 
4.5). 
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
South Carolina experiences dozens of earthquakes annually. These are events 
with magnitudes ranging up to 3.0, and generally not felt by people. About 
70 percent of these occur in the vicinity of the epicenter of the 1886 
Charleston earthquake, a region referred to as the Middleton Place-
Summerville Seismic Zone.   
 
4. Severity 
 
Loss estimations for an earthquake of magnitude 7.3 occurring in the 
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Middleton Place-Summerville Seismic Zone include $14 billion (2000 
dollars) in economic loss due to building damage alone.  77% of the loss due 
to building loss would occur in Charleston, Berkeley, and Dorchester 
Counties.  $4.2 billion in losses due to business interruption from building 
damage alone.  The most damaging in terms of casualties would be a daytime 
event.  Such an event would cause an estimated 45,000 casualties, with close 
to 9,000 of those being major injuries requiring hospitalization.  An 
estimated 200,000 people will be displaced from their homes and an 
estimated 60,000 of those people will require short-term shelter.  30 hospitals 
could suffer enough damage to be completely nonfunctional.   
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
 
The 1886 Charleston earthquake was the most damaging earthquake to occur 
in the Eastern United States.  Movement was felt over 2.5 million square 
miles (from Cuba to New York and from Bermuda to the Mississippi River.  
Approximately 110 persons lost their lives.  Ninety percent of the brick 
structures in Charleston were damaged. (Today equates to approximately 24 
million tons of debris.)  Damaging secondary effects were fires, ruptured 
water, gas, and sewage lines, damaged wells, and flooding from a cracked 
dam in Langley, SC.  Dollar damage estimates in 1886 dollars were about 
$5.5 million. (In today’s dollars, approximately $969 million). 
 
J. Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane 
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
Beaufort, Berkeley, Charleston, Colleton, Dorchester, Georgetown, 
Greenville, Horry, Jasper, Marion, Richland, Spartanburg 
 
 b. High 
 
Aiken, Anderson, Cherokee, Clarendon, Florence, Hampton, 
Lexington, Orangeburg, Sumter, Williamsburg, York 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
Abbeville, Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Calhoun, Chester, 
Chesterfield, Darlington, Dillon, Edgefield, Fairfield, Greenwood, 
Kershaw, Lancaster, Laurens, Lee, Marlboro, McCormick, Newberry, 
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Oconee, Pickens, Saluda, Union 
 
 d. Limited 
 
None 
 
 e. Low 
 
None 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
Hurricanes produce strong winds and large amounts of rain. The winds 
generate large waves causing the height of sea level to rise as much as 20 feet 
or more above normal along the coast. Known as storm surge, it can cause 
extensive flooding in coastal areas. Excessive rainfall also results in flooding 
both in coastal and inland areas. Since thunderstorms are often embedded 
within hurricanes, lightning is common. Tornadoes frequently accompany 
hurricanes. While the impacts of hurricanes are felt most forcefully along the 
coast, inland areas also experience the effects of wind and rain. 
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
From 1975 to 1996, the paths of 19 hurricanes or tropical storms passed 
within 100 miles of the coast of South Carolina.  Seven of these were 
categorized as hurricanes for some amount of time within 100 miles of the 
coast, and 12 were classified as tropical storms the entire time. Four 
hurricanes made landfall in South Carolina between 1975 and 2005: 
Hurricane Bob (Category 1) in 1985 at Beaufort, Hurricane Hugo (Category 
4) in 1989, Charley (Category 1) in 2004 and Gaston (Category 1) in 2004. 
 
4. Severity 
 
A Category 3 or 4 storm such as Hurricane Hugo (which came ashore as a 4 
and diminished to a 1 before leaving the state) will cause massive destruction 
near the path of the eye with lesser damage 50 to 75 miles either side of its 
path.  South Carolina has not experienced a Category 5 storm in historical 
times, but based on observations of recent Category 5 storms elsewhere, 
would be expected to incur comparable levels of damage. 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
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Hurricane Hugo was the most financially devastating hurricane to strike 
South Carolina. Hugo made landfall as a Category 4 hurricane just north of 
Charleston leaving a path of destruction through the center of the state up 
through Charlotte, NC.  Hugo caused over $7 billion damage ($12.25 billion 
in 2004 dollars) and at the beginning of the 2005 tropical season stood as the 
fourth most costly hurricane in U.S. history behind Andrew (1992), Charley 
(2004) and Ivan (2004). The hurricanes of the 2005 storm season, including 
the record-breaking Katrina again emphasized the destructive power of 
hurricanes.  Other major hurricanes to hit South Carolina were Hazel (1954), 
which caused 95 deaths and an estimated $27 million (1954 dollars) in 
damages and Gracie (1959).  Only Florida, Texas, and Louisiana have a 
greater risk of hurricanes than South Carolina. 
 
K. Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices 
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
Charleston, Florence, Greenville, Horry, Lexington, Pickens, 
Richland, Spartanburg 
 
 b. High 
 
Anderson, Darlington, Orangeburg, Sumter, York 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
Aiken, Beaufort, Berkeley, Cherokee, Chester, Chesterfield, Colleton, 
Dorchester, Georgetown, Greenwood, Kershaw, Lancaster, Laurens, 
McCormick, Newberry, Oconee, Williamsburg 
 
 d. Limited 
 
Abbeville, Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Calhoun, Clarendon, 
Dillon, Edgefield, Fairfield, Hampton, Jasper, Lee, Marion, 
Marlboro, Saluda, Union 
 
 e. Low 
 
None 
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2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
South Carolina has four areas with high population density, major airports, 
and large sports and recreation venues.  There are many indoor and outdoor 
shopping malls that have significant pedestrian traffic densities, particularly 
during seasonal shopping.  The areas of high population density also include 
certain tourist populations throughout the year, including international 
visitors.  There are a number of South Carolina facilities licensed to possess 
material that could be diverted and used in a Radiological Dispersal Device.  
Some of these sources are intensely radioactive such as spent fuel from a 
nuclear reactor or teletherapy and other irradiation sources. 
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
There have been a number of lost or stolen radioactive sources, usually in the 
form of industrial gauges.  Radiologically contaminated steel products 
resulting from accidental smelting of industrial gauges have also been 
distributed and subsequently recovered in South Carolina. 
 
4. Severity 
 
Covert deployment of a spent fuel rod or an irradiator or teletherapy source, 
typically containing hundreds to thousands of curies of radioactive material, 
would create an intense local radiation field which could result in life-
threatening radiation exposure to any individual remaining in its vicinity and 
lesser exposures to individuals at greater distance or exposed for shorter 
times.  If deployed covertly a source could potentially remain undetected for 
days to weeks.  Covert deployment of a smaller source such as an industrial 
gauge or medical isotope would result in correspondingly lower potential 
exposures.  Dispersal of radioactive material over a wider area would also 
result in radiation exposure to anyone in the contaminated area.  Unless 
dispersal occurs with a conventional explosion or is accompanied by a threat 
or ultimatum, it may not be detected for days or weeks.  Depending on the 
isotope, recovery may consist of allowing natural radioactive decay to 
eliminate the contamination (some medical isotopes decay rapidly and 
essentially disappear in days to weeks) or may require decontamination or 
removal of the affected structures. 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
 
There are no reports of actual Radiological Dispersal Device use; however, 
there are records of incidents involving radiological source material which 
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indicate that such an attack would result in significant requirements for 
decontamination, medical treatment and monitoring, and crisis counseling. 
 
L. Explosives Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Devices 
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
Charleston, Greenville, Horry, Lexington, Pickens, Richland, 
Spartanburg, Sumter 
 
 b. High 
 
Anderson, Darlington, Florence, Orangeburg, York 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
Aiken, Beaufort, Berkeley, Cherokee, Chester, Chesterfield, Colleton, 
Dorchester, Georgetown, Greenwood, Kershaw, Lancaster, Laurens, 
McCormick, Newberry, Oconee, Williamsburg 
 
 d. Limited 
 
Abbeville, Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Calhoun, Clarendon, 
Dillon, Edgefield, Fairfield, Hampton, Jasper, Lee, Marion, 
Marlboro, Saluda, Union 
 
 e. Low 
 
None 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
It is estimated that incidents involving Improvised Explosive Devices would 
be in locations of higher population density or revenue-generating tourist 
destinations.  South Carolina’s population density is concentrated in 
Charleston, Greenville/Spartanburg, Richland/Lexington, and the major 
tourist destinations include the state’s coastal counties. 
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
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Improvised Explosive Devices have been used in other states by disaffected 
individuals (Atlanta Olympics bombing; Oklahoma City courthouse bomb; 
Oklahoma University backpack bomb); although there have been sporadic 
reports of pipe bombs or Improvised Explosive Devices targeting individuals 
(see, e.g., Payne v State, 355 S.C. 642 (S.C., 2003); State v. Locklair, 341 
S.C. 352, 535 S.E.2d 420 (S.C., 2000); State v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 105, 326 
S.E.2d 132 (S.C., 1985)) to date there has not been any use of an Improvised 
Explosive Device which appears to have been motivated by politics or 
terrorism in South Carolina. 
 
4. Severity 
 
The consequences of a bomb or Improvised Explosive Device range from 
damage limited to a few meters (grenade or satchel bomb) to devastation of a 
large area using a truck bomb (Oklahoma City, Khobar Towers), depending 
on the quantity and type of explosive, the skill of the bomb maker, and 
placement of the device(s).  Casualties numbering in the hundreds would tax 
emergency medical and trauma capabilities for the first few days.  An event 
of this type would not be expected to give rise to a delayed or continuing 
patient load. 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
 
As discussed earlier, there are no reported events using Improvised Explosive 
Devices in South Carolina that appear to have been motivated by politics or 
terrorism.  However, the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, and the 
well-documented 1995 truck bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma demonstrate the potential impact of such devices. 
 
M. Biological Attack – Food Contamination  
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
None 
 
 b. High 
 
Abbeville, Aiken, Allendale, Anderson, Bamberg, Barnwell, 
Beaufort, Berkeley, Calhoun, Charleston, Cherokee, Chester, 
Chesterfield, Clarendon, Colleton, Darlington, Dillon, Dorchester, 
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Edgefield, Fairfield, Florence, Georgetown, Greenville, Greenwood, 
Hampton, Horry, Jasper, Kershaw, Lancaster, Laurens, Lee, 
Lexington, Marion, Marlboro, McCormick, Newberry, Oconee, 
Orangeburg, Pickens, Richland, Saluda, Spartanburg, Sumter, Union, 
Williamsburg, York 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
None 
 
 d. Limited 
 
None 
 
 e. Low 
 
None 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
South Carolina has a number of wholesale food preparation facilities.  
Approximately 975 facilities in the state prepare pre-packaged foods:  86 
state-inspected meat packing plants, 13 state-inspected poultry packing 
plants, 5 custom meat packing plants, 9 dairies, and 4 frozen dairy product 
plants.  In addition, there are a number of schools, colleges, and convention 
venues at which prepare and serve large numbers of meals on a daily basis.   
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
There are no known instances in South Carolina of food contamination using 
a biological agent.  There are no known instances of deliberate contamination 
with E. coli, hepatitis, salmonella, or other naturally occurring pathogens, 
although there have been some outbreaks determined to be caused by failure 
to follow routine food-protection precautions. 
 
4. Severity 
 
Deliberate adulteration of meat or poultry could be expected to infect 
hundreds to thousands of individuals in South Carolina and neighboring 
states. 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
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A recent food-borne outbreak of salmonella, probably from improperly 
prepared turkey, caused approximately 50 illnesses and one death.  There are 
no known instances of deliberate food contamination. 
 
N. Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth Disease)  
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
Aiken, Anderson, Lexington, Newberry, Orangeburg, Spartanburg, 
York 
 
 b. High 
 
Abbeville, Chester, Chesterfield, Greenville, Greenwood, Horry, 
Kershaw, Lancaster, Laurens, Oconee, Saluda 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Berkeley, Calhoun, Charleston, 
Cherokee, Clarendon, Colleton, Darlington, Dorchester, Edgefield, 
Fairfield, Florence, Hampton, Lee, Marion, Marlboro, McCormick, 
Pickens, Richland, Sumter, Union, Williamsburg 
 
 d. Limited 
 
Beaufort, Dillon, Georgetown, Jasper 
 
 e. Low 
 
None 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
South Carolina is home to numerous beef and swine farms as well as 
significant numbers of turkey farms and chicken farms for broiler and egg 
production.  South Carolina also has some dairy farm activity, particularly in 
Orangeburg and Newberry counties.  The state also receives swine from 
bordering states for processing and shipment to distributors. 
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3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
The last outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in the United States was in 
1929.  The disease occurs regularly in some countries in Africa, the Middle 
East, and South America.  The US Department of Agriculture uses many 
controls and procedures to reduce the probability that the disease will spread 
back into the United States. 
 
4. Severity 
 
The severity of Foot and Mouth Disease in terms of public health is related to 
the secondary effects of disease control measures and economic impact.  Foot 
and Mouth Disease does not directly affect food safety and it is not a disease 
that causes human illness.  The quarantine measures and disposal of infected 
animals have been shown to have mental health ramifications for farmers and 
animal disease control professionals.  Additionally, there would be public 
health issues stemming from any outbreak that would cause significant 
economic loss.  Health care availability would be reduced, as well as the 
affordability of vital items such as medications, including maintenance 
medications for high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and many more serious 
chronic diseases. 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
 
From February 20th to October 19th of 2001, 3,915,000 animals were 
slaughtered in the United Kingdom in efforts to stop the spread of the 
disease. The economic and public health impact have been significant. 
 
O. Cyber Attack  
 
1. Vulnerabilities by County 
 
 a. Severe 
 
None 
 
 b. High 
 
Abbeville, Aiken, Allendale, Anderson, Bamberg, Barnwell, 
Beaufort, Berkeley, Calhoun, Charleston, Cherokee, Chester, 
Chesterfield, Clarendon, Colleton, Darlington, Dillon, Dorchester, 
Edgefield, Fairfield, Florence, Georgetown, Greenville, Greenwood, 
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Hampton, Horry, Jasper, Kershaw, Lancaster, Laurens, Lee, 
Lexington, Marion, Marlboro, McCormick, Newberry, Oconee, 
Orangeburg, Pickens, Richland, Saluda, Spartanburg, Sumter, Union, 
Williamsburg, York 
 
 c. Moderate 
 
None 
 
 d. Limited 
 
None 
 
 e. Low 
 
None 
 
2. Background and Local Conditions 
 
South Carolina’s public health system is vulnerable to cyber attack a number 
of different ways.  The hospital system, clinics, and other providers are all 
supported by intricate computing architecture that allows for patient record 
information, insurance coverage, and payment for services.  The South 
Carolina emergency management and emergency communications 
infrastructure are all supported by computer systems including internet-based 
information sharing among hospitals. 
 
3. Historic Frequency and Probability of Occurrence 
 
The historic frequency and probability of occurrence for cyber attack are 
moderate to high. 
 
4. Severity 
 
Internet-based systems for communications are our primary means of 
communication for certain processes.  Disruption by way of cyber attack 
would have a negative impact on the speed and efficiency of public health 
activities in an emergency.  Simple systems such as power supply or patient 
bed telemetry, as well as numerous others, could be disrupted by a cyber 
attack and would have severe implications on public health infrastructure. 
 
5. Historic Losses and Impacts 
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Various cyber attacks have been documented.  There is no readily available 
data on the impact of documented cyber attacks. 
 
III. PRIORITY OF HAZARD BASED ON POTENTIAL IMPACT TO HUMAN HEALTH 
 
1: Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza 
2: Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake 
3: Nuclear Detonation – 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device  
4: Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane 
5: Biological Attack – Pneumonic Plague 
6: Chemical Attack – Blister Agent 
7: Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent 
8: Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
9: Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion 
10: Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax 
11: Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices 
12: Explosives Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Devices 
13: Biological Attack – Food Contamination  
14: Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth Disease)  
15: Cyber Attack 
 
IV. PUBLIC HEALTH COURSES OF ACTION 
 
A. South Carolina’s Emergency Operations Plan outlines the courses of action followed 
by the state in response to a disaster.  The base document takes an all-hazards 
planning approach and is built on an Emergency Support Function structure.  The 
document complements the National Response Plan and integrates the National 
Incident Management Structure and Incident Command System into South 
Carolina’s emergency operations.  Specific impact hazards to the state are addressed 
in the plan and its appendices.  They include: 
 
  Appendix 1:  South Carolina Hurricane Plan 
  Appendix 2:  SC Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan 
  Appendix 3:  South Carolina Earthquake Plan 
  Appendix 4:  South Carolina Terrorism Operations Plan 
  Appendix 5:  South Carolina Mass Casualty Plan 
  Appendix 6:  South Carolina Recovery Plan 
 
B. As part of the base Emergency Operations Plan, Annex 8 (Health and Medical) 
outlines the majority of the public health courses of action in the broad categories of: 
 medical care; public health and sanitation, crisis counseling (behavioral health); and 
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deceased identification and mortuary services.  Annex 25H (Mass Casualty Plan) 
includes public health courses of action for disease control and public health 
authority, mass immunization, Strategic National Stockpile operations, and pandemic 
influenza response.  Other courses of action are identified throughout the Emergency 
Operations Plan where the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control is a supporting agency to a particular Emergency Support Function.  Each of 
the specific impact hazard plans also addresses the Health and Medical Emergency 
Support Function and its courses of action. 
 
C. Additional detailed information regarding specific public health courses of action 
that address the hazards identified in this document will be further developed. 
 
V. REFERENCES 
 
A. National Planning Scenarios version 20.2 April 2005 Draft 
 
B. State of South Carolina Hazards Assessment 2005 (Cutter et al. 2006) 
 
C. South Carolina Atlas of Environmental Risks and Hazards (Cutter et al. 1999)  
 
ANNEX 1 
STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is a federally owned and managed 
stockpile of pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical supplies, equipment and other 
items established by Congress to augment local supplies of these critical medical 
items in the event of their depletion due to an attack on the United States using 
weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological or explosive) or a 
major natural or technological disaster.  This plan provides for the request, 
receipt, staging, storage, repackaging, distribution, dispensing, and retrieval and 
return of any unused assets of this stockpile. 
 
II. MISSION 
 
The mission of the Strategic National Stockpile is to rapidly and safely provide 
pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical supplies and equipment in a rapid and safe 
manner to a community in South Carolina in the event that local capacities are 
exceeded due to a weapon of mass destruction or a major natural or technological 
disaster. 
 
III. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
A. Situation: 
 
An attack has occurred in South Carolina involving a weapon of mass 
destruction or a major natural or technological disaster has occurred.  The 
capacity of South Carolina’s local and state assets to meet the demand for 
pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical supplies, or other related equipment 
has been exceeded. 
 
B. Assumptions: 
 
1. The State Emergency Operations Plan will be activated. 
 
2. The State Emergency Operations Center will be activated at 
Operating Condition 1 (OPCON 1). 
 
3. The Governor will declare a State of Emergency and invoke the 
South Carolina Emergency Health Powers Act. 
 
4. The South Carolina Emergency Management Division will activate  
the Statewide Mutual Aid Agreement and the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact. 
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5. The arrival of the Strategic National Stockpile materials to the 
local Health Regions will not occur until 24 to 36 hours after the 
federal decision to deploy. 
 
IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
 
A. The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control is 
responsible for developing, coordinating and maintaining procedures to 
support Strategic National Stockpile operations in South Carolina in 
conjunction with ESF-8 (Health and Medical Services) and South Carolina 
Emergency Management Division.  The South Carolina Department of 
Health and Environmental Control is responsible for the coordination of 
all Strategic National Stockpile administrative, management, planning, 
training, preparedness/mitigation, response, and recovery activities in 
South Carolina to include developing, coordinating, and maintaining the 
Strategic National Stockpile Standard Operating Procedures. 
 
B. Activation 
 
1. Requesting the Strategic National Stockpile 
 
The decision to deploy the Strategic National Stockpile will be a 
collaborative effort between local, state, and federal officials.  
After the recognition of a potential or actual Weapons of Mass 
Destruction event or a major natural or technological disaster that 
may or will exceed local medical supplies, the local Health 
Department along with the Region Health Director will contact the 
Office of Public Health Preparedness Director of Emergency 
Management. The Governor, the South Carolina Emergency 
Management Director, and the Commissioner of the Department of 
Health and Environmental Control will meet to determine if the 
Strategic National Stockpile should be requested.  If required, the 
Commissioner of the Department of Health and Environmental 
Control, with the consent of the governor, will submit a formal 
request to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for the 
deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile in South Carolina. 
 
  2. Consultation 
 
Once the Department of Health and Environmental Control 
Commissioner, or designee, has requested the Strategic National 
Stockpile, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
Director will initiate a conference call to the Commissioner of the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control and other 
Federal, state and local officials to determine if an event threatens 
the public’s health and if the state has the capacity and adequate 
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resources to respond. If the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention Director decide that the event threatens the public’s 
health and that the on-site capacity and resources have or will be 
strained or exhausted a request will be made for a copy of the SC 
Strategic National Stockpile Plan.  Upon receipt of the SC 
Strategic National Stockpile Plan, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention Director will order the deployment of the Strategic 
National Stockpile “12-Hour Push Package” to the SC Strategic 
National Stockpile Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) Center 
as designated by the Commissioner of the Department of Health 
and Environmental Control. 
 
C. Local Response 
 
1. In conjunction with the Region Health Director, county emergency 
management officials will determine if local medical supplies will 
be exhausted, and if federal assets in the form of the Strategic 
National Stockpile will be needed to manage the Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), or major natural or technological event.  The 
Region Health Director, after consultation with the county 
emergency management officials, will request the initial Strategic 
National Stockpile “12-Hour Push Package” and any additional 
specific Strategic National Stockpile assets that are needed to 
ensure a continual supply of medications and medical supplies to 
manage casualties, until the event has reached the point that the 
operation may be scaled down.  The Health Regions will 
coordinate with county governments to provide Emergency 
Medical Technicians and security at local Dispensing Sites and 
security at Region Distribution Centers. 
 
2. The Health Regions will coordinate with county emergency 
management officials, to report to ESF-8 (Health and Medical 
Services) at the state emergency operations center, the number of 
people treated, given prophylactic medication and sent home, the 
number of people treated and transferred to hospitals or other 
treatment centers, and the number of people given prophylactic 
medication and sent home. The projected number of people still 
requiring treatment is to be reported also.  These numbers will be 
reported on a regular basis determined by the particular incident.  
In conjunction with the Health Regions, the county will maintain 
and provide lists of county medical resources.  
 
3. The Public Health Region personnel assess the situation (both pre- 
and post-event), and in coordination with local emergency 
management officials, develop strategies to respond to the 
emergency. In coordination with The Office of Public Health 
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Preparedness and the Strategic National Stockpile Pharmacist, the 
Health Region personnel request assets from the Strategic National 
Stockpile as described in the “Requesting the Strategic National 
Stockpile” section above. 
 
4. The Health Region Strategic National Stockpile plan identifies 
adequate public mass dispensing sites to prophylax the entire 
population.  The Region Health Director (or designee) will insure 
that symptomatic individuals are directed and/or transferred to 
treatment facilities, guidelines are followed to determine whether 
an individual needs prophylactic drugs, individuals are counseled 
on the threat/risk of the drug, potential contraindications in 
individuals are identified, guidelines for correct dosage based on 
age and weight are provided, proper documentation is maintained 
identifying individual that is receiving the drug, lot number, 
expiration date, and amount of drug received, and that the 
individuals who receive a drug are properly counseled on how the 
drug is to be taken, duration of treatment and expected side effects. 
The Region Health Director (or designee) will be the lead official 
at the local Dispensing Site. The Region Strategic National 
Stockpile plan will also provide for on-site security and traffic 
control at the Dispensing Sites. 
 
D. Receipt 
 
Upon receiving notification of the deployment of the Strategic National 
Stockpile by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control will request the 
following resources to support this plan through the State Emergency 
Operations Center (SEOC): warehouse management and inventory 
tracking, on-site security, transportation and security during transport, and 
communication. The Commissioner of the Department of Health and 
Environmental Control has predetermined a Strategic National Stockpile 
Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) Center for the receipt of all 
Strategic National Stockpile assets. When the Strategic National Stockpile 
“12- Hour Push-Package” arrives at the Receiving, Staging and Storage 
(RSS) Center, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention liaison for 
the Strategic National Stockpile will immediately transfer custody of the 
Strategic National Stockpile to the State of South Carolina. The SC 
Strategic National Stockpile Pharmacist or designee is designated by the 
Commissioner of the Department of Health and Environmental Control to 
officially accept the custody of the Strategic National Stockpile from the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for the State of South Carolina 
at the Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) Center. 
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E. Staging 
 
Once custody of the assets have been signed for by the South Carolina 
Strategic National Stockpile Pharmacist or designee and transferred to the 
State of South Carolina at the Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) 
Center, these assets will be off loaded and staged. Strategic National 
Stockpile shipping containers will be arranged in a color-coded schematic 
by product type and container number. 
 
F. Distribution 
 
1. While the Strategic National Stockpile assets are being staged at 
the state Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) Center, the Region 
Health Director or designee in conjunction with local emergency 
management officials will request the supplies that are needed to 
replenish exhausted local inventories.  The intravenous medicines, 
IV administration supplies, fluids, life support medicines airway 
equipment, antidotes and symptomatic treatment material for 
casualties; and medical or surgical items for treating casualties 
from a WMD event will be transported from the Receiving, 
Staging and Storage (RSS) Center to treatment facilities within 
each region that have been identified in the health region Strategic 
National Stockpile plan. In the event the treatment center cannot 
accept the materials, the medical supplies will be delivered to the 
Region Distribution Center.  All control substances will be 
transferred to treatment centers that are properly registered to 
accept these substances by the federal Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA).  Post exposure prophylaxis packages will be delivered to 
pre-identified Region Distribution Centers once the numbers of 
regimens needed is requested.  The Region Distribution Center will 
distribute these regimens to the identified first responder site and to 
the mass public dispensing sites for distribution to the general 
public. 
 
2. The Region Distribution centers will meet the same specifications 
as the Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) Center and will serve 
as alternate Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) Center sites.  
These distribution centers are located in each Health Region.  The 
Health Region Strategic National Stockpile plan will provide for 
necessary support to off load the shipment, manage and track the 
inventory, on-site security; and transportation and transportation 
security of medical supplies to the predetermined receiving 
hospital or to the predetermined dispensing site. The Region 
Health Director (or designee) will be the lead official at the Region 
Distribution site.   
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G. Continuation of Supplies 
 
While the initial Centers for Disease Control and Prevention “12-Hour 
Push Package” is being distributed from the Region Distribution Center, 
the Region Health Director in conjunction with local/county emergency 
management officials will determine if additional supplies of specific 
items are needed.  These items are requested from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention and are supplied through the Vendor Managed 
Inventory (VMI).  The Vendor Managed Inventory pharmaceuticals, 
vaccines, medical supplies, equipment and other items may arrive in bulk 
or repackaged regimens and may be shipped directly to a Region 
Distribution Center or to the Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) Center 
site.  In an event when the causative factors have been identified, the 
Region Health Director in conjunction with local/county emergency 
management officials and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Director can determine the specific supplies that are needed, the first 
shipment received may be from the Vendor Managed Inventory and not 
from the multi-hazard “12-Hour Push Package.”  The Region Distribution 
Centers will report continually to the Receiving, Staging and Storage 
(RSS) Center the number and type of prophylactic regimens dispensed, the 
number and types of Strategic National Stockpile assets transferred to the 
treatment centers and the projected number of additional assets that will be 
needed.  The frequency of these reports will be determined by the specific 
incident. 
 
H. Dispensing Sites 
 
The Health Region Strategic National Stockpile plan will be developed by 
the Region Health Director in conjunction with local and county 
emergency management agencies. Each Health Region Strategic National 
Stockpile plan will identify adequate public mass dispensing sites to 
prophylax the entire population.  The Region Health Director (or 
designee) will insure that symptomatic individuals are directed and/or 
transferred to treatment facilities, guidelines are followed to determine 
whether an individual needs prophylactic drugs, individuals are counseled 
on the threat/risk of the drug, potential contraindications in individuals are 
identified, guidelines for correct dosage based on age and weight are 
provided, proper documentation is maintained identifying individual that 
is receiving the drug, lot number, expiration date, and amount of drug 
received, and that the individuals who receive a drug are properly 
counseled on how the drug is to be taken, duration of treatment and 
expected side effects. The Region Health Director (or designee) will be the 
lead official at the local Dispensing Site. The Health Region Strategic 
National Stockpile plan will also provide for on-site security and traffic 
control at the Dispensing Sites. 
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I. Retrieval 
 
All unused assets of the Strategic National Stockpile program remain the 
property of the Strategic National Stockpile program.  These unused 
supplies must be returned to the Region Distribution Centers by the local 
Dispensing Sites and hospitals for return to the Receiving, Staging and 
Storage (RSS) Center to be inventoried and returned to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention.   
 
J. Communication 
 
The communications function ensures the timely flow of information used 
in the decision making process as well as in operational effectiveness.  
The communications function involves three distinct areas: healthcare 
communication, logistical communication and available communication 
modalities. 
 
 K. Security and Transport 
 
The security and transport functions will be coordinated through the State 
Emergency Operations Center Operations Group.  Security will be 
provided for all personnel, material, and equipment involved in the 
management and distribution of the Strategic National Stockpile.  Security 
to be provided includes but is not limited to access in and out of the 
Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) Center facility, security within the 
Receiving, Staging and Storage facility; and traffic control within and to 
and from the Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) Center facility.  The 
South Carolina Air and/or Army National Guards have been tasked with 
providing security for the Strategic National Stockpile at the Receiving 
Staging and Storage site. The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division 
has been tasked with providing security in transport to the Receiving, 
Staging and Storage (RSS) Center site and from the Receiving, Staging 
and Storage (RSS) Center site to the Region Distribution Center and with 
coordinating security with local law enforcement at the Region 
Distribution Center. If repackaging is necessary prior to distribution from 
the Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) Center site, SLED will provide 
security in transport from the Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) 
Center site to the re-packager and back to the Receiving, Staging and 
Storage (RSS) Center site.  The Department of Health and Environmental 
Control Drug Control Pharmacists are tasked with providing security and 
transportation of any controlled substances. 
 
L. Repackaging 
 
In the event that the prophylactic medication required to treat the biologic 
agent is not available in the unit of use packaging in the 12-Hour push 
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package or the state receives bulk medication from the Vendor Managed 
Inventory (VMI), the bulk medication will be repackaged into unit of use 
containers by an off-site re-packager prior to distribution from the 
Receiving, Staging and Storage (RSS) Center site. 
 
V.  RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
 A. Department of Health and Environmental Control 
 
1. Develop, coordinate and maintain a written plan to implement the 
Strategic National Stockpile operations in South Carolina. 
 
2. Develop and maintain mutual support relationships with other 
governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and other private services that may assist during a 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), natural or technological 
disaster. 
 
3. Identify, coordinate and credential personnel necessary to deploy 
the Strategic National Stockpile. 
 
4. Identify and establish locations for Receiving, repackaging, 
staging, distributing and dispensing the Strategic National 
Stockpile assets. 
 
5. Identify and coordinate with other health care providers other 
sources of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment/supplies. 
 
6. Develop and maintain dosing and dispensing guidelines and 
procedures for the prophylactic drugs contained in the Strategic 
National Stockpile. 
 
7. Assure that Department of Health and Environmental Control 
Health Regions develop Strategic National Stockpile plans for the 
management and distribution of the medical supplies and 
medications in the Strategic National Stockpile “12-Hour Push 
Package” and the Vendor Managed Inventory.  
 
8. Identify, train, and assign Department of Health and 
Environmental Control personnel to implement Strategic National 
Stockpile plan. 
 
9. Notify all Strategic National Stockpile supporting agencies upon 
implementation of the Strategic National Stockpile plan. 
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10. Develop mutual support relationships with professional 
associations and other private services and volunteer organizations 
that may assist during emergencies or disasters. 
 
11. Coordinate and direct the activation and deployment of state 
agencies, volunteer health/medical personnel, supplies, equipment 
and provide certain direct resources under the control of the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control. 
 
12. Develop and conduct drills and exercises to coordinate emergency 
medical care in disaster situations requiring Strategic National 
Stockpile assets. 
 
13. Assure that the procedure described in section IV.E is in place for 
requesting the Strategic National Stockpile “12-Hour Push 
Package” and “Vendor Managed Inventory” from the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. 
 
14. Coordinate requesting and consultation phases of the Strategic 
National Stockpile with the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention.  
 
15. Insure that required information is available for the consultation 
phase with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. This 
information includes but is not limited to the following: current or 
projected casualties, projected needs based on population, presence 
of an Strategic National Stockpile plan, hospital capacities at the 
time of the event including Intensive Care Unit beds and 
ventilators; other state/local resources such as pharmacy 
distributors, oxygen suppliers, nearby hospital and alternate care 
sites, other stockpiles of pharmaceuticals; and a plan to receive, 
repackage prophylactic oral antibiotics.   
 
16. Coordinate need for initiating any waiver of rules and regulations 
regarding licensed professional personnel or dispensing outlets. 
 
17. Accept custody of the Strategic National Stockpile assets from the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
 
18. Insure all state and federal documentation available and in order to 
accept and distribute the Strategic National Stockpile and that such 
documentation complies with state and federal pharmacy and drug 
control regulations. 
 
19. Maintain lists of points of contact with all agencies and 
organizations involved with the warehouse management, inventory 
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control, on-site security, transport, transport security, distribution, 
dispensing, retrieval and return to Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention of Strategic National Stockpile assets.   
 
20. Provide all inventory control records and distribution records of 
Strategic National Stockpile assets as required by Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. 
 
21. Maintain all expense records associated with deployment of the 
Strategic National Stockpile for possible reimbursement. 
 
22. Assess the situation and determine if a potential or actual WMD 
event or a major natural or technological disaster may exceed local 
medical supplies. 
 
23. Facilitate the collaboration of state and local officials to determine  
 whether to request federal assistance. 
 
24. The Strategic National Stockpile is requested by the Department of 
Health and Environmental Control Commissioner with the consent 
of the Governor, when it is determined by state and local officials 
that Federal assets are required. 
 
25. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Director upon 
receiving the request for the Strategic National Stockpile will 
initiate a conference call to the Department of Health and 
Environmental Control Commissioner and other Federal, State and 
local officials to determine if an event threatens the public health 
and exceeds or strains the local capacity to respond. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention Director will request a copy of the 
South Carolina Strategic National Stockpile Plan. Upon receipt of 
the South Carolina Strategic National Stockpile Plan, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention Director will order the 
deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile. 
 
26. Request deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile. 
 
27. Notify the Department of Health and Environmental Control 
Region Health Directors of the deployment of the Strategic 
National Stockpile to the SC Receiving, Staging and Storage site 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and request the 
implementation of the Region Strategic National Stockpile plan(s). 
 
28. Notify SEOC of the deployment of Strategic National Stockpile by 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to the South 
Carolina Receiving, Staging and Storage site. 
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29. Notify Receiving, Staging and Storage location of expected arrival 
of the Strategic National Stockpile. 
 
30. Notify and coordinate the agencies and organizations involved in 
the staging of the Strategic National Stockpile. 
 
31. Notify and coordinate the agencies and organizations involved in 
the support of the individuals involved in the staging of the 
Strategic National Stockpile. 
 
32. Notify and coordinate the agencies and organizations involved in 
the transport of the Strategic National Stockpile.  
 
33. Notify Region Distribution Centers and/or Region Directors of the 
arrival of the Strategic National Stockpile at the South Carolina 
Receiving, Staging and Storage warehouse. Notify the Region 
Distribution Centers and/or Region Directors of the deployment of 
the Strategic National Stockpile to the Region Distribution Center. 
Insure that Region Dispensing sites are notified of the deployment 
by the Department of Health and Environmental Control Region 
Director. 
 
34. Coordinate with ESF-1 (Transportation Services) transport of 
Strategic National Stockpile assets to the Region Distribution 
Center(s) for distribution to the local Dispensing Site or designated 
hospital. 
 
35. Coordinate with Department of Health and Environmental Control 
Health Regions distribution of Strategic National Stockpile 
supplies to designated hospitals. 
 
36. Coordinate with Department of Health and Environmental Control 
Health Regions dispensing of Strategic National Stockpile 
prophylactic antibiotic regimens to the general public. 
 
37. Coordinate with ESF-13 (Law Enforcement Services) and ESF-16 
(Emergency Traffic Management) security for Strategic National 
Stockpile assets in transport to the Receiving, Staging and Storage 
site, from the Receiving, Staging and Storage site to the Regions 
Distribution Centers, designated hospitals, and repackaging facility 
and back to Receiving, Staging and Storage site. 
 
38. Provide transport and security of control substances to designated 
treatment centers and provide for the transfer of these control 
substances to treatment centers that are properly registered to 
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accept these substances by the federal Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA).   
 
39. Determine the need for additional medical supplies in conjunction 
with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control Regions Health Director and the county/local emergency 
management officials. 
 
  40. Provide transport of bulk pharmaceuticals to repackaging facilities. 
 
41. Request additional supplies of specific items through the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention Vendor Managed inventory 
portion of the Strategic National Stockpile program. 
 
42. Coordinate with the Department of Health and Environmental 
Control Health Regions follow up of individuals receiving 
prophylaxis to insure completion of therapy in individuals actually 
exposed to the biologic agent. 
 
43. Coordinate retrieval of all unused assets of the Strategic National 
Stockpile program from the distribution and dispensing sites to the 
Receiving, Staging and Storage site. 
 
44. Coordinate with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the 
return of all unused Strategic National Stockpile assets from 
Receiving, Staging and Storage to the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention.       
 
  45. Support, plan and implement mitigation measures. 
 
46. Support requests and directives resulting from the Governor and/or 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention concerning mitigation 
and/or re-development activities. 
 
47. Document matters that may be needed for inclusion in agency or 
state/federal briefings, situation reports and action plans.                                      
 
B. Office of the Governor 
 
1. Coordinate with the Department of Health and Environmental 
Control Commissioner, South Carolina Emergency Management 
Division Director, the Department of Health and Environmental 
Control Deputy Director of Health Services, the Department of 
Health and Environmental Control Region Health Director and the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control Director of 
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Public Health Preparedness requesting the Strategic National 
Stockpile. 
 
2. Authorize the Department of Health and Environmental Control 
Commissioner to request the Strategic National Stockpile. 
 
3. Declare a State of Emergency and invoke the South Carolina 
Emergency Health Powers Act. 
 
 C. Office of the Adjutant General 
 
1. South Carolina National Guard  
 
a. Identify, train, and assign South Carolina National Guard 
personnel to maintain contact with and prepare to execute 
missions in support of Strategic National Stockpile during 
periods of activation. 
 
b. Provide on-site security at the Receiving, Staging and 
Storage site for the Strategic National Stockpile. 
 
c. Provide personnel to perform security at the Receiving, 
Staging and Storage site for the Strategic National 
Stockpile. 
 
d. Provide warehouse facilities to receive, stage, and store the 
Strategic National Stockpile. 
 
e. Provide personnel to assist with the receipt, staging and 
storage of the Strategic National Stockpile at the Receiving, 
Staging and Storage site. 
 
  f. Provide backup transportation for the Strategic National  
     Stockpile to the Region Distribution Sites. 
   
2. SC Emergency Management Division 
 
a. The Director will confer with the Governor and the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control 
Commissioner to determine to request the Strategic 
National Stockpile. 
 
b. The Director will participate in the consultation phase of 
the Strategic National Stockpile with the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. 
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c.  Liaison with the federal Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention Strategic National Stockpile Technical 
Advisory Response Unit (TARU) member at ESF-8  
(Health and Medical Services) at the SEOC. 
 
D.      Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, Division of Professional  
and Occupational Licensing: 
 
1. Assist with temporary licensing of health care workers, or drug 
dispensing outlets if needed. 
 
2. Review and approve mass drug dispensing site procedures. 
 
E. South Carolina Commission on Higher Education 
 
1. University of South Carolina School of Pharmacy:  Provide 
pharmacy students to assist in the repackaging of bulk quantity 
antibiotics into individual patient regimens.   
 
2. Medical University of South Carolina School of Pharmacy: 
Provide pharmacy students to assist in the repackaging of bulk 
antibiotics into individual patient regimens.   
 
F. South Carolina Hospital Association: Identify hospitals to receive 
Strategic National Stockpile supplies when local capacities are exceeded.  
Identify hospitals to participate in regional planning to determine local 
capacities for response prior to the arrival of the Strategic National 
Stockpile. 
 
G. South Carolina Medical Association:  Assist with recruitment of 
physicians for Strategic National Stockpile at dispensing site operations.  
These physicians will assist in determining appropriate treatment in 
presenting individuals. 
 
 H. South Carolina Pharmacy Association 
 
1. Assist with recruitment and training of pharmacists for Strategic 
National Stockpile operations. 
 
2. Act as a warehouse or clearinghouse for pharmaceuticals other 
than Strategic National Stockpile assets. 
 
I. South Carolina Nursing Association:  Assist with recruitment of nurses for 
Strategic National Stockpile dispensing site operations. 
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J. South Carolina Department of Commerce, Aeronautics Division: Provide 
contingency warehouse space for storage of Strategic National Stockpile 
assets. 
 
K. South Carolina Baptist Convention: Provide meals and snacks and 
personnel to distribute those meals/snacks for workers staffing the 
Receiving Staging and Storage Center. 
 
L. SC Department of Education: Provide dispensing sites for prophylactic 
drug distribution to the general public in a biologic exposure. 
 
            M.      American Red Cross: Provide snacks and beverages at dispensing sites. 
 
N. South Carolina Law Enforcement Division:  
 
1. Provide security in transport and escort during transport to the 
Receiving Staging and Storage site. 
 
2. Provide security in transport and escort during transport to the 
Region Distribution Center. Coordinate security at the Region 
Distribution Site with local law enforcement. 
 
3. Provide security in transport to the repackaging facility and back to 
the Receiving Staging and Storage site. 
 
O. South Carolina Department of Transportation: 
 
1. Provide transportation of the Strategic National Stockpile materials 
to the Region Distribution Center. 
 
2. Provide transportation of the Strategic National Stockpile materials 
to the designated treatment centers. 
 
3. Provide transportation of Strategic National Stockpile materials to 
the repackaging facility and back to the Receiving Staging and 
Storage site. 
 
P. Budget and Control Board:  
 
1. Provide additional telecommunications devices if needed for 
Strategic National Stockpile operations. 
 
2. Provide for additional phone lines at the Receiving Staging and 
Storage site. 
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Q. Veteran’s Administration Consolidated Mail Order Pharmacy:  Provide 
repackaging of bulk pharmaceuticals into 10-day unit of dispensing 
packages. 
 
R. Fort Jackson Moncrief Community Hospital: Provide repackaging of bulk 
pharmaceuticals into 10-day unit of dispensing packages 
 
VI. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
 
A. This plan has no direct counterpart in the National Response Plan.  
 
B. The formation of this plan is required for receipt of the Strategic National 
Stockpile by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention under Title 
V, Emergency Preparedness and Response, section 502 of the “Homeland 
Security Act of 2002.” 
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Under 42 USC 300hh-12(c), no federal agency shall disclose under section 552, United States Code, any 
information identifying the location at which Strategic National Stockpile Program materials are stored.  To 
the extent permitted by law, the parties agree that neither will disclose the nature of this effort and the terms 
of this agreement to any person or entity, except as may be necessary to fulfill its mission and statutory and 
regulatory responsibilities. The parties agree to notify one another before releasing materials or information 
relating to CHEMPACK or the CHEMPACK program Standard Operating Procedures pursuant to federal or 
state freedom of information act statutes or similar provisions in law.   
ATTACHMENT A, ANNEX 1 - CHEMPACK  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, on behalf of the Department of 
Homeland Security have established a program to pre-position sustainable 
repositories of nerve agent antidotes and other necessary and certain supporting 
equipment to care for individuals exposed to nerve agents.  The CHEMPACK 
program is part of the Strategic National Stockpile program.  The CHEMPACK is 
a pre-positioned stockpile of nerve agent antidote and equipment to augment local 
supplies of these critical medical items in the event of their depletion due to a 
nerve agent attack on the United States.  Federal resources, including stocks of 
nerve agent antidotes would not be available in a sufficient amount of time 
thorough standard Strategic National Stockpile operations.  This plan provides for 
the storage, surveillance, distribution, retrieval and return of any unused assets of 
this pre-positioned asset. 
 
II. MISSION 
 
This plan provides the procedures for maintenance and distribution of a cache of 
pre-positioned, sustainable repositories of nerve agent antidotes within the State 
of South Carolina. 
 
III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
 
A. CHEMPACK operations in South Carolina will consist of four phases:  
placement of assets, surveillance of the secure storage and maintenance of 
assets, use of assets, and replenishment of assets. 
 
B. Placement of assets involves establishment and modification of storage 
facilities to accommodate the requirements of the CHEMPACK program, 
specifically supporting the shelf life extension program.  The locations 
where CHEMPACK assets are stored will be referred to as CHEMPACK 
cache facilities and the responsible parties at the cache facilities will be 
referred to as CHEMPACK cache custodians.  Additional details 
regarding the cache facilities and cache custodians are available in the 
Standard Operating Procedures. 
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C. Surveillance of the secure storage and maintenance of assets includes 
incorporation of appropriate security measures for controlled drug storage, 
maintenance of proper climate control and tamper detection for 
compliance with the shelf life extension program.  CHEMPACK assets are 
stored in cache locations throughout the state; however, they remain the 
property of the Federal Government at all times.   
 
D. Use of assets would be authorized by designated state officers as outlined 
in the CHEMPACK Standard Operating Procedures for the State of South 
Carolina when an accidental or intentional nerve agent release has 
threatened the medical security of the community; has put multiple lives at 
risk; is beyond the local emergency response capabilities; and the 
CHEMPACK material is medically necessary to save lives.  The 
CHEMPACK drugs are useful in the treatment of certain other chemical 
exposures, such as organophosphate or insecticide poisoning, and may be 
used in response to release of those chemicals as well.  County Emergency 
Management Agencies can coordinate for CHEMPACK assets through 
Regional Offices of the Department of Health and Environmental Control.   
 
E. Replenishment of assets would occur after CHEMPACK material has 
been used in accordance with federal guidelines or after CHEMPACK 
material has exceeded the shelf life limitations provided for in the shelf 
life extension program.  Assets will be replenished through the Strategic 
National Stockpile’s Vendor Managed Inventory. 
 
IV.  RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
 A. Department of Health and Environmental Control 
  
1. Authorize breaking the CHEMPACK container seal and use the 
packaged products when designated state officers, employees and 
agents determine that an accidental or intentional nerve agent 
release has threatened the medical security of the community; has 
put multiple lives at a risk; is beyond local emergency response 
capabilities; and the materiel is medically necessary to save lives. 
 
2. Designate a single person to be the statewide point of contact for 
CHEMPACK.   
 
3. Designate an alternate point of contact to backup the State 
CHEMPACK point of contact. 
 
4. Notify SNS Program of any changes in contact personnel within 
one business day of assignment of a new point of contact / 
alternate point of contact. 
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5. Develop Standard Operating Procedures that support this state 
CHEMPACK plan and also meet Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention/Strategic National Stockpile planning requirements.  
The Standard Operating Procedures will address: asset placement; 
distribution; coverage areas; security; procedures for control, 
authorization and use of CHEMPACK assets.  
 
6. Ensure pre-coordinated access for Strategic National Stockpile 
Program personnel to cache locations as needed to monitor 
CHEMPACK materiel and provide this information to the 
Strategic National Stockpile Program. 
 
7.        Ensure that cache storage locations are of a suitable size; designed 
to provide adequate lighting, ventilation, temperature control; 
provide sanitation, humidity, and space and security conditions for 
storage of pharmaceuticals.  
 
8. Ensure proper disposal in accordance with applicable federal, state, 
and local regulations of expired CHEMPACK medical materiel 
and provide copies of the destruction documentation to the 
Strategic National Stockpile Program.   
 
9. Conduct joint inventories with the CHEMPACK fielding team 
upon initial placement and approximately every 18 months 
thereafter.   
 
10. Provide adequate transportation of CHEMPACK materiel in an 
emergency, to include coordinating with state and local officials 
and emergency planning members for use of vehicles, freeway 
routes, and airfields. 
 
11. Ensure storage facilities have the capability to rapidly move 
CHEMPACK materiel as required. This may include, but is not 
limited to, hydraulic lifts, forklifts, loading docks, or ramps. 
 
12. Provide a list of personnel with access to the CHEMPACK 
containers at each cache location to the Strategic National 
Stockpile Program point of contact at the time of fielding, and 
update as changes occur.  
 
13. Ensure cache storage locations correct non-complying 
environmental and security conditions identified by Strategic 
National Stockpile Program point of contact in a timely manner 
(usually within one hour).  When conditions cannot be corrected 
within 12 hours, the CHEMPACK Logistics Team will coordinate 
with the State CHEMPACK point of contact to move 
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CHEMPACK container(s) to an acceptable location to safeguard 
the quality or security of the materiel. 
 
14. Notify the CHEMPACK Logistics Team within two hours if a 
CHEMPACK cache storage location loses climate control.  Any 
reports of materiel stored outside of the accepted storage range will 
be handled on a case-by-case basis.  Outcomes could range from 
having the materiel remain in the shelf life extension program to 
removing the materiel from the shelf life extension program and 
the State forfeiting the long-term sustainability of the resource.   
 
15. Coordinate with Strategic National Stockpile Program personnel to 
ensure the maintenance of proper security and environmental 
conditions for CHEMPACK materiel during any non-emergency 
movement (to include pre-positioning assets for special events).   
 
16. Notify the Strategic National Stockpile program within 24 hours of 
an emergency deployment.  The deployment report should identify 
the amount of CHEMPACK expended and the amount of materiel 
returned to the container. 
 
17. In the event of a non-emergency use or compromise of 
CHEMPACK materiel the state will report the loss to the Strategic 
National Stockpile Program as soon as possible following 
discovery.  Within 48 hours of the discovery of the loss the state 
must submit a report documenting the circumstances resulting in 
the loss and providing a inventory of materiel lost or destroyed. 
 
 B. CHEMPACK Cache Custodian 
 
1. Conduct monthly security checks to visually inspect Strategic 
National Stockpile Program seals on the CHEMPACK containers 
(in accordance with applicable federal and state regulations the 
person signing for custody must be a Registered Pharmacist or 
his/her designee). 
 
2. Conduct quality control checks at each cache location to ensure the 
facility’s climate is within acceptable environmental limits and 
submit a monthly CHEMPACK Project quality control checklist to 
document storage conditions at the cache location to Strategic 
National Stockpile Program.  
 
3. Conduct joint inventories with the CHEMPACK fielding team 
upon initial placement and approximately every 18 months 
thereafter.   
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4. Correct non-complying environmental and security conditions 
identified by Strategic National Stockpile Program point of contact 
in a timely manner (usually within one hour) 
 
5. Notify the CHEMPACK Logistics Team within two hours if a 
CHEMPACK cache storage location loses climate control.   
 
V. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
 
A. This plan has no specific counterpart in the National Response Plan.  
Strategic National Stockpile assets are addressed in ESF-8 of the National 
Response Plan.  The CHEMPACK Project is described in the Version 10 
Draft of “Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing Strategic National 
Stockpile Assets – A Guide for Preparedness” dated June 2005. 
 
B. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention require this plan in order 
to support CHEMPACK Project operations in South Carolina. 
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 ATTACHMENT B, ANNEX 1 – FEDERAL MEDICAL STATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TO BE PUBLISHED 
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PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A. An Influenza pandemic is an outbreak of a novel Influenza virus that has 
worldwide consequences.  Influenza pandemics present special 
requirements for disease surveillance, rapid delivery of vaccines and 
antiviral drugs, allocation of limited medical resources, and expansion of 
health care services to meet a surge in demand for care.   
 
B. Pandemics occur in the following six phases defined by the World Health 
Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:  
Interpandemic Period (Phases 1 and 2), Pandemic Alert Period (Phases 3, 
4, and 5), and Pandemic Period (Phase 6).  Distinguishing characteristics 
of each phase are described below.  The phases will be identified and 
declared at the national level for the purposes of consistency, 
comparability, and coordination of response. 
 
C. The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed a global influenza 
preparedness plan, which defines the stages of a pandemic, outlines the 
role of WHO, and makes recommendations for national measures before 
and during a pandemic.  
 
 The distinction between phases 1 and 2 is based on the risk of human 
infection or disease resulting from circulating strains in animals.  The 
distinction is based on various factors and their relative importance 
according to current scientific knowledge.  Factors may include 
pathogenicity in animals and humans, occurrence in domesticated animals 
and livestock or only in wildlife, whether the virus is enzootic or 
epizootic, geographically localized or widespread, and other scientific 
parameters. 
 
The distinction among phases 3, 4, and 5 is based on an assessment of the 
risk of a pandemic. Various factors and their relative importance 
according to current scientific knowledge may be considered. Factors may 
include rate of transmission, geographical location and spread, severity of 
illness, presence of genes from human strains (if derived from an animal 
strain), and other scientific parameters.   
 
In order to describe its approach to the pandemic response, the federal 
government characterized the stages of an outbreak in terms of the 
immediate and specific threat a pandemic virus poses to the United States 
population.  The chart below shows the relationship of the federal 
government response to the WHO Phases and the appearance of the 
disease in the United States. 
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Additionally, SC DHEC further breaks down the WHO Phases/Federal 
Government Response Stages to define the appearance of the pandemic 
virus in or near South Carolina.  This breakdown is used particularly to 
trigger SC DHEC epidemiological and pharmaceutical and non-
pharmaceutical (community mitigation) responses. 
 
 D. Planning guidance and assumptions are based on information provided by   
the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services in the “HHS 
Pandemic Influenza Plan – November 2005”, by the Homeland Security 
Council in the “National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation 
Plan” and by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the “Interim Pre-pandemic 
Planning Guidance:  Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
Mitigation in the United States—Early, Targeted, Layered Use of 
Nonpharmaceutical Interventions.”  South Carolina has correlated sub-
phases to direct emergency operations specific to South Carolina’s 
Emergency Operations Plans. 
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The WHO phases, related Federal Government stages and South Carolina 
sub-phases are:  
 
WHO Global Pandemic Phases and the Stages for Federal Government Response 
and Corresponding South Carolina Response 
WHO Phases Federal Government Response Stages 
Inter Pandemic Period 
1 
No new influenza virus subtypes have 
been detected in humans.  An influenza 
virus subtype that has caused human 
infection may be present in animals.  If 
present in animals, the risk of human 
disease is considered to be low. 0 New domestic animal outbreak in at-risk country 
2 
No new influenza virus subtypes have 
been detected in humans.  However, a 
circulating animal influenza virus 
subtype poses a substantial risk of human 
disease. 
Pandemic Alert Period 
3 
Human infection(s) with a new subtype, 
but no human-to-human spread, or at 
most rare instances of spread to a close 
contact. 
0 New domestic animal outbreak in at-risk country 
1 Suspected human outbreak overseas 
4 
Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-
human transmission but spread in highly 
localized suggesting that the virus is not 
well adapted to humans. 
2 Confirmed human outbreak overseas 5 Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, suggesting that the 
virus is becoming increasingly better 
adapted to humans, but may not yet be 
fully transmissible (substantial pandemic 
risk). 
Pandemic Period 
6 
Pandemic phase: increased and sustained 
transmission in general population 3 
Widespread human outbreaks in multiple 
locations overseas 
4 
First human case in North America 
 
a. First case in CDC Region IV*, but not in 
South Carolina 
5 
Spread throughout United States 
 
a. First case in South Carolina  
b. Localized clusters in South Carolina 
c. Widespread cases in South Carolina 
6 Recovery and preparation for subsequent waves 
*CDC Region IV states include:  Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. 
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The four traditional phases of emergency management can be matched 
with the six phases of a pandemic in the following way: 
 
1. Preparedness Interpandemic (WHO Phases 1 and 2)  
 
2. Response Pandemic Alert (WHO Phases 3, 4 and 5)  
   Pandemic (WHO Phase 6) 
 
3. Recovery Pandemic Over and Interpandemic (WHO Phases 1  
  and 2) 
 
4. Mitigation Interpandemic (primarily) (WHO Phases 1 and 2) 
 
D. In addition to the planning recommendations using WHO pandemic 
phases, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has issued a 
planning document that outlines a Pandemic Severity Index (PSI), 
characterizing the possible severity of a pandemic.  The index uses case 
fatality ratio as the critical driver for categorizing the severity of a 
pandemic.  In this index, pandemics will be assigned to one of five 
discrete categories of increasing severity (Category 1 to Category 5).   
 
Pandemic Severity Index (PSI) 
Category of 
Pandemic 
Case Fatality Ratio Projected Number of 
Deaths, SC Estimated 
Population 2006 
(4,320,593) 
Category 5 > 2.0% > 25,924 
Category 4 1.0 - < 2.0% 12,962 - < 25,924 
Category 3 0.5 - < 1.0% 6,481 - < 12,962 
Category 2 0.1 - <0.5% 6,481 - < 1,296 
Category 1 < 0.1% < 1,296 
Per CDC interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance, these figures assume a 
30% illness rate and unmitigated pandemic without interventions 
 
The interim guidance in which this index was submitted provides planning 
recommendations for specific community mitigation interventions that 
may be used for a given level of pandemic severity. Planning 
considerations included in this document are based on the possible 
severity of the event. 
 
E. Assistance in response to an influenza pandemic consists of health and 
medical resources, including transportation assets, temporarily realigned 
from established programs having coordination or direct service capability 
for communication of medical information, disease surveillance, vaccine 
delivery, distribution of medications, public health authority and disease 
control. 
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1. COMMUNICATION OF MEDICAL INFORMATION refers to 
both the information flow within the public health community and 
the provision of critical information to the public.  Appropriate and 
timely messages to the public are an essential element of 
community mitigation. 
 
2. DISEASE SURVEILLANCE refers to the voluntary and required 
systematic reporting and analysis of signs, symptoms, and other 
pertinent indicators of illness to identify disease and characterize 
its transmission. 
 
3. VACCINE PROGRAMS refers to acquisition, allocation, 
distribution, and administration of influenza vaccine, and 
monitoring the safety and effectiveness of influenza vaccinations.  
Vaccine programs are established as part of pharmaceutical 
intervention measures. 
 
4. DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICATIONS AND OTHER CDC 
APPROVED COUNTERMEASURES refers to the acquisition, 
apportionment, and dispensing of pharmaceuticals (other than 
vaccines) and other countermeasures such as personal protective 
equipment, IV fluids and ventilators to lessen the impact of the 
disease and also to minimize secondary infection.  This includes 
strategies involving both antiviral medications and antibiotics.  
These strategies are used as part of pharmaceutical intervention 
measures. 
 
5. PUBLIC HEALTH AUTHORITY AND DISEASE CONTROL 
refers to the aspects of pandemic response requiring executive 
decisions and recommendations for social distancing, such as: 
 
a. ordering and enforcing quarantine, which is the physical 
separation, including restriction of movement, of 
populations or groups of healthy people who have been 
potentially exposed to a contagious disease; 
 
b. ordering and enforcing isolation, which is the separation 
and confinement of individuals known or suspected (via 
signs, symptoms, or laboratory criteria) to be infected with 
a contagious disease to prevent them from transmitting 
disease to others; 
 
c. ordering the release of medical information for 
epidemiological investigation;  
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d. expanding or lifting regulations and licensure requirements 
to allow for the expansion of medical services; and 
 
e. ordering expansion of medical services under emergency 
conditions 
 
f. issuing other lawful directives in support of the response. 
 
g. recommending other or additional nonpharmaceutical 
containment strategies and other measures applied to an 
entire community or region, designed to reduce personal 
interactions and thereby transmission risk; 
 
h. recommendations for school and public institution closings; 
 
6. MASS FATALITY MANAGEMENT during a pandemic influenza 
refers to the local and statewide management and identification of 
human remains during the weeks of the waves of a pandemic and 
will overwhelm local and regional resources.  Actions listed in 
Annex 2, Pandemic Influenza, are specific to mass fatalities during 
a pandemic.  The general plan for mass fatality management is 
included as Annex 4 in the South Carolina Mass Casualty Plan, 
Appendix 5 to the South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan. 
 
II. MISSION 
 
This plan is Annex 2, Pandemic Influenza, of the Mass Casualty Plan, Appendix 5 
of the South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan.  This attachment identifies 
critical influenza pandemic response functions and assigns responsibilities for 
those functions within the State of South Carolina. 
 
III. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
A. Situation 
 
1. Vaccination of susceptible individuals is the primary means to 
prevent disease and death from influenza during an epidemic or 
pandemic.   
 
2. The State’s established vaccine delivery infrastructure consists of 
46 county health departments, 20 community health centers, 
approximately 1700 private physicians’ offices (primarily pediatric 
practices), birthing hospitals, and universities with health centers 
or schools of medicine or nursing. 
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3. In the event of a pandemic, the Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices, a federal entity, will publish 
recommendations to state immunization programs on the use of the 
pandemic vaccine and priority groups for immunization.  These 
recommendations will be distributed as national guidelines as soon 
as possible with the expectation that they will be followed in order 
to ensure a consistent and equitable program. 
 
4. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention will control the allocation and 
distribution of influenza vaccine to the states during a pandemic 
period. 
 
5. The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control will control the allocation and distribution of influenza 
vaccine within South Carolina and will implement specific 
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommendations 
regarding priority groups for immunization. 
 
6. County Coroners have control over mass fatalities within their 
jurisdiction.  When a County Coroner deems that the number of 
fatalities exceeds local resources and capabilities to effectively 
handle a mass fatality incident, they may request that the county 
emergency manager request state-level assistance or request 
mutual aid from another jurisdiction. 
 
B. Assumptions 
 
1. Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza subtype will be universal. 
 
2. All persons will lack immunity and will likely require two doses of 
the influenza vaccine. 
 
3. After receipt of the influenza vaccine, the goal is to vaccinate the 
population of South Carolina on a continuous, prioritized basis.   
 
4. When influenza vaccine becomes available, initial supplies will not 
be sufficient to immunize the whole population and prioritization 
for vaccine administration will be necessary. 
 
5. Antiviral medications may play a significant role in disease control 
operations. 
 
6. In periods of limited vaccine supply, public health clinics will be 
the predominant locations for influenza vaccine administration.  
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7. A reduction or cessation of other public health programs may be 
necessary in order to provide supplemental personnel for specific 
immunization job actions. 
 
8. South Carolina’s health care workers, emergency response 
workers, medical examiners, funeral directors, and morticians will 
face a sudden and massive demand for services and a possible 40% 
attrition of essential personnel. 
 
9. The projected peak transmission period for a pandemic influenza 
outbreak will be 6 to 8 weeks.  At least two pandemic disease 
waves are likely.  Following the pandemic, the new viral subtype is 
likely to continue circulating and to contribute to seasonal 
influenza.  
 
10. On average, infected persons will transmit infection to 
approximately two other people.10. For the purposes of these 
estimates, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
FluAID and FluSURGE models were used.  Planning assumptions 
used for these estimates are as follows:   
 
a. Population estimate:  4,320,593 (2006) 
 
b. Age groups: 
i. School-aged children (0-19yrs):   1,165,847 
ii. Working adults (20-64yrs):    2,602,006 
iii. Retirees (65+yrs):       552,740 
 
c. Attack rates: 
i. Minimum:  15% 
ii. Most likely: 25% 
iii. Maximum: 35% 
 
11.  Based upon these planning assumptions, South Carolina could 
anticipate between: 
 
a. 350,000 (15% attack rate) and 750,000 (35% attack rate) 
outpatient visits, 
 
b. 7,000 (15% attack rate) and 16,000 (35% attack rate) 
hospitalizations, due to novel or pandemic-strain influenza. 
 
12.  The demand for hospital resources will peak at week five (5) 
during an eight-week pandemic “wave”.  During this week, an 
expected increase due to the additional burden statewide caused by 
pandemic influenza-related cases would be: 
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a. An increase of an estimated 433 hospital admissions per day, 
 
b. An additional estimated 2,114 persons requiring 
hospitalization, 
 
c. An additional estimated 612 requiring the use of an ICU bed, 
 
d. An additional estimated 306 requiring mechanical ventilation. 
 
13. The number of hospital beds and the level of mortuary services 
available to manage the consequences of an influenza pandemic 
will be inadequate. 
 
14. South Carolina may experience a range of deaths from 1,296 for a 
Pandemic Severity Level of 1 to over 25,924 deaths in a Severity 
Level of 5.   
  
  15. A pandemic influenza death is a natural manner of death.  
   Pandemic mortalities will be counted above the normal mortality  
   rates. 
 
  16. The death care industry, comprised of public and private agencies,  
   will not be able to process remains the traditional manner due to  
   the increased number of cases. 
 
  17. PI related deaths will primarily fall in two major categories,  
   attended and unattended.  The process to identify remains from  
   attended deaths will be relatively straightforward, however,  
   unattended deaths, which require verification of identity, issuing a  
   death certificate and notifying the next of kin, will be labor   
   intensive. 
 
  18. There will be delays in the issuances of death certificates for both  
   attended and unattended deaths.  This delay will place substantial  
   pressure on the Coroner to issue death certificates so that the next  
   of kin can manage the decedent’s estate. 
 
19. South Carolina recognizes that a mass fatality event and the 
subsequent caring for the deceased is a sensitive issue.  The state 
can also expect to see a significant increase in the need for 
behavioral health services due to the number of stress reactions and 
extreme feelings of grief, loss and guilt in survivors and 
responders. 
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IV.  CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
 
A. The Department of Health and Environmental Control is responsible for 
the coordination of all Public Health measures in South Carolina, 
including coordination of Emergency Support Function-8 (Health and 
Medical Services).  Beyond the traditional scope of medical care outlined 
in the Health and Medical Services Emergency Support Function (Annex 
8), the priorities in an Influenza Pandemic response will be:  
communication of medical information, disease surveillance, vaccine 
delivery, distribution of medications, public health authority, disease 
control, recommendations for community mitigation measures, and mass 
fatality management.   
 
B. Certain key actions may be accomplished in these priority areas during 
each phase of an Influenza Pandemic.  The following sections will discuss 
activation of the plan, local response to a pandemic, pharmaceutical and 
nonpharmaceutical intervention measures and will give specific details on 
activities to be accomplished by phases during a pandemic. 
 
C. Activation 
  
This plan discusses many public health activities such as disease 
surveillance that are conducted during normal operations.  The progression 
of small disease outbreaks into larger pandemics is tracked by the World 
Health Organization, the health organizations of other nations and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention will identify, confirm and communicate to DHEC 
officials South Carolina’s pandemic phase status.  Certain actions 
described in this plan will be taken by the relevant agencies before 
activation of the State Emergency Operations Plan.  Full activation of this 
plan and activation of the State Emergency Response Team would be 
made in accordance with procedures outlined in the Basic Plan. 
 
D. Local Response 
 
Local response to pandemic influenza is discussed in detail in respective 
Health Region Pandemic Influenza Emergency Operations Plans and 
Regional Mass Casualty Plans.  The primary actions and logistics 
requirements at the local level are supported in this state-level plan.  
Primary actions at the local level would include: communication of 
medical information, disease surveillance, vaccine delivery, distribution of 
medications, implementation of public health authority, disease control, 
implementation of community mitigation measures, including school 
closings, and mass fatality management.  
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E. Community Mitigation 
   
1. Introduction 
 
For each Pandemic Phase, non-pharmaceutical measures to limit 
the spread of disease in the general community are outlined.  
Pharmaceutical measures are included as containment strategies in 
the appropriate phases.  The non-pharmaceutical containment 
measures include (but are not limited to) isolation, quarantine, 
infection control, and recommendations for community-based 
activity restrictions, including school closings.  Additionally, 
planning for pre-event and event messages is included as part of 
community mitigation measures.  Community mitigation measures 
as appropriate for each pandemic phase and pandemic severity 
index are included in the Public Health Authority and Disease 
Control sections of the plan. 
 
2. Definitions 
 
Isolation is the separation and confinement of individuals known 
or suspected (via signs, symptoms, or laboratory criteria) to be 
infected with a contagious disease to prevent them from 
transmitting disease to others.  Voluntary isolation of the ill at 
home (adults and children) will be recommended for all severity 
levels of a pandemic.  
 
Quarantine is the physical separation, including restriction of 
movement, of populations or groups of healthy people who have 
been potentially exposed to a contagious disease, or to efforts to 
segregate these persons within specified geographic areas.    
Individual quarantine control measures are most likely to be used 
primarily during the Pandemic Alert (Phases 4 and 5).  Planning 
for this will include working with community partners to review 
steps involved in establishing and maintaining quarantine facilities 
and procedures.  Voluntary quarantine of household members in 
homes with ill persons (adults and children) during Phase 6 may be 
considered if the Pandemic Severity Index is 2 or 3 and may be 
recommended if the PSI is 4 or 5. 
 
Infection control protects individuals from coming in direct 
contact with infectious materials or agents to limit transmission 
and include physical barriers (e.g. masks, gloves), hygiene (e.g. 
respiratory and hand hygiene), and disinfection measures. 
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Community-based activity restrictions (also referred to as  
“social distancing”) increase distance between members of a 
community by restricting or limiting public gatherings, public 
events, or group activities.  Certain measures may be beneficial 
and practical when there is a larger number of cases and more 
extensive or severe viral transmission.  In such settings, individual-
level measures may no longer be effective or practical.  To 
maximize their effectiveness, a combination of non-pharmaceutical 
measures tailored to the epidemiologic context of each pandemic 
phase and severity index will be considered for recommendation. 
 
3. Community Mitigation Strategies 
 
Communication of medical and preparedness information is a key 
factor in the success of any community mitigation measures.  
Development of the messages to prepare communities for 
implementation of individual and community control measures 
begins in the Interpandemic (Phases 1 and 2) and continues 
through the end of the Pandemic (Phase 6).  Messages should 
address how individual actions (hand washing, covering coughs, 
staying home when ill) and community efforts (school closings, 
telecommuting) can help reduce disease transmission.  
 
Community mitigation measures during Phases 1 and 2 include 
planning efforts related to influenza prevention and control, a 
major part of which is communication of medical and preparedness 
information. 
 
During Phase 3, response efforts include development of the 
recommendations for isolation and quarantine that are deemed 
medically and legally appropriate for each pandemic severity level.  
The recommendations should address: 
  
a.. symptomatic persons with travel risk factors or contact with 
others having travel risk factors (history of travel to a 
country with a novel virus subtype or novel strain of 
influenza documented in poultry, wild birds, and/or 
humans) or having occupational risk); 
b. those with culture confirmed and identified novel strain 
and; 
 
c. symptomatic persons that are not yet confirmed. 
 
Although individual containment measures may have limited 
impact in preventing the transmission of pandemic influenza 
(given the likely characteristics of a novel influenza virus), they 
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may have great effectiveness with a less efficiently transmitted 
virus and may slow disease spread and buy time for vaccine 
development.   
 
Used primarily in Phase 4 and, possibly 5, quarantine of 
individuals may include family members, work or schoolmates, 
and healthcare workers exposed to an infected or potentially 
infected person.  The individuals remain separated from others for 
a specified period during which the individual is regularly assessed 
for signs and symptoms of disease.  This may be appropriate in 
situations in which the risk of exposure and subsequent 
development of disease is high and the risk of delayed recognition 
of symptoms is moderate.  Persons in quarantine who experience 
fever, respiratory, or other early influenza symptoms require 
immediate evaluation by a healthcare provider. 
 
Another initial pharmaceutical containment measure that may be 
considered for implementation early in a pandemic is the targeted 
prophylaxis of a small disease cluster in an effort to slow the 
spread of the disease in the state.  This intervention includes the 
investigation of disease clusters, administration of antiviral 
treatment to persons with confirmed or suspected pandemic 
influenza and the provision of drug prophylaxis to all likely 
exposed persons in the affected community.  This intervention may 
be useful upon the recognition of the first cases or introduction in 
South Carolina, especially in a closed community. 
 
In Phase 6 for PSI of 4 and 5, when there is sustained novel 
influenza virus transmission in an area of the state, with a large 
number of cases without clear epidemiologic links to other cases, 
focused measures to increase social distance and restrict 
community-wide activities would be considered.  At this time, 
individual isolation and quarantine are much less likely to have a 
disease control impact and likely would not be feasible to 
implement because of shortages in public health to track 
information and to verify monitoring and appropriate actions based 
on their findings.  Additionally, there may be a shortage of law 
enforcement to help enforce isolation and quarantine orders.  
 
In Phase 6, planning and implementation efforts should address 
community-based activity restrictions for pandemics with a PSI of 
2 or greater.  Efforts emphasizing what individuals can do to 
reduce their risk of infection may be more effective disease control 
tools.  For all pandemic severity levels, communication of medical 
information should include recommendations for home care of 
those with pandemic influenza.   
  SC Mass Casualty Plan 
July 2008 Annex 2-13 
 
Annex 2 
 
Measures that may be considered for implementation for all 
pandemic severity levels that affect communities include: 
  
a. Promotion of community-wide infection control measures 
(e.g. respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette). 
 
b. “Stay Home Days”(asking everyone to stay home for an 
initial 10-day period, with final decisions on duration based 
on an epidemiological and social assessment of the 
situation) and self-isolation 
    
Measures that may be considered for implementation for pandemic 
severity levels of 2 and greater that affect communities include: 
 
a. Closure of schools and cancellation of school-based 
activities, and closure of out-of-home child care programs 
and reduction of out-of-school social contacts and 
community mixing. 
 
b. Social distancing measures such as postponement or 
cancellation of public gatherings such as sports events, 
theater performances, concerts and modifications of work 
place schedules and distancing practices. 
    
Measures that may be considered for implementation for pandemic 
severity levels of 4 and 5 that affect communities include: 
 
a. Closure of office buildings, shopping centers and malls, 
schools and out-of-home childcare, and public 
transportation. 
 
In Phase 6 of a pandemic, recovery-focused messages should be 
provided to the public. 
 
In the Post Pandemic Phase, the decision to discontinue 
community-level measures will balance the need to lift individual 
movement restrictions against community health and safety.  
Premature removal of containment strategies can increase the risk 
of additional transmission.  Generally, considerations will be made 
to withdraw the most stringent or disruptive measures first. 
 
4. Actions listed in Annex 2, Pandemic Influenza, are specific to mass 
fatalities during a pandemic.  The general plan for mass fatality 
management is included as Annex 4 in the South Carolina Mass Casualty 
Plan, Appendix 5 to the South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan.  
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Actions cited in the SC Mass Fatality Management Plan will be 
implemented in addition to the pandemic-specific actions cited in this 
plan. 
 
The following sections discuss state-level actions triggered by certain 
phases of an influenza pandemic. 
 
WHO Inter Pandemic Period Phases 1 
and 2 USG Response Stage 0 
 
F. Inter Pandemic (Phases 1 and 2)/USG Response Stage 0 
 
1. Communication of Medical Information 
 
a. Communicate health advisories, alerts and updates through 
the Health Alert Network. 
 
b. Communicate educational messages regarding influenza 
prevention, surveillance, and other recommendations to the 
media and the public. 
 
c. Prepare pre-event messages and materials on pandemic 
influenza for public dissemination. 
 
d. Update public health regions on state level planning to 
ensure continuity of pandemic planning between state and 
regional levels.  Distribute published medical information 
to regional coordinators. 
 
2. Disease Surveillance  
 
a. Continue year-round Outpatient Influenza-Like Illness 
Sentinel Provider Surveillance, which is voluntary 
participation by South Carolina health care providers in the 
influenza-like illness (ILI) surveillance, under the guidance 
of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.   
Sentinel healthcare providers report the percentage of ILI 
patients seen each week. 
 
b. Conduct Sentinel Laboratory Surveillance for viral isolates.   
The Department of Health and Environmental Control, 
Bureau of Laboratories maintains the Laboratory Influenza 
Surveillance Program, under the guidance of the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention.  Participating 
institutions (physicians, colleges, hospitals and local health 
departments) submit influenza culture specimens for viral 
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isolation and typing.  Commercial and private clinical 
laboratories in South Carolina are required by law to report 
influenza viral isolates from South Carolina residents to the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control. 
 
c. Conduct Rapid Diagnostic Testing Surveillance.  Hospitals 
and private healthcare providers report positive rapid flu 
tests to the Department of Health and Environmental 
Control.  Rapid flu test reports include influenza virus type 
detected and the numbers of patients testing positive. 
Positive rapid flu test reporting to the Department of Health 
and Environmental Control is required by South Carolina 
law. 
 
d. Implement electronic death reporting throughout South 
Carolina counties so that rapid reporting of  a novel virus 
may be detected in a timely fashion. 
 
3. Vaccine Programs  
 
a. Develop tiered contingency plans for use of pandemic 
vaccine and targeted population groups for immunization. 
 
b. Develop plans for storage, distribution, and administration 
of pandemic influenza vaccine through public health and 
other providers to nationally defined high-priority target 
groups.   These plans should include the following: 
 
1, mass immunization clinic capability within each 
Public Health Region; 
 
2, locations of clinics (e.g., central sites, pharmacies, 
work place, military facilities); 
 
3, vaccine storage capability, including current and 
potential contingency depots for both state and 
region-level storage 
 
4, numbers of staff needed to operate immunization 
clinics; 
 
5, procedures to deploy staff from other areas, from 
within and outside public health, to assist in 
immunization clinics; 
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6, training for deployed staff; and 
 
7, measures to be taken to prevent distribution to 
persons other than those in the targeted population 
groups. 
 
c. Determine how receipt of vaccine will be recorded and how 
a two-dose immunization program would be implemented 
in terms of necessary recall and record keeping procedures. 
 
d. Determine the number of people within each Public Health 
Region who fall within each of the targeted population 
groups for vaccination and ensure that regional plans are 
consistent with state plans. 
 
e. Verify capacity of suppliers for direct shipping of vaccine 
and other medications to Public Health Regions and private 
health care providers. 
 
f. Develop plans for vaccine security: 
 
1. during transport, 
 
2. during storage, and 
 
3. at clinics. 
 
g. Coordinate proposed vaccine distribution plans with 
bordering Public Health Regions and States. 
 
h. Continue vaccine adverse event surveillance. 
 
i. Determine what information needs to be collected and how 
this will be done, to facilitate evaluation of pandemic 
influenza vaccine program activities in the post-pandemic 
period (including socio-economic evaluations). 
 
4. Distribution of Medication and other CDC Approved 
Countermeasures: 
 
a. Develop, coordinate and maintain a written plan to 
implement the Pandemic Influenza Antiviral Distribution 
Plan in coordination with the State SNS plan.       
 
b. Ensure that the DHEC Health Regions develop Pandemic 
Influenza Antiviral Distribution Plans in coordination with 
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the State Pandemic Influenza plan and the State and Region 
SNS plan. 
  
c. Identify and coordinate current inventories of available 
antiviral medication and other pandemic influenza 
countermeasures and medical equipment/supplies at 
community healthcare providers. 
 
d. Obtain and maintain a current inventory of available 
antiviral medication and other pandemic influenza 
countermeasures maintained by the SC Department of 
Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) and at the 
DHEC prime pharmaceutical vendor. 
 
e. Identify and establish locations for reception, repackaging, 
staging, distributing and dispensing the Pandemic Influenza 
antivirals and other CDC approved countermeasures in 
conjunction with the SNS assets. 
 
f. Develop and maintain standing orders and policies and 
procedures for antiviral countermeasures located within the 
DHEC Public Health Preparedness Pharmacy. 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control: 
 
a. Ensure legal authorities and procedures exist for various 
levels of movement restrictions. 
 
a. The Disease Control subcommittee will meet to determine 
recommendations of community containment measures and 
PPE, excluding recommendations regarding school closure. 
 
b. Develop protocols for initiating and monitoring isolation 
and quarantine measures. 
 
c. Develop and coordinate protocols for enforcing isolation 
and quarantine measures. 
 
c. Establish plans to address medical surge issues, including 
the allocation of health care services amongst traditional 
health care facilities, alternate care sites, and triage 
facilities.  
 
d. Establish and maintain a database of alternate care sites and 
triage facilities.   
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e. Develop public information about the appropriate use of 
personal protective equipment such as disposable masks 
and respirators that could be used during a pandemic. 
 
f. Define risk groups by potential risk of exposure and 
develop guidelines and recommendations for the use of 
personal protective equipment by individual risk groups or 
potential exposure setting. 
 
g. Recruit medical volunteers for provision of care and 
vaccine administration to augment medical, nursing, and 
other healthcare staffing.  Volunteer activities for disease 
containment will include administering antivirals or 
vaccinations.   
 
h. Develop plans for the coordination of  Public Health Orders 
and plans with bordering states, including isolation and 
quarantine orders and recommendations and orders related 
to social distancing and community mitigation measures.   
 
i. Confirm that health region plans incorporate the capability 
to employ the recommended disease containment activities. 
 
6. Mass Fatality Management: 
 
a. Review state and local laws and regulations to ensure that 
issues related to temporary interment are in place. 
 
b. Train local coroners, funeral directors and morticians in the 
planning assumptions and the issues of mass fatality 
management specific to a pandemic. 
 
c. Encourage local coroners, funeral directors and morticians 
to develop response plans and continuity of operations 
plans that include pandemic influenza scenario. 
 
d. Provide information to local coroners, funeral directors and 
morticians on the current disease characteristics of a novel 
virus. 
 
e. Encourage local coroners, funeral directors and morticians  
to participate in the state’s electronic disease reporting 
system and to participate in disease surveillance activities. 
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f. Provide guidance to fatality responders on personal 
protective equipment, infection control measures, and 
secondary traumatic stress. 
 
 
WHO Pandemic Alert Period  Phase 3 USG Response Stage 0 and 1 
 
 
G. Pandemic Alert (Phase 3)/USG Response Stage 0 and 1 
 
1. Communication of Medical Information – Communications same 
as in preparedness phase, with the addition of following: 
 
a. Communicate with statewide stakeholders, partners, and 
healthcare providers regarding enhanced surveillance. 
 
b. Communicate with statewide stakeholders and partners 
regarding actions to be taken if a person presents with 
severe respiratory signs and symptoms and a travel history 
from a high-risk global area. 
 
c. Develop or use pre-developed risk communication 
messages and education programs to improve public 
understanding of the dangers of pandemic influenza and the 
benefits of community-wide disease control practices, 
including social distancing measures and on stress 
management, psychosocial impact of disasters..   
 
d. Work with HHS Region IV states to ensure consistency of 
risk communication messages across state lines. 
 
e. Develop scripts and messages for use in the statewide 2-1-1 
information system. 
 
2. Disease Surveillance – Year-round sentinel provider, sentinel lab 
and rapid influenza test surveillance activities will continue as in 
preparedness phase, with the addition of the following: 
 
a. Enhance avian influenza surveillance.   
 
b. Inform SC health care providers of the latest clinical and 
epidemiologic risk factors through the Health Alert 
Network.   
 
c. Upgrade suspected human cases of avian influenza to an 
“urgently reportable condition.” 
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d. Enhanced surveillance that will include participation of 
stakeholders and partners, once novel strain identified in 
the U.S.   
 
e. Maintain and review Regional Memoranda of Agreements 
between Local Education Agencies and DHEC Regions for 
enhanced epi surveillance of school absences. 
 
f. Develop means of rapid communication to other HHS 
Region IV states if a suspected novel virus appears in South 
Carolina. 
 
3. Vaccine Programs –  
 
a Promote pneumococcal vaccination of high-risk groups to 
reduce the incidence and severity of secondary bacterial 
pneumonia. 
 
b. Establish Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) with agencies, 
organizations and individuals capable of providing 
assistance in administering vaccine. 
 
4. Distribution of Medication and other CDC Approved 
Countermeasures: 
 
a. Confirm current inventory of available medication of health 
care providers (i.e. hospitals, clinics, pharmacies). 
 
b. Confirm current inventory of available medication at 
Department of Health and Environmental Control primary 
drug wholesaler and additional wholesalers in South 
Carolina.   
 
c. Prepare to activate memoranda of agreement with agencies, 
organizations and individuals capable of providing 
assistance in obtaining and distributing medication such as 
the South Carolina Pharmacy Association. 
 
d. Confirm credentialed personnel necessary to deploy the 
Pandemic Influenza Antiviral Distribution Plan. 
 
e. Confirm the locations for reception, repackaging, staging, 
distributing and dispensing the Pandemic Influenza 
antivirals and other CDC approved counter measures in 
conjunction with the SNS assets. 
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f. If necessary, modify plans for the distribution of 
medications and other medical materiel. 
 
g. Deploy State antiviral stockpile for initial disease 
containment. 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control. 
 
a. Review state and regional response plans. 
 
b. Confirm that notification lists are current for local agencies, 
the medical community, and decision makers.  
 
c. Confirm that the database for the Health Alert Network 
(HAN) is current. 
 
d. Determine if a meeting of the Disease Control 
subcommittee or other decision makers is indicated to 
recommend courses of action for disease containment 
measures, excluding school closures, which will be 
addressed by the inter-agency school closure task force. 
 
e. Convene a school closure task force  led by SCDHEC and 
State Department of Education (SDE)  to identify threshold 
criteria for consideration of epidemiological and 
administrative school closure thresholds during a pandemic 
of PSI category 2 and greater. 
 
f. Develop triggers for recommending implementation of 
other specific community mitigation and social isolation 
actions. 
 
g. Develop messages for home care of pandemic influenza 
patients. 
 
6. Mass Fatality Management – Mass Fatality Management same as 
in preparedness phase, with the addition of following: 
 
 a. Ensure that MOAs for temporary interment are in place. 
 
b. Establish multiple vendors for mortuary resources which 
may be in short supply during the pandemic; stockpile 
supplies as possible. 
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  SC Mass Casualty Plan 
WHO Pandemic Alert Phase 4 USG Response Stage 2 
 
H. Pandemic Alert (Phase 4)/USG Response Stage 2 
 
1. Communication of Medical Information 
 
a. Communications and education to health care providers, 
the media and the general public same as in Pandemic Alert 
phase 3. 
 
b. Communicate disease prevention, control, and mitigation 
guidelines for physicians providing care during a pandemic 
to address the provision of basic medical treatment in non-
hospital settings. 
 
c. Issue recommendation not to travel to affected areas. 
 
d. Also, disseminate influenza isolation and quarantine 
guidelines and social distancing measures. 
 
2. Disease Surveillance – Year-round surveillance activities, 
including enhanced surveillance, are the same as in Pandemic Alert 
phase 3, with the addition of the following: 
 DHEC and State Department of Education continue 
development and testing of mechanisms for enhanced epi 
surveillance of school absences. 
 
3. Vaccine Programs  
 
a. Conduct initial availability assessment of supplies (e.g., 
syringes, adrenalin, sharps disposal units), equipment and 
locations potentially required for a vaccine-based response 
(i.e., mass immunization clinics). 
 
b. Develop a list of currently qualified vaccinators and 
sources of potential vaccinators. 
 
c. Review educational materials concerning administration of 
vaccines and update as needed. 
 
d. Collaborate on national and international vaccine 
development initiatives. 
 
4. Distribution of Medication and other CDC Approved 
Countermeasures – Activities continue as in Pandemic Alert phase 
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3 and CDC will begin shipment of DSNS held antivirals and other 
medical countermeasures over 21 days to the 62 project areas. 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control. 
 
a. The school closure task force continues development and 
refinement of threshold criteria for consideration of 
epidemiological and administrative school closure 
thresholds during a pandemic.  As MOAs are implemented 
between Local Education Agencies and DHEC Regional 
Health Departments, absenteeism data tracking and sharing 
mechanisms are tested. 
  
b. Coordinate triage logistics with hospitals and Emergency 
Medical Services including patient assessment, 
communication between facilities, and direction of patients 
to available beds.   
 
c. Confirm the medical surge plan is current and test its 
activation. 
 
d. Provide consultation and support on animal issues which 
impact public health and coordinate with Animal 
Emergency Response Agencies regarding culling infected 
animal populations or other animal disease containment 
activities during a pandemic. 
 
e. Investigate suspect cases and close contacts. 
 
f. Implement individual isolation and quarantine of suspect 
and confirmed cases and their close contacts. 
 
g. Enforce isolation and quarantine measures 
 
6. Mass Fatality Management - Activities continue as in Pandemic 
Alert phase 3. 
 
 
 
WHO Pandemic Alert Phase 5 USG Response Stage 2 
 
 
I. Pandemic Alert (Phase 5)/USG Response Stage 2 
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1. Communication of Medical Information – Communication to 
health care providers, the media and the general public is the same 
as in the Pandemic Alert phase 4.  
 
  2. Disease Surveillance –  
 
a. Community surveillance activities are the same as in the 
Pandemic Alert phases 3 and 4.  
 
b.  DHEC and State Department of Education begin enhanced 
surveillance of school student and faculty absences, ability 
to operate administratively, and situationally determined 
epi assessments. 
 
3. Vaccine Programs 
 
a. Ensure ongoing involvement in vaccine development 
initiatives. 
 
b. Review and modify if necessary, plans for storage, 
distribution, and administration of pandemic influenza 
vaccine through public health and other providers to high-
priority target groups. 
 
c. Ensure staff is trained and infrastructure is in place to 
record immunizations, including requirements for a two-
dose immunization program (i.e., recall and record keeping 
procedures). 
 
d. Review estimates of the number of people who fall within 
each of the targeted population groups for vaccination (i.e., 
high-risk groups, health care workers, emergency service 
workers, specific age groups). 
 
4. Distribution of Medication and other CDC Approved 
Countermeasures: 
 
a.  Develop strategies for antiviral drug use incorporating 
CDC guidance and priority groups. 
 
b. Communicate to providers who have signed the 
Memorandum of Agreement with SCDHEC when the 
federal government: 
 
1, authorizes the release of the joint state/federal 
purchased antivirals 
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2, determines commercially available supplies are  
  sufficient.  
 
c. Distribute antivirals and other CDC approved   
  countermeasures in accordance with the pandemic   
  Influenza Antivirals Distribution plan and the SC Strategic  
  National Stockpile plan. 
 
d. Activate established memoranda of agreement with other 
governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and private services that may assist during a 
pandemic influenza or other disaster.   
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control. 
 
a. Coordinate disease control activities with vaccination 
activities to ensure vaccination of essential workers and 
population who are either at high risk of spreading the 
influenza virus or who provide essential community 
services. 
 
b. If enhanced epi surveillance data indicate, school closure 
task force-determined school-closure thresholds have been 
met, or if other compelling epi or societal criteria present 
themselves, School Closure Executive Committee is 
convened by the State Epidemiologist. 
 
c. The Commissioner of Health will advise the Governor on: 
 
1. the most appropriate pharmaceutical and non-
pharmaceutical community mitigation measures 
during the time period when no vaccines are yet 
available, 
 
2. school closures (per recommendation from school 
closure executive committee), 
 
3. the most appropriate distribution priorities and 
systems during time when there is insufficient 
supply of vaccines and prioritization of distribution 
is necessary;  
 
4. the most appropriate uses of antiviral drugs during 
the time before vaccine is available; 
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5. the projected demand for health and medical care 
services; and 
 
6. whether the threat of a public health emergency, as 
defined in Section 44-4-130, is imminent. 
 
d. Investigate suspect cases and close contacts. 
 
e. Implement individual isolation and quarantine of suspect 
and confirmed cases and their close contacts.  
 
f. Enforce isolation and quarantine measures. 
 
6. Mass Fatality Management - Activities continue as in Pandemic 
Alert phase 4. 
 
WHO Pandemic Period Phase 6 USG Response Stages 3, 4, 5 SC Response 3, 4, 4a, 5 
 
 
J. Pandemic (Phase 6)/USG Response Stages 3,4,5 (SC Response SC 
Response 3, 4, 4a, 5) 
 
1. Communication of Medical Information 
 
a. Communication to health care providers, the media and the  
general public is the same as in Pandemic Alert phase 5. 
 
b. Also, establish and communicate precautions needed for 
disposal of deceased persons. 
 
c. Activate  2-1-1 information system. 
 
2. Disease Surveillance: Continue community and school 
surveillance activities in any Local Education Agencies in which 
schools remain open or are re-opened . 
 
3. Vaccine Programs 
 
a. General 
 
1. Ensure ongoing involvement in vaccine 
development, testing, and production initiatives. 
 
2. Purchase vaccine if necessary. 
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3. Evaluate  recommended priority groups for 
immunization based on available epidemiologic 
data and Health and Human Services 
(HHS)/Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (ACIP) guidance. 
 
 4. Review and modify if necessary, plans for vaccine 
security (i.e., during transport, storage, and clinic 
administration) 
 
b. When vaccine is available: 
 
1. Activate immunization clinic capability. 
 
2. Implement streamlined Vaccine Adverse Event 
surveillance. 
 
3. Arrange for direct shipping of vaccine to public 
health regions. 
 
4. Communicate with bordering states to facilitate 
awareness of the vaccine distribution plan and 
coordination of efforts as much as possible. 
 
5. Collect and compile reports of total people 
immunized with one or two doses. 
 
6. Monitor vaccine supply, demand, distribution, and 
uptake. 
 
7. Recruit trained immunization staff from unaffected 
public health regions to augment regular staff in 
affected areas. 
 
c. End of first wave: 
 
1. Expand vaccine programs to cover population not 
yet immunized, according to priority group, if 
applicable. 
 
2. Summarize and report coverage data (with one or 
two doses) and Vaccine Adverse Event data. 
 
3. Examine vaccine efficacy. 
 
4. Continue Vaccine Adverse Event surveillance. 
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5. Restock supplies and resume routine programs. 
 
6. Review and revise policies, procedures, and 
standing orders used during the mass immunization 
campaigns. 
 
4. Distribution of Medication and other CDC Approved 
Countermeasures:  
 
a. Assess availability of antiviral medication and other 
approved countermeasures. 
 
b. Provide for the distribution of state and federal medical 
assets in conjunction with the SC SNS plan. 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control. 
 
a. Depending on the severity of the pandemic and its 
proximity to the state, implement social distancing 
measures and school closings. 
  
b. Investigate suspect cases and close contacts. 
 
c. Implement individual isolation and quarantine of suspect 
and confirmed cases and their close contacts.  
 
d. Enforce isolation and quarantine measures. 
 
e. Make decisions about culling infected animal populations 
or other animal disease containment activities during a 
pandemic. 
 
6. Mass Fatality Management: 
 
a. Monitor disease fatality rate using the electronic death 
reporting system and written Vital Records reports. 
 
b. If needed by the disease Severity Level, determine if 
implementation of the Emergency Public Health Authority 
Act or Governor’s Declaration of State of Emergency is 
needed to manage the mass fatalities resulting from the 
disease. 
 
c. Establish Family Assistance Centers that minimize contact 
with the public; consider the use of virtual FACs. 
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WHO Pandemic Period Phase 6 USG Response Stages 3, 4, 5 SC Response 5a and 5b 
 
K. WHO Pandemic Period Phase 6/USG Response Stages 3, 4, 5/SC 
Response 5a and 5b 
 
1. Communication of Medical Information- Activities will continue 
as under Pandemic (Phase 6)/USG Response Stages 3,4,5 (SC 
Response SC Response 3, 4, 4a, 5) 
 
2. Disease Surveillance – Activities will continue as under Pandemic 
(Phase 6)/USG Response Stages 3,4,5 (SC Response SC Response 
3, 4, 4a, 5) 
 
3. Vaccine Programs – Activities will continue as under Pandemic 
(Phase 6)/USG Response Stages 3,4,5 (SC Response SC Response 
3, 4, 4a, 5) 
 
4. Distribution of Medication and other CDC Approved 
Countermeasures – Activities will continue as under Pandemic 
(Phase 6)/USG Response Stages 3,4,5 (SC Response SC Response 
3, 4, 4a, 5) 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control. 
 
a. Dependent on the severity of the pandemic, implement 
social distancing measures and school closings. 
  
b. Investigate suspect cases and close contacts. 
 
c. Implement individual isolation and quarantine of suspect 
and confirmed cases and their close contacts.  
 
d. Enforce isolation and quarantine measures. 
 
e. Make decisions about culling infected animal populations 
or other animal disease containment activities during a 
pandemic 
 
6. Mass Fatality Management - Activities will continue as under 
Pandemic (Phase 6)/USG Response Stages 3,4,5 (SC Response SC 
Response 3, 4, 4a, 5) 
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WHO Pandemic Period Phase 6 USG Response Stages 3, 4, 5 
 SC Response 5c 
 
L. WHO Pandemic Period Phase 6/USG Response Stages 3, 4, 5/SC 
Response 5c 
 
1. Communication of Medical Information – Activities will continue 
as in WHO Pandemic Period Phase 6/USG Response Stages 3, 4, 
5/SC Response 5a and 5b 
 
2. Disease Surveillance - Activities will continue as in WHO 
Pandemic Period Phase 6/USG Response Stages 3, 4, 5/SC 
Response 5a and 5b 
 
3. Vaccine Programs - Activities will continue as in WHO Pandemic 
Period Phase 6/USG Response Stages 3, 4, 5/SC Response 5a and 
5b 
 
4. Distribution of Medication and other CDC Approved 
Countermeasures - Activities will continue as in WHO Pandemic 
Period Phase 6/USG Response Stages 3, 4, 5/SC Response 5a and 
5b 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control. 
   
a. Cease epidemiological investigations when adequate 
numbers of staff are no longer available to pursue 
investigations. 
 
b. Cease individual isolation and quarantine when adequate 
numbers of staff are no longer available to monitor subjects 
and when measures will no longer have a disease control 
affect. 
 
c. Dependent on the severity of the pandemic, implement 
social distancing measures and school closings. 
 
6. Mass Fatality Management: 
 
 a. Replenish mortuary supplies 
 
b. Review and revise state and local plans for managing mass 
fatalities. 
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WHO Pandemic Period Phase 6 USG Response Stages 3, 4, 5, 6 
 SC Response 4a, 5a, b, c 
 
M. Second Wave/Pandemic Period Phase 6/USG Response Stages 3, 4, 5, 6 
(SC Response Stages 5a, b, c) 
 
Activities will continue as under First Wave Pandemic Phase 6/USG 
Response Stages 3, 4, 5, 6 (SC Response 5a, b, c) 
 
 
WHO Inter Pandemic Period Phases 1 
and 2 USG Response Stage 0 
 
N. Pandemic Over / Interpandemic Period Phases 1 and 2/USG Response 
Stage 0 
 
1. Communication of Medical Information – Communicate to 
medical community, the media and the general public regarding 
decreasing trend of influenza attack rates data.   
 
2. Disease Surveillance – Conduct studies of morbidity and mortality 
data, attack rates in South Carolina. 
 
3. Vaccine Programs – Replenish medical supplies and initiate 
resumption of routine programs. 
 
4. Distribution of Medication and other CDC Approved 
Countermeasures – Review and revise current distribution plans. 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control:  Lift or revoke 
public health orders that are no longer necessary.  
 
6. Mass Fatality Management: 
 
 a. Replenish mortuary supplies 
 
b. Review  and revise state and local plans for managing mass 
fatalities. 
 
WHO Inter Pandemic Period Phases 1 
and 2 USG Response Stage 0 
 
O. Mitigation/WHO Inter Pandemic Period Phases I and 2/USG Response 
Stage 0 
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1. Communication of Medical Information –  
a. Communicate with the medical community, stakeholders, 
the media, and the general public regarding decreasing trend of 
influenza attack rates. 
 
b. Communicate the lifting or revocation of public health 
orders that are no longer necessary to the affected populations 
through the Joint Information System. 
 
2. Disease Surveillance – Conduct studies of morbidity and mortality 
data, attack rates in South Carolina. 
 
3. Vaccine Programs 
 
a. Review, evaluate, and take measures to improve or enhance 
respective roles. 
 
b. Recommend post-pandemic studies to assist in evaluations 
of the pandemic influenza response capacities and 
coordinated activities. 
 
4. Distribution of Medication and other CDC Approved 
Countermeasures – Review, evaluate, and take corrective action to 
improve response. 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control 
 
a. Evaluate effectiveness of statutory and regulatory 
authorities related to pandemic response. 
 
b. Evaluate effectiveness of school closings, if any, and 
impact versus value of closings. 
 
c. Make efforts to amend statutory and regulatory authorities 
to increase the effectiveness of pandemic response. 
 
6. Mass Fatality Management: 
 
a. Evaluate effectiveness of plans, including staffing and 
equipment needs. 
 
b. Evaluate sufficiency and effectiveness of mental health 
responses. 
 
V. RESPONSIBILITIES 
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A. Department of Health and Environmental Control  
 
1. Communicate health advisories, alerts and updates through the 
Health Alert Network. 
 
2. Communicate educational messages regarding influenza 
prevention and surveillance to the media and the public. 
 
3. Prepare pre-event messages and materials on pandemic influenza 
for public dissemination. 
 
4. Update public health regions on state level planning to ensure 
continuity of pandemic planning between state and regional levels.  
Distribute published medical information to regional coordinators. 
 
5. Continue Outpatient Influenza-Like Illness Sentinel Provider 
Surveillance. 
 
6. Communicate Influenza-Like Illness surveillance data as 
appropriate. 
 
7. Conduct Sentinel Laboratory Surveillance for viral isolates. 
 
8. Conduct Rapid Diagnostic Testing Surveillance. 
 
9. Implement electronic death reporting throughout South Carolina 
counties. 
 
10. Develop tiered contingency plans for use of pandemic vaccine and 
targeted population groups for immunization. 
 
11. Develop plans for storage, distribution, and administration of 
pandemic influenza vaccine through public health and other 
providers to nationally defined high-priority target groups – these 
plans should include: 
 
a. mass immunization clinic capability within each Public 
Health Region; 
 
b. locations of clinics (e.g., central sites, pharmacies, work 
place, military facilities); 
 
c. vaccine storage capability, including current and potential 
contingency depots for state and regional-level storage; 
 
d. numbers of staff needed to run immunization clinics; 
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e. procedures to deploy staff from other areas, from within 
and outside public health, to assist in immunization; 
 
f. training for deployed staff; and 
 
g. measures to be taken to prevent distribution to persons 
other than those in the targeted population groups. 
 
12. Determine how receipt of vaccine will be recorded and how a two-
dose immunization program would be implemented in terms of 
necessary recall and record keeping procedures. 
 
13. Determine the number of people within each public health region 
who fall within each of the targeted population groups for 
vaccination. 
 
14. Verify capacity of suppliers for direct shipping of vaccine and 
other medications to public health regions and private health care 
providers. 
 
15. Develop plans for vaccine, antiviral and countermeasures security: 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
16. Coordinate proposed vaccine distribution plans with bordering 
Public Health Regions and States. 
 
17. Continue Vaccine Adverse Event Surveillance. 
 
18. Determine what information needs to be collected and how this 
will be done, to facilitate evaluation of pandemic influenza vaccine 
program activities in the post-pandemic period (including socio-
economic evaluations). 
 
19. Develop, coordinate and maintain a written plan to implement the 
Pandemic Influenza Antiviral Distribution Plan in coordination 
with the State SNS plan. 
 
20. Ensure that the SCDHEC Health Regions develop Pandemic 
Influenza Antiviral Distribution Plans in coordination with the 
State Pandemic Influenza plan and the State and Region SNS plan. 
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21. Identify and coordinate current inventories of available antiviral 
medication and other pandemic influenza countermeasures and 
medical equipment/supplies at community healthcare providers. 
 
22. Obtain and maintain a current inventory of available antiviral 
medication and other pandemic influenza countermeasures 
maintained by the SC Department of Health and Environmental 
Control (SCDHEC) and at the SCDHEC prime pharmaceutical 
vendor. 
 
23. Develop, coordinate and maintain a written plan to implement the 
Pandemic Influenza Antiviral Distribution Plan in coordination 
with the State SNS Plan. 
 
24. Identify and establish locations for reception, repackaging, staging, 
distributing and dispensing the Pandemic Influenza antivirals and 
other CDC approved countermeasures in conjunction with the SNS 
assets. 
 
25. Develop and maintain standing orders and policies and procedures 
for antiviral countermeasures located within the Public Health 
Preparedness Pharmacy. 
 
26. Ensure legal authorities and procedures exist for various levels of 
movement restrictions. 
 
27. The Disease Control Subcommittee will meet to determine 
recommendations of community containment measures and PPE, 
excluding recommendations regarding school closure. 
 
28. Develop protocols for initiating and monitoring isolation and 
quarantine measures. 
 
29. Develop and coordinate protocols for enforcing isolation and 
quarantine measures. 
 
30. Establish plans to address medical surge issues, including the 
allocation of health care services amongst traditional health care 
facilities, alternate care sites, and triage facilities.  
 
31. Establish and maintain a database of alternate care sites and triage 
facilities.   
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32. Develop public information about the appropriate use of personal 
protective equipment like disposable masks that could be used 
during a pandemic. 
 
33. Define risk groups by potential risk of exposure and develop 
guidelines and recommendations for the use of personal protective 
equipment by individual risk group or potential exposure setting. 
 
34. Recruit medical volunteers for provision of care and vaccine 
administration to augment medical, nursing, and other healthcare 
staffing.  Volunteer activities for disease containment will include 
administering antivirals or vaccinations. 
 
35. Develop plans for the coordination of Public Health Orders and 
plans with bordering states, including isolation and quarantine 
orders and recommendations and orders related to social distancing 
and community mitigation measures. 
 
36. Confirm that health region plans incorporate the capability to 
employ the recommended disease mitigation activities. 
 
37. Review state and local laws and regulations to ensure that issues 
related to temporary interment are in place. 
 
38. Train local coroners, funeral directors and morticians in the 
planning assumptions and the issues of mass fatality management 
specific to a pandemic. 
 
39. Encourage local coroners, funeral directors and morticians to 
develop response plans and continuity of operations plans that 
include pandemic influenza scenario. 
 
40. Provide information to local coroners, funeral directors and 
morticians in the current disease characteristics of H5N1 and 
potential characteristics of a novel virus. 
 
41. Encourage local coroners, funeral directors and moriticians to 
participate in the state’s electronic disease reporting system and to 
participate in disease surveillance activities. 
 
42. Provide guidance to fatality responders on personal protective 
equipment and infection control measures. 
 
43. Communicate with statewide stakeholders, partners, and healthcare 
providers regarding enhanced surveillance. 
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44. Communicate with statewide stakeholders and partners regarding 
actions to be taken if a person presents with severe respiratory 
signs and symptoms and a travel history from a high-risk global 
area. 
 
45. Develop or use pre-developed risk communication messages and 
education programs to improve public understanding of the 
dangers of pandemic influenza and the benefits of community-
wide disease control practices, including social distancing 
measures. 
 
46. Work with HHS Region IV states to ensure consistencey of risk 
communication messages across state lines. 
 
47. Develop scripts and messages for use in the statewide 2-1-1 
information system. 
 
48. Enhance avian influenza surveillance. 
 
49. Inform SC health care providers of the latest clinical and 
epidemiologic risk factors through the Health Alert Network. 
 
50. Upgrade suspected human cases of avian influenza to an 
“urgentable reportable condition.” 
 
51. Maintain and review Regional Memoranda of Agreements between 
Local Education Agencies and DHEC Regions for enhanced epi 
surveillance of school absences. 
 
52. Develop means of rapid communication to other HHS Region IV 
states if a suspected novel virus appears in South Carolina 
 
53. Promote pneumococcal vaccination of high-risk groups to reduce 
the incidence and severity of secondary bacterial pneumonia. 
 
54. Establish Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) with agencies, 
organizations and individuals capable of providing assistance in 
administering vaccine. 
 
55. Confirm current inventory of available medication of health care 
providers (i.e. hospitals, clinics, pharmacies). 
 
56. Confirm current inventory of available medication at Department 
of Health and Environmental Control primary durg wholesaler and 
additional wholesalers in South Carolina. 
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57. Prepare to activate memoranda of agreement with agencies, 
organizations and individuals capable of providing assistance in 
obtaining and distributing medication such as the South Carolina 
Pharmacy Association. 
 
58. Confirm credentialed personnel necessary to deploy the Pandemic 
Influenza Antiviral Distribution Plan. 
 
59. Confirm the locations for reception, repackaging, staging, 
distributing and dispensing the Pandemic Influenza antivirals and 
other CDC approved countermeasures in conjunction with the SNS 
assets. 
 
60. If necessary, modify plans for the distribution of medications and 
other medical materiel. 
 
61. Deploy State antiviral stockpile for initial disease containment. 
 
62. Review state and regional response plans. 
 
63. Confirm that notification lists are current for local agencies, the 
medical community, and decision makers. 
 
64. Confirm that the database for the Health Alert Network (HAN) is 
current. 
 
65. Determine if a meeting of the Disease Control subcommittee or 
other decision makers is indicated to recommend courses of action 
for disease containment, excluding school closures 
 
66. Convene a school closure task force led by SCDHEC and State 
Department of Education (SDE) to identify threshold criteria for 
consideration of epidemiological and administrative school closure 
thresholds during a pandemic of PSI category 2 and greater. 
 
67. Develop triggers for recommending implementation of other 
specific community mitigation and social isolation actions. 
 
68. Develop messages for home care of pandemic influenza patients. 
 
69. Ensure that MOAs for temporary interment are in place. 
 
70. Establish multiple vendors for mortuary resources which may be in 
short supply during the pandemic; stockpile supplies as possible. 
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71. Communicate disease prevention, control, and mitigation 
guidelines for physicians providing care during a pandemic to 
address the provision of basic medical treatment in non-hospital 
settings. 
 
  72. Issue recommendation not to travel to affected areas. 
 
73. Disseminate influenza isolation, quarantine and social distancing 
guidelines. 
  
74. Conduct initial availability assessment of supplies (e.g., syringes, 
adrenalin, sharps disposal units), equipment and locations 
potentially required for a vaccine-based response (i.e., mass 
immunization clinics). 
 
75. Develop a list of currently qualified vaccinators and sources of 
potential vaccinators. 
 
76. Review educational materials concerning administration of 
vaccines and antivirals and update as needed. 
 
77. Collaborate on national and international vaccine development 
initiatives. 
 
 78. The school closure task force continues development and 
refinement of threshold criteria for consideration of 
epidemiological and administrative school closure thresholds 
during a pandemic.  As MOAs are implemented between LEAs 
and DHEC Regional Health Departments, absenteeism data 
tracking and sharing mechanisms are tested. 
 
79. Coordinate triage logistics with hospitals and Emergency Medical 
Services including patient assessment, communication between 
facilities, and direction of patients to available beds. 
 
80. Confirm the medical surge plan is current and test its activation. 
 
81. Provide consultation and support on animal issues which impact 
public health and coordinate with Animal Emergency Response 
Agencies regarding culling infected animal populations or other 
animal disease containment activities during a pandemic. 
 
82. Investigate suspect cases and close contacts. 
 
83. Implement individual isolation and quarantine of suspect and 
confirmed cases and their close contacts. 
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84. Enforce isolation and quarantine measures. 
 
85. DHEC and State Department of Education begin enhanced 
surveillance of school student and faculty absences, ability to 
operate administratively, and situationally determined epi 
assessments. 
 
86. Review and modify if necessary, plans for storage, distribution, 
and administration of pandemic influenza vaccine through public 
health and other providers to high-priority target groups. 
 
87. Ensure staff is trained and infrastructure is in place to record 
immunizations, including requirements for a two-dose 
immunization program (i.e., recall and record keeping procedures). 
 
88. Review estimates of the number of people who fall within each of 
the targeted population groups for vaccination (i.e., high-risk 
groups, health care workers, emergency service workers, specific 
age groups). 
 
89. Develop strategies for antiviral drug use incorporating CDC 
guidance and priority groups. 
 
90. Communicate to providers who have signed the Memorandum of 
Agreement with SCDHEC when the federal government: 
 
a. authorizes the release of the joint state/federal purchased 
antivirals; 
 
b. determines commercially available supplies are sufficient. 
 
91. Distribute antivirals and other CDC approved countermeasures in 
accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Antiviral Distribution 
Plan and the SC Strategic National Stockpile. 
 
92. Activate established memoranda of agreement with other 
governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and private services that may assist during a 
pandemic influenza or other disaster. 
 
93. Coordinate disease control activities with vaccination activities to 
ensure vaccination of essential workers and population who are 
either at high risk of spreading the influenza virus or who provide 
essential community service. 
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94. If enhanced epi surveillance data indicate, school closure task 
force-determined school closure thresholds have been met, or if 
other compelling epi or societal criteria present themselves, School 
Closure Executive Committee is convened by the State 
Epidemiologist. 
 
95. The Commissioner of Health will advise the Governor on: 
 
a. the most appropriate pharmaceutical and non-
pharmaceutical community mitigation measures during the 
time period when no vaccines are yet available, 
 
b. school closures (recommendation from the school closure 
executive committee), 
 
c. the most appropriate distribution priorities and systems 
during time when there is insufficient supply of vaccines 
and prioritization of distribution is necessary; 
 
d. the most appropriate uses of antiviral drugs during the time 
before vaccine is available;  
 
e. the projected demand for health and medical care services; 
and whether the threat of a public health emergency, as 
defined in Section 44-4-130, is imminent. 
 
96. Investigate suspect cases and close contacts. 
 
97. Implement individual isolation and quarantine of suspect and 
confirmed cases and their close contacts.  
 
98. Enforce isolation and quarantine measures. 
 
99. Establish and communicate precautions needed for disposition of 
deceased persons. 
 
100. Activate 2-1-1 information system.  
 
101. Ensure ongoing involvement in vaccine development, testing, and 
production initiatives. 
 
102. Purchase vaccine if necessary. 
 
103. Evaluate recommended priority groups for immunization based on 
available epidemiologic data and Health and Human Services 
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(HHS)/Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) 
guidance. 
 
104. Activate immunization clinic capability. 
 
105. Implement streamlined Vaccine Adverse Event surveillance. 
 
106. Arrange for direct shipping of vaccine to public health regions. 
 
107. Communicate with bordering states to facilitate awareness of the 
vaccine distribution plan and coordination of efforts as much as 
possible. 
 
108. Collect and compile reports of total people immunized with one or 
two doses. 
 
109. Monitor vaccine supply, demand, distribution, and uptake. 
 
110. Recruit trained immunization staff from unaffected public health 
regions to augment regular staff in affected areas. 
 
111. Expand vaccine programs to cover population not yet immunized. 
 
112. Summarize and report coverage data (with one or two doses) and 
Vaccine Adverse Event data. 
 
113. Examine vaccine efficacy. 
 
114. Continue Vaccine Adverse Event surveillance. 
 
115. Restock supplies and resume routine programs. 
 
116. Review and revise policies, procedures and standing orders used 
during the mass immunization campaigns. 
 
117. Assess availability of antiviral medication and other approved 
countermeasures. 
 
118. Provide for the distribution of state and federal medical assets in 
conjunction with the SC SNS plan. 
 
119. Depending on the severity of the pandemic and its proximity to the 
state, implement social distancing measures and school closings. 
 
120. Make decisions about culling infected animal populations or other 
animal disease containment activities during a pandemic.   
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121. Monitor disease fatality rate using the electronic death reporting 
system and written Vital Records reports. 
 
122. If needed by the disease severity level, determine if 
implementation of the Emergency Public Health Authority Act or 
Governor’s Declaration of State of Emergency is needed to 
manage the mass fatalities resulting from the disease. 
 
123. Establish Family Assistance Centers that minimize contact with the 
public; consider the use of virtual FACs. 
 
124. Cease epidemiological investigations when adequate numbers of 
staff are no longer available to pursue investigations. 
 
125. Cease individual isolation and quarantine when adequate numbers 
of staff are no longer available to monitor subjects and when 
measures will no longer have a disease control affect. 
 
126. Review and revise state and local plans for managing mass 
fatalities. 
 
127. Communicate to the medical community, the media and the 
general public regarding decreasing trend of influenza attack rates 
data. 
 
128. Conduct studies of morbidity and mortality data, attack rates in 
South Carolina. 
 
129. Replenish medical supplies and initiate resumption of routine 
programs.. 
 
130. Review and revise current distribution plans for antivirals and 
other approved countermeasures. 
 
131. Communicate the lifting or revocation of public health orders that 
are no longer necessary to the affected populations through the 
Joint Information system. 
 
132. Review, evaluate, and take measures to improve or enhance 
respective roles in vaccine programs. 
 
133. Recommend post-pandemic studies to assist in evaluations of the 
pandemic influenza response capacities and coordinated activities. 
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134. Evaluate effectiveness of statutory and regulatory authorities 
related to pandemic response. 
 
135. Make efforts to amend statutory and regulatory authorities to 
increase the effectiveness of pandemic response. 
 
136. Communicate with the public regarding the potential impact and 
what to expect during a pandemic. 
  
B. South Carolina Pharmacy Association 
 
1. Assist with the procurement of medications. 
 
2. Assist with obtaining volunteer pharmacists for distribution 
 
3. Assist with storage, distribution, and administration of pandemic 
influenza vaccine to defined high-priority target groups. 
 
4. Assist with development of list of currently qualified vaccinators 
and sources of potential vaccinators. 
 
C. South Carolina Department of Transportation 
 
1. Assist with storage and transportation of vaccine, antiviral and 
other countermeasures. 
 
2. Assist with control of roads and transportation to support disease 
containment efforts. 
 
3. Assist with enhanced surveillance efforts including assessment and 
consideration of isolation of symptomatic travelers from high-risk 
areas. 
 
D. South Carolina Press Association – Assist with distribution of information 
to keep the public informed about disease containment and prevention 
measures and where to go for assistance. 
 
E. South Carolina Hospital Association 
 
1. Support disease surveillance activities. 
 
2. Assist with coordination for the administration of pandemic 
influenza vaccine to defined high-priority target groups. 
 
3. Assist with development of list of currently qualified vaccinators 
and sources of potential vaccinators. 
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4. Assist with development of plans for surge capacity and, along 
with the Department of Health and Environmental Control, 
establish acceptable standards of care when facilities are at or 
beyond capacity. 
 
5. Assist with coordination of expansion of medical services to meet 
surge in demand. 
 
F. South Carolina Ports Authority – Assist with enhanced surveillance efforts  
including assessment and consideration of isolation of symptomatic 
travelers from high-risk areas. 
 
 G. South Carolina National Guard 
 
1. Assist with storage, distribution, and administration of pandemic 
influenza vaccine to defined high-priority target groups. 
 
2.  Assist with the development of protocols for the enforcement of 
isolation, quarantine and  other community containment measures. 
 
3. Assist with the coordination and implementation of protocols for 
the enforcement of isolation, quarantine and  other community 
containment measures. 
 
 
4. Assist in the development of plans for vaccine and antiviral and 
other countermeasures security: 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
4. Assist with vaccine and antiviral and other countermeasures 
security 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
H. South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulations 
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1. Assist with development of a list of currently qualified vaccinators 
 and sources of potential vaccinators. 
 
2. Assist with establishing licensing privileges for out-of-state 
physicians, nurses and pharmacists. 
 
 I. South Carolina Department of Commerce 
 
1. Assist with the acquisition of pandemic influenza vaccine, and 
other pandemic response materials, if necessary. 
 
2. Assist with developing collaborative relationships and Memoranda 
of Agreement with business and industries that have work-site 
health care facilities that can be used as mass vaccination clinics 
for their employees. 
 
J. Department of Public Safety 
 
1. Assist in the development of plans for vaccine and antiviral and 
other countermeasures security: 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
2. Assist with vaccine and antiviral and other countermeasures 
security 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
3. Assist with the development of protocols for the enforcement of 
isolation, quarantine and  other community mitigation measures. 
 
4. Assist with the coordination and implementation of protocols for 
the enforcement of isolation, quarantine and  other community 
mitigation  measures 
 
K. State Law Enforcement Division 
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1. Assist in the development of plans for vaccine and antiviral and 
other countermeasures security: 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
2. Assist with vaccine and antiviral and other countermeasures 
security 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
3. Assist with the development of protocols for the enforcement of 
isolation, quarantine and  other community mitigation measures. 
 
4. Assist with the coordination and implementation of protocols for 
the enforcement of isolation, quarantine and  other community 
mitigation measures. 
 
L. SC Budget and Control Board 
 
1. Assist with the acquisition of pandemic influenza vaccine. 
 
2. Assist with procurement of medical supplies. 
 
M. Clemson University Livestock and Poultry Health – Identify and assess 
livestock disease threats and animal related public health issues that may 
contribute to pandemic influenza spread. 
 
N. Department of Natural Resources 
 
1. Assist in the development of plans for vaccine and antiviral and 
other countermeasures security: 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
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2. Assist with vaccine and antiviral and other countermeasures 
security 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
3. Assist with the development of protocols for the enforcement of 
isolation, quarantine and  other community mitigation measures. 
 
4. Assist with the coordination and implementation of protocols for 
the enforcement of isolation, quarantine and  other community 
mitigation measures. 
 
O. South Carolina Department of Education 
 
1. Assist with communication of the need for school closures to 
prevent the spread of disease. 
 
2. Work in collaboration with DHEC on the school closure task force 
on collection of enhanced surveillance of absenteeism and ability 
of schools to operate administratively and advise/staff the school 
closure executive committee. 
 
3. Assist with designating school facilities for non-traditional health 
care facilities when needed 
 
P. South Carolina Department of Mental Health 
 
1. Provide guidance to fatality responders on secondary traumatic 
stress. 
 
2. Develop or use pre-developed risk communication messages and 
education programs for stress management and psychosocial 
impact of disasters.   
 
Q. South Carolina Coroners Association 
 
1. Local Coroners will coordinate and direct temporary morgue 
operations. 
 
2. Local Coroners will coordinate and direct documentation of, 
handling of, and final disposition of deceased persons including the 
next of kin notification operations. 
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3. Monitor disease fatality rate using electronic death reporting 
system  and written Vital Records reports. 
 
4. Establish multiple vendors for mortuary resources which may be in 
short supply during the pandemic; stockpile supplies as possible. 
 
5. Establish Family Assistance Centers that minimize contact with the 
public; consider the use of virtual FACs. 
 
6. Review and revise state and local plans for managing mass 
fatalities. 
 
R. South Carolina Funeral Directors Association 
 
1. Assist in coordination of next of kin notification operations. 
 
2. Assist with coordination of temporary morgue operations and final 
disposition of deceased persons. 
 
3. Assist with documentation and recordkeeping relevant to pandemic 
influenza-related mortality. 
 
4. Establish multiple vendors for mortuary resources which may be in 
short supply during the pandemic; stockpile supplies as possible. 
 
5. Monitor disease fatality rate using electronic death reporting 
system and written Vital Records reports. 
 
6.  Establish Family Assistance Centers that minimize contact with the 
public; consider the use of virtual FACs. 
 
7. Review and revise state and local plans for managing mass 
fatalities. 
 
  
S. South Carolina Mortician’s Association 
 
  1. Assist in coordination of next of kin notification operations. 
 
2. Assist with coordination of temporary morgue operations and final 
disposition of deceased persons. 
 
3. Assist with documentation and recordkeeping relevant to pandemic 
influenza-related mortality. 
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4. Establish multiple vendors for mortuary resources which may be in 
short supply during the pandemic; stockpile supplies as possible. 
 
5. Monitor disease fatality rate using electronic death reporting 
system and written Vital Records reports. 
 
6.  Establish Family Assistance Centers that minimize contact with the 
public; consider the use of virtual FACs. 
 
7. Review and revise state and local plans for managing mass 
fatalities. 
 
T. South Carolina United Way  
  
  1. Activate 2-1-1 system. 
 
VI. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
 
The Department of Health and Human Services is the principal Federal agency for 
protecting the health of all Americans.  State response operations will interface 
with Federal response assets through ESF-8 and through liaison between the State 
Department of Health and Environmental Control and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention.  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention will also 
facilitate guidance and information flow between the State of South Carolina and 
the World Health Organization, which would have significant involvement during 
an Influenza Pandemic.   
 
Once the World Health Organization declares Phase 4 of an influenza pandemic, 
the Director of the CDC on consultation with the Secretary of HHS, or his/her 
designee, will determine when to activate the SNS to begin the distribution of 
medical materiel based on the WHO Phase characterization and the severity of the 
disease; no state request will be necessary to launch the distribution of the 
medical countermeasures.  These medical assets will arrive in three deployments, 
each taking approximately 7 to 10 days to arrive.  
 
Liaison between the State Emergency Operations Center and the Department of 
Homeland Security will provide access to additional Federal health and medical 
assets. 
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ANNEX 3 
SMALLPOX 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A. A smallpox outbreak would be assumed to be a terrorist act and would 
have worldwide consequences.  Smallpox outbreaks present special 
requirements for disease surveillance, rapid delivery of vaccines and 
treatment drugs, allocation of limited medical resources, and expansion of 
health care services to meet a surge in demand for care.   
 
B. A laboratory confirmed smallpox case anywhere in the United States 
would trigger federal and state response efforts including mass 
vaccination. 
 
C. Assistance in response to a smallpox outbreak consists of health and 
medical resources, including transportation assets, temporarily realigned 
from established programs having coordination or direct service capability 
for communication of medical information, disease surveillance, vaccine 
delivery, distribution of medications, public health authority and disease 
control. 
 
1. COMMUNICATION OF MEDICAL INFORMATION refers to 
both the information flow within the public health community and 
the provision of critical information to the public. 
 
2. DISEASE SURVEILLANCE refers to the voluntary and required 
systematic reporting and analysis of signs, symptoms, and other 
pertinent indicators of illness to identify disease and characterize 
its transmission. 
 
3. VACCINE PROGRAMS refers to acquisition, allocation, 
distribution, and administration of smallpox vaccine, and 
monitoring the safety and effectiveness of smallpox vaccinations. 
 
4. DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICATIONS refers to the acquisition, 
apportionment, and dispensing of pharmaceuticals (other than 
vaccines) to lessen the impact of the disease and also to minimize 
secondary infection.  This includes strategies involving both 
antiviral medications and antibiotics. 
 
5. PUBLIC HEALTH AUTHORITY AND DISEASE CONTROL 
refers to the aspects of smallpox response requiring executive 
decisions such as: 
 
a. ordering and enforcing quarantine, which is the separation 
and restriction of movement of persons who, while not yet 
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ill, have been exposed to an infectious agent and therefore 
may become infectious; 
 
b. ordering and enforcing isolation, which is the separation of 
persons who have a specific infectious illness from those 
who are healthy and the restriction of their movement to 
stop the spread of that illness; 
 
c. ordering the release of medical information for 
epidemiological investigation;  
 
d. expanding or lifting regulations and licensure requirements 
to allow for the expansion of medical services; and 
 
e. ordering expansion of medical services under emergency 
conditions 
 
f. issuing other lawful directives in support of the response. 
 
II. MISSION 
 
This plan is part of the South Carolina Mass Casualty Plan - Appendix 5 of the 
South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan.  This attachment identifies critical 
smallpox outbreak response functions and assigns responsibilities for those 
functions within the State of South Carolina. 
 
III. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
A. Situation 
 
1. Vaccination of susceptible individuals is the primary means to 
prevent disease and death from smallpox during an outbreak.   
 
2. The State’s established vaccine delivery infrastructure consists of 
46 county health departments, 20 community health centers, 
approximately 1700 private physicians’ offices (primarily pediatric 
practices), birthing hospitals, and universities with health centers 
and/or schools of medicine and/or nursing. 
 
3. In the event of an outbreak, the Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices, a federal entity, will update existing 
recommendations to state immunization programs on the use of the 
smallpox vaccine and priority groups for immunization.  These 
recommendations will be distributed as national guidelines as soon 
as possible with the expectation that they will be followed in order 
to ensure a consistent and equitable program. 
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4. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention will control the allocation and 
distribution of smallpox vaccine to the states during an outbreak. 
 
5. The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control will control the allocation and distribution of smallpox 
vaccine within South Carolina and will implement specific 
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommendations 
regarding priority groups for vaccination. 
 
B. Assumptions 
 
1. All persons will lack immunity and will likely require vaccination 
 
2. After receipt of the smallpox vaccine, the goal is to vaccinate the 
entire population of South Carolina over a period of ten days on a 
continuous, prioritized basis.   
 
3. When vaccine becomes available, initial supplies will not be 
sufficient to immunize the whole population and prioritization for 
vaccine administration will be necessary. 
 
4. Public health clinics and related points of dispensing will be the 
predominant locations for smallpox vaccine administration during 
the first month of vaccine availability, and a reduction or cessation 
of other public health programs may be necessary in order to 
provide supplemental personnel for specific vaccination job 
actions. 
 
5. South Carolina’s health care workers, emergency response 
workers, medical examiners, funeral directors, and morticians will 
face a sudden and massive demand for services and a possible 
attrition of essential personnel. 
 
6. The number of hospital beds and the level of mortuary services 
available to manage the consequences of smallpox outbreak will be 
inadequate. 
 
7. The case fatality rate in a smallpox outbreak is estimated to reach 
30%. 
 
8. The secondary attack rate for smallpox is expected to fall within 
the range of 38-88%. 
 
  
  SC Mass Casualty Plan 
December 2006 Annex 3-3 
Annex 3 
 
IV.  CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
 
A. The Department of Health and Environmental Control is responsible for 
the coordination of all Public Health measures in South Carolina, 
including coordination of Emergency Support Function-8 (Health and 
Medical Services).  Beyond the traditional scope of medical care outlined 
in the Health and Medical Services Emergency Support Function (Annex 
8), the priorities in a smallpox response will be:  communication of 
medical information, disease surveillance, vaccine delivery, distribution of 
medications, public health authority and disease control.  Certain key 
actions may be accomplished in these priority areas during each phase of a 
smallpox response. 
 
B. Activation 
  
This plan discusses many public health activities such as disease 
surveillance that are conducted during normal operations.  Disease 
outbreaks are tracked by the World Health Organization, the health 
organizations of other nations and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention.  Certain actions described in this plan will be taken by the 
relevant agencies before activation of the State Emergency Operations 
Plan.  Full activation of this plan and activation of the State Emergency 
Response Team would be made in accordance with procedures outlined in 
the Basic Plan. 
 
C. Local Response 
 
Local Response to a smallpox outbreak is discussed in detail in respective 
Health Region Emergency Operations Plans and Regional Mass Casualty 
Plans.  The primary actions and logistics requirements at the local level 
are supported in this state-level plan.  Primary actions at the local level 
would include: communication of medical information, disease 
surveillance, vaccine delivery, distribution of medications, implementation 
of public health authority, and disease control.  The following sections 
discuss state-level actions triggered by phase of emergency management 
 
D. Preparedness 
 
1. Communication of Medical Information 
 
a. Communicate health advisories, alerts and updates through 
the Health Alert Network. 
 
b. Communicate educational messages regarding disease 
prevention and surveillance to the media and the public. 
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c. Communicate with statewide stakeholders and partners 
regarding actions to be taken if a person presents with 
febrile rash illness and a travel history from a high-risk 
area. 
 
2. Disease Surveillance – the major surveillance activities prior to a 
laboratory confirmed case are: 
 
a. Registration of persons already vaccinated under pre-event 
vaccination programs (first responders and military 
personnel.) 
 
b. Tracking the occurrence of vaccine “takes” for quality 
assurance and possible follow-up vaccination. 
 
c. Identification, monitoring and reporting of adverse 
reactions to vaccination. 
 
3. Vaccine Programs  
 
a. Develop tiered contingency plans for use of vaccine and 
priority groups for vaccination. 
 
b. Develop plans for storage, distribution, and administration 
of vaccine through public health and other providers to 
nationally defined high-priority target groups – these plans 
should include: 
 
1) mass immunization clinic capability within each 
Public Health Region; 
 
2) locations of clinics (e.g., central sites, pharmacies, 
work place, military facilities); 
 
3) vaccine storage capability, including current and 
potential contingency depots for both state and 
region-level storage 
 
4) numbers of staff needed to run immunization 
clinics; 
 
5) procedures to deploy staff from other areas, from 
within and outside public health, to assist in 
immunization; 
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6) advanced discussions with professional 
organizations regarding tasks outside routine job 
descriptions during a pandemic; 
 
7) training for deployed staff; and 
 
8) measures to be taken to prevent distribution to 
persons other than those in the priority groups. 
 
c. Determine how receipt of vaccine will be recorded in terms 
of vaccine effectiveness, necessary recall and record 
keeping procedures. 
 
d. Determine the number of people within each Public Health 
Region who fall within each of the priority groups for 
vaccination. 
 
e. Develop plans for vaccine security: 
 
1) during transport, 
 
2) during storage, and 
 
3) at clinics. 
 
f. Coordinate proposed vaccine distribution plans with 
bordering Public Health Regions and States. 
 
g. Conduct Vaccine Adverse Event Surveillance. 
 
4. Distribution of Medication 
 
a. Establish Memoranda of Agreement with agencies, 
organizations and individuals capable of providing 
assistance in obtaining and distributing medication such as 
the South Carolina Pharmacy Association. 
 
b. Develop plans for the distribution of medications. 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control: 
 
a. Establish plans for diverting patients who require 
supportive but not advanced level care to non-traditional 
care facilities.   
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b. Establish and maintain a database of alternate non-
traditional medical facilities and services to which patients 
could be diverted during an outbreak.   
 
c. Develop public information about the appropriate use of 
personal protective devices like disposable masks that 
could be used during an outbreak. 
 
d. Define risk groups by potential risk of exposure and 
develop guidelines and recommendations for the use of 
personal protective equipment by individual risk group or 
potential exposure setting. 
 
e. Recruit medical volunteers for provision of care and 
vaccine administration to augment medical, nursing, and 
other healthcare staffing.  Volunteer activities for disease 
containment will include administering vaccine.   
 
f. Coordinate Public Health Orders and plans with bordering 
states.   
 
g. Confirm that health region plans incorporate the capability 
to employ the recommended disease containment activities. 
 
E. Response to outbreak outside of the continental United States 
 
1. Communication of Medical Information 
 
a. Communications to health care providers, the media and 
the general public include detailed case definition and 
procedures for case verification. 
 
b. Also, disseminate smallpox isolation and quarantine 
guidelines. 
 
2. Disease Surveillance – Train additional personnel to conduct 
surveillance support activities and increase the number of 
personnel directly tasked with disease surveillance activities. 
 
3. Vaccine Programs  
 
a. Conduct initial availability assessment of supplies (e.g., 
bifurcated needles, adrenalin, sharps disposal units), 
equipment and locations potentially required for a vaccine-
based response (i.e., mass immunization clinics). 
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b. Develop a list of currently qualified vaccinators and 
sources of potential vaccinators. 
 
c. Review educational materials concerning administration of 
vaccines and update as needed. 
 
d. Collaborate on national and international vaccine program 
initiatives. 
 
4. Distribution of Medication – Activities continue as in preparedness 
phase. 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control 
 
a. The Disease Control subcommittee of the Bioterrorism 
Advisory Council will meet. 
 
b. Develop and communicate disease prevention, control, and 
containment guidelines for physicians providing care 
during an outbreak to address the provision of basic 
medical treatment in non-hospital settings.   
 
c. Develop clinical guidelines for physicians and Emergency 
Medical Services personnel to direct patients to the 
appropriate level of care based on their clinical 
presentation.  
 
d. Develop processes for patient assessment, communication 
between facilities, and direction of patients to available 
beds.   
  
e. Coordinate triage logistics with hospitals and Emergency 
Medical Services including patient assessment, 
communication between facilities, and direction of patients 
to available beds.   
 
f. Coordinate disease control activities with vaccination 
activities to ensure vaccination of essential workers and 
population who are either at high risk of spreading the 
influenza virus or who provide essential community 
services. 
 
g. Advise the Governor and the Governor’s Emergency 
Health Powers Advisory Group on: 
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1) the most appropriate community-based infection 
control methods during the time period when no 
vaccines are yet available, 
 
2) the most appropriate distribution priorities and 
systems during time when there is insufficient 
supply of vaccines and prioritization of distribution 
is necessary; and 
 
3) the most appropriate uses of antiviral drugs during 
the time before vaccine is available. 
 
4) the projected demand for health and medical care 
services 
 
h. Recommend employment of isolation practices for:  
 
1) symptomatic persons with travel risk factors or 
contact with others having travel risk factors.   
 
2) those with laboratory confirmed smallpox.   
 
3) symptomatic persons that are not yet confirmed. 
 
F. Response to outbreak inside of the continental United States 
 
1. Communication of Medical Information 
 
a. Communication to health care providers, the media and the  
general public is the same as in previous phases. 
 
b. Establish and communicate precautions needed for disposal 
of deceased persons. 
 
2. Disease Surveillance – Surveillance activities are the same as in 
the previous phases. 
 
3. Vaccine Programs 
 
a. General 
 
1) Purchase vaccine if necessary. 
 
2) Review/revise recommended priority groups for 
immunization based on available epidemiologic 
data. 
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3) Modify/refine priority target groups depending on 
circumstances. 
 
4) Modify/refine other aspects of the Health and 
Human Services/Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention/Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices guidelines, as needed. 
 
5) Review and modify if necessary, plans for vaccine 
security (i.e., during transport, storage, and clinic 
administration) 
 
b. When vaccine is available: 
 
1) Activate mass vaccination clinic capability. 
 
2) Implement streamlined Vaccine Adverse Event 
surveillance. 
 
3) Arrange for shipment of vaccine to public health 
regions (primarily through Strategic National 
Stockpile – as described in Annex 1 of the Mass 
Casualty Plan.) 
 
4) Communicate with bordering states to facilitate 
awareness of the vaccine distribution plan and 
coordination of efforts as much as possible. 
 
5) Collect and compile reports of total people 
immunized follow-up data of vaccine “takes”. 
 
6) Monitor vaccine supply, demand, distribution, and 
uptake. 
 
7) If  the outbreak is contained in a particular region, 
recruit trained immunization staff from unaffected 
public health regions to augment regular staff in 
affected areas. 
 
8) Expand vaccine programs to cover population not 
yet immunized. 
 
9) Summarize and report coverage data, vaccine 
“takes” and Vaccine Adverse Event data. 
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10) Examine vaccine efficacy. 
 
11) Continue Vaccine Adverse Event surveillance. 
 
12) Restock supplies and resume routine programs. 
 
13) Review/revise policies/procedures/standing orders 
used during the mass immunization campaigns. 
 
4. Distribution of Medication  
 
a. Provide or coordinate obtaining pharmaceuticals other than 
vaccines. 
 
b. Assist with the coordination of the distribution of these 
pharmaceuticals. 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control 
 
a. Implement restrictions on travel, trade, and the prohibition 
of large public gatherings.  Non-essential businesses that 
may result in large congregations of people will be closed 
as will schools and other public meetings will be 
suspended. 
  
b. Individual quarantines may be authorized and employed.  
 
c. Enforce quarantine measures. 
 
d. Make decisions about culling infected animal populations 
or other animal disease containment activities during a 
pandemic. 
 
e. Implement orders for expansion of medical care under 
emergency conditions. 
 
G. Recovery 
 
1. Communication of Medical Information – Communicate to 
medical community, the media and the general public regarding 
decreasing trend of smallpox attack rates data.   
 
2. Disease Surveillance  
 
a.  Confirm reduction in the number of confirmed cases. 
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b. Conduct studies of morbidity and mortality data, attack 
rates in South Carolina. 
 
3. Vaccine Programs – Replenish medical supplies and initiate 
resumption of routine programs. 
 
4. Distribution of Medication – Replenish medical supplies and 
initiate resumption of routine programs. 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control:  Lift or revoke 
public health orders which are no longer necessary. 
 
H. Mitigation  
 
1. Communication of Medical Information – Communicate with the 
medical community, stakeholders, the media, and the general 
public regarding smallpox preparedness and response roles. 
 
2. Disease Surveillance – Conduct studies of morbidity and mortality 
data, attack rates in South Carolina. 
 
3. Vaccine Programs 
 
a. Review, evaluate, and take measures to improve or enhance 
respective roles. 
 
b. Recommend post-outbreak studies to assist in evaluations 
of the smallpox response capacities and coordinated 
activities. 
 
4. Distribution of Medication – Review, evaluate, and take measures 
to improve or enhance respective roles. 
 
5. Public Health Authority and Disease Control 
 
a. Evaluate effectiveness of statutory and regulatory 
authorities related to smallpox response. 
 
b. Make efforts to amend statutory and regulatory authorities 
to increase the effectiveness of smallpox response. 
 
V. RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
A. Department of Health and Environmental Control  
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1. Communicate health advisories, alerts and updates through the 
Health Alert Network. 
 
2. Communicate educational messages regarding smallpox 
prevention and surveillance and treatment to the media and the 
public. 
 
3. Communicate Influenza-Like Illness surveillance data as 
appropriate. 
 
4. Conduct febrile rash illness surveillance. 
 
5. Conduct Sentinel Laboratory Surveillance for viral isolates. 
 
6. Conduct Rapid Diagnostic Testing Surveillance. 
 
7. Develop tiered contingency plans for use of smallpox vaccine and 
priority groups for vaccination. 
 
8. Develop plans for storage, distribution, and administration of 
smallpox vaccine through public health and other providers to 
nationally defined high-priority target groups – these plans should 
include: 
 
a. mass immunization clinic capability within each Public 
Health Region; 
 
b. locations of clinics (e.g., central sites, pharmacies, work 
place, military facilities); 
 
c. vaccine storage capability, including current and potential 
contingency depots for: 
 
1) state central vaccine storage depot, and 
 
2) each Public Health Region depot; 
 
d. numbers of staff needed to run vaccination clinics; 
 
e. procedures to deploy staff from other areas, from within 
and outside public health, to assist in vaccination; 
 
f. advanced discussions with professional organizations 
regarding tasks outside routine job descriptions during an 
outbreak; 
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g. training for deployed staff; and 
 
h. measures to be taken to prevent distribution to persons 
other than those in the priority groups. 
 
9. Determine how receipt of vaccine will be recorded. 
 
10. Determine the number of people within each public health region 
who fall within each of the priority groups for vaccination. 
 
11. Verify capacity of suppliers for direct shipping to public health 
regions. 
 
12. Develop plans for vaccine security: 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
13. Coordinate proposed vaccine distribution plans with bordering 
Public Health Regions and States. 
 
14. Enhance Vaccine Adverse Event Surveillance. 
 
15. Obtain and maintain a current inventory of available medication of 
healthcare providers (i.e. hospitals, clinics, pharmacies). 
 
16. Obtain and maintain a current inventory of available medication at 
the Department of Health and Environmental Control primary drug 
wholesaler and additional wholesalers in South Carolina. 
 
17. Establish Memoranda of Agreement with agencies, organizations 
and individuals capable of providing assistance in obtaining and 
distributing medication such as the South Carolina Pharmacy 
Association. 
 
18. Develop plans for the distribution of medications. 
 
19. Establish plans for diverting patients who require supportive but 
not advanced level care to non-traditional care facilities. 
 
20. Establish and maintain a database of alternate non-traditional 
medical facilities and services to which patients could be diverted 
during an outbreak. 
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21. Develop public information about the appropriate use of personal 
protective devices like disposable masks that could be used during 
an outbreak. 
 
22. Define risk groups by potential risk of exposure and develop 
guidelines and recommendations for the use of personal protective 
equipment by individual risk group or potential exposure setting. 
 
23. Recruit medical volunteers for provision of care and vaccine 
administration to augment medical, nursing, and other healthcare 
staffing.  Volunteer activities for disease containment will include 
administering vaccinations. 
 
24. Coordinate Public Health Orders and plans with bordering states. 
 
25. Confirm that health region plans incorporate the capability to 
employ the recommended disease containment activities. 
 
26. Upgrade surveillance reporting requirements as necessary. 
 
27. Expand surveillance network during response phase. 
 
28. Confirm that notification lists are current for local agencies, the 
medical community, and decision makers. 
 
29. Determine if a meeting of the Disease Control subcommittee or 
other decision makers is indicated to recommend courses of action 
for disease containment. 
 
30. Confirm that the database for the Health Alert Network is current. 
 
31. Disseminate smallpox isolation and quarantine guidelines. 
 
32. Conduct initial availability assessment of supplies (e.g., syringes, 
adrenalin, sharps disposal units), equipment and locations 
potentially required for a vaccine-based response (i.e., mass 
immunization clinics). 
 
33. Develop a list of currently qualified vaccinators and sources of 
potential vaccinators. 
 
34. Review educational materials concerning administration of 
vaccines and update as needed. 
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35. Collaborate on national and international disease control 
initiatives. 
 
36. Develop and communicate disease prevention, control, and 
containment guidelines for physicians providing care during a 
pandemic to address the provision of basic medical treatment in 
non-hospital settings. 
 
37. Develop clinical guidelines for physicians and Emergency Medical 
Services personnel to direct patients to the appropriate level of care 
based on their clinical presentation. 
 
38. Develop processes for patient assessment, communication between 
facilities, and direction of patients to available beds. 
 
39. Coordinate triage logistics with hospitals and Emergency Medical 
Services including patient assessment, communication between 
facilities, and direction of patients to available beds. 
 
40. Recommend employment of isolation practices for: 
 
a. symptomatic persons with travel risk factors or contact with 
others having travel risk factors, 
 
b. those with culture confirmed and identified smallpox, 
 
c. symptomatic persons that are not yet confirmed. 
 
41. Review and modify if necessary, plans for storage, distribution, 
and administration of smallpox vaccine through public health and 
other providers to high-priority target groups. 
 
42. Ensure staff is trained and infrastructure is in place to record 
immunizations. 
 
43. Review estimates of the number of people who fall within each of 
the priority groups for vaccination (i.e., high-risk groups, health 
care workers, emergency service workers, specific age groups). 
 
44. Determine the most clinically effective and cost-effective 
strategies for use of pharmaceuticals. 
 
45. Communicate to providers if and when the federal government 
moves to: 
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a. purchase large quantities of drugs to provide for state-level 
public health distribution, 
 
b. purchase such drugs for private sector distribution 
according to prioritization rules communicated by state 
public health, or 
 
c. leaves distribution entirely to the private sector. 
 
46. As necessary, provide for drug distribution. 
 
47. Coordinate disease control activities with vaccination activities to 
ensure vaccination of essential workers and population who are 
either at high risk of spreading the smallpox virus or who provide 
essential community service. 
 
48. Advise the Governor and the Governor’s Public Health Emergency 
Plan Committee on: 
 
a. the most appropriate community-based infection control 
methods, 
 
b. the most appropriate distribution priorities and systems 
during time when there is insufficient supply of vaccines 
and prioritization of distribution is necessary; 
 
c. planning for expansion of the medical care system to meet 
the surge in demand for care. 
 
49. Authorize required isolation practices for 
 
a. symptomatic persons with travel risk factors or contact with 
others having travel risk factors, 
 
b. those with culture confirmed and identified smallpox, 
 
c. symptomatic persons that are not yet confirmed. 
 
50. Establish and communicate precautions needed for disposal of 
deceased persons. 
 
51. Purchase vaccine if necessary. 
 
52. Review/revise recommended priority groups for immunization 
based on available epidemiologic data. 
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53. Activate immunization clinic capability. 
 
54. Implement streamlined Vaccine Adverse Event surveillance. 
 
55. Arrange for direct shipping of vaccine to public health regions. 
 
56. Communicate with bordering states to facilitate awareness of the 
vaccine distribution plan and coordination of efforts as much as 
possible. 
 
57. Collect and compile reports of total people immunized. 
 
58. Monitor vaccine supply, demand, distribution, and uptake. 
 
59. Recruit trained immunization staff from unaffected public health 
regions to augment regular staff in affected areas. 
 
60. Expand vaccine programs to cover population not yet immunized. 
 
61. Summarize and report coverage data and Vaccine Adverse Event 
data. 
 
62. Examine vaccine efficacy. 
 
63. Restock supplies and resume routine programs. 
 
64. Review/revise policies/procedures/standing orders used during the 
mass vaccination campaigns. 
 
65. Provide or coordinate obtaining pharmaceuticals other than 
vaccines. 
 
66. Implement restrictions on travel, trade, and the prohibition of large 
public gatherings.  Non-essential businesses that may result in 
large congregations of people will be closed as will schools and 
other pubic meetings will be suspended. 
 
67. Enforce quarantine measures. 
 
68. Make decisions in coordination with Animal Emergency Response 
about culling infected animal populations or other animal disease 
containment activities during an outbreak. 
 
69. Communicate to medical community, the media and the general 
public regarding status of the smallpox outbreak. 
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70. Conduct studies of morbidity and mortality data, attack rates in SC. 
 
71. Lift/revoke public health orders that are no longer necessary. 
 
72. Recommend post-outbreak studies to assist in evaluations of the 
smallpox response capacities and coordinated activities. 
 
73. Evaluate effectiveness of statutory and regulatory authorities 
related to smallpox response. 
 
74. Make efforts to amend statutory and regulatory authorities to 
increase the effectiveness of smallpox response. 
  
B. South Carolina Pharmacy Association 
 
1. Assist with the procurement of medications. 
 
2. Assist with obtaining volunteer pharmacists for distribution 
 
3. Assist with storage, distribution, and administration of smallpox 
vaccine to defined high-priority target groups. 
 
4. Assist with development of list of currently qualified vaccinators 
and sources of potential vaccinators. 
 
C. South Carolina Department of Transportation 
 
1. Assist with storage and transportation of vaccine. 
 
2. Assist with control of roads and transportation to support disease 
containment efforts. 
 
3. Assist with enhanced surveillance efforts including 
assessment/isolation of symptomatic travelers from high-risk areas. 
 
D. South Carolina Press Association – Assist with distribution of information 
to keep the public informed about disease containment and prevention 
measures and where to go for assistance. 
 
E. South Carolina Hospital Association 
 
1. Support disease surveillance activities. 
 
2. Assist with coordination for the administration of smallpox vaccine 
to defined high-priority target groups. 
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3. Assist with development of list of currently qualified vaccinators 
and sources of potential vaccinators. 
 
4. Assist with development of plans for surge capacity and, along 
with the Department of Health and Environmental Control, 
establish acceptable standards of care when facilities are at or 
beyond capacity. 
 
5. Assist with coordination of expansion of medical services to meet 
surge in demand. 
 
F. South Carolina Ports Authority – Assist with enhanced surveillance efforts  
including assessment/isolation of symptomatic travelers from high-risk  
areas. 
 
 G. South Carolina National Guard 
 
1. Assist with storage, distribution, and administration of smallpox 
vaccine to defined high-priority target groups. 
 
2. Assist with enforcement of quarantine measures and restrictions on 
travel.  
 
3. Assist in the development of plans for vaccine security: 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
  4. Assist with vaccine security 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
H. South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulations 
 
1. Assist with development of a list of currently qualified vaccinators 
and sources of potential vaccinators. 
 
2. Assist with establishing licensing privileges for out-of-state 
physicians, nurses and pharmacists. 
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 I. South Carolina Department of Commerce 
 
1. Assist with the acquisition of smallpox vaccine. 
 
2. Assist with developing collaborative relationships and Memoranda 
of Agreement with business and industries that have work-site 
health care facilities that can be used as mass vaccination clinics 
for their employees. 
 
J. Department of Public Safety 
 
1. Assist in the development of plans for vaccine security: 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
  2. Assist with vaccine security 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
3. Assist with enforcement of quarantine measures and restrictions on 
travel. 
 
K. State Law Enforcement Division 
 
1. Assist in the development of plans for vaccine security: 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
  2. Assist with vaccine security 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
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c. at clinics. 
 
3. Assist with enforcement of quarantine measures and restrictions on 
travel. 
 
L. SC Budget and Control Board 
 
1. Assist with the acquisition of smallpox vaccine. 
 
2. Assist with procurement of medical supplies. 
 
M. Clemson University Livestock and Poultry Health – Identify and assess 
livestock disease threats and animal related public health issues that may 
contribute to smallpox spread. 
 
N. Department of Natural Resources 
 
1. Assist in the development of plans for vaccine security: 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
  2. Assist with vaccine security 
 
a. during transport, 
 
b. during storage, and 
 
c. at clinics. 
 
3. Assist with enforcement of quarantine measures and restrictions on 
travel. 
 
O. South Carolina Department of Education 
 
1. Assist with communication of the need for school closures to 
prevent the spread of disease. 
 
2. Assist with designating school facilities for non-traditional health 
care facilities when needed 
 
P. South Carolina Coroners Association 
SC Mass Casualty Plan 
 Annex 3-22 December 2006 
Annex 3 
  
 
1. Assist with coordination of temporary morgue operations and final 
disposition of deceased persons. 
 
2. Assist with documentation and recordkeeping relevant to 
smallpox-related mortality. 
 
Q. South Carolina Funeral Directors Association 
 
1. Assist in coordination of next of kin notification operations. 
 
2. Assist with coordination of temporary morgue operations and final 
disposition of deceased persons. 
 
3. Assist with documentation and recordkeeping relevant to 
smallpox-related mortality. 
 
VI. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
 
The Department of Health and Human Services is the principal Federal agency for 
protecting the health of all Americans.  State response operations will interface 
with Federal response assets through ESF-8 and through liaison between the State 
Department of Health and Environmental Control and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention.  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention will also 
facilitate guidance and information flow between the State of South Carolina and 
the World Health Organization, which would have significant involvement during 
a smallpox outbreak.  Liaison between the State Emergency Operations Center 
and the Department of Homeland Security will provide access to additional 
Federal health and medical assets. 
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MASS FATALITY MANAGEMENT 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
A. The South Carolina Mass Fatality Management Plan is Annex 4 to the 
South Carolina Mass Casualty Plan.  The Mass Fatality Management Plan 
addresses the state level response to a mass fatality incident, identifies the 
elements of response and pre-assigns responsibilities and actions to state 
agencies and organizations. 
 
B. In South Carolina natural and man-made hazards have the potential to 
generate large numbers of fatalities.  Areas of the state are vulnerable to 
hurricanes, earthquakes, dam failures, radiological disasters, railway 
disasters, industrial disasters, weapons of mass destruction and biological 
events.  A pandemic influenza has the potential to rapidly spread among 
the population, last for many weeks and cause fatalities in such large 
numbers that the current capacity of our medical and coroner 
infrastructures could be overwhelmed. 
 
C. Under the direction of the State Department of Health and Environmental 
Control, eight public health regions serve the citizens of South Carolina.  
Each health region has, or will, develop a mass fatality management plan 
in cooperation with county coroners, local government officials, health 
care providers, first responder community and other local responders such 
as local funeral home directors and morticians.  Under the direction of the 
South Carolina Emergency Management Division, the state level response 
to a mass-fatality producing event would primarily involve coordination of 
the response among the health regions and arranging for support from 
state and federal assets as needed. 
 
D. Authority for operations in response to a mass fatality-producing incident 
are derived from several sources.  The first are the powers conferred upon 
the Governor to declare a state of emergency or public health emergency 
under the Emergency Health Powers Act and to direct the State’s response 
to such emergencies, including S.C. Code of laws, Sections 1-3-410 to -
490 and Section 25-1-440.  The second is the State of South Carolina 
Executive Order number 2003-12, which authorizes emergency operations 
under the State Emergency Operations Plan.  The third authority has its 
basis in the traditional Health Powers held by the Commissioner of the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control.  Those powers include 
the ability to issue Public Health Orders under traditional public health 
authority.  Fourth, after a mass-casualty producing incident, the Governor 
may invoke the Emergency Health Powers Act.  The Emergency Health 
Powers Act gives extraordinary powers to the Commissioner of the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control so that he may issue 
extraordinary Public Health orders, including the authority and powers to 
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coordinate with coroners, medical examiners and funeral directors to 
manage the safe disposal of human remains.  Finally, coroners, medical 
examiners, funeral directors, and embalmers all have enabling statutes that 
give them authority to handle human remains. 
 
E. Mission: 
 
This Annex to the State Mass Casualty Plan provides operational concepts 
unique to mass fatality response, assigns responsibilities to state agencies 
and coordinates response efforts in order to meet the needs of local 
governments following a mass fatality-producing incident. 
 
II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 A.  Situation 
 
1. For the purposes of this plan, a mass fatality incident is described 
as any event that produces more fatalities than can be handled 
using local resources. 
 
2. County Coroners have control over acute mass fatalities within 
their jurisdiction.  When a County Coroner deems that the number 
of fatalities exceeds local resources and capabilities to effectively 
handle a mass fatality incident, they may request that the county 
emergency manager request state-level assistance or request 
mutual aid from another jurisdiction.  When appropriate, state-
level Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) will be notified of 
possible activation early in the incident assessment phase. 
 
3. State Level ESF-8 may determine that assistance from federal 
agencies, such as the Federal Disaster Mortuary Operational 
Response Team (DMORT), may be needed. DMORT assistance 
would be requested through the State Emergency Operations 
Center. 
 
4. In addition to state level response for morgue and final disposition 
arrangements for a mass fatality event, assistance will be needed 
from local officials in providing assistance and aid to the families 
of the victims, as well as for morgue operations workers. 
 
 B. Assumptions 
 
1. The plan assumptions stated in the Basic Plan of the South 
Carolina Emergency Operations Plan and the South Carolina Mass 
Casualty Plan are valid for this Mass Fatality Management Plan. 
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2. The term “mass fatality-producing events” applies to a wide range 
of incidents and emergencies, accidental or deliberate, including 
disease outbreaks, geological and meteorological disasters, 
nuclear, hazardous materials (hazmat) or conventional events and 
all manners of transportation incidents (land, air, marine). 
 
3. Mass fatality-producing events may overwhelm local, county and 
state resources. 
 
4. Family members may mobilize to the incident scene or other areas 
to search for loved ones. 
 
5. Families will seek information on unaccounted family 
members/loved ones and will share information on them. 
 
6. Behavioral health issues will be apparent in mass-fatality incidents, 
causing increased demand for behavioral health treatment and 
intervention support services to local Departments of Mental 
Health, emergency departments, community health centers, and 
other designated locations. 
 
7. Recovery and identification of remains are expected to continue 
for a prolonged period.  Some remains may never be identified.  
Death registration and certification may also be delayed. 
 
8. Fatality management staffing may include medical 
examiners/coroners (ME/C), funeral service personnel, cemetery 
and crematorium personnel, forensic specialists, crime lab 
technician, and any other person whose responsibility involves 
direct handling of human remains, as well as support to 
identification of remains and data collection. 
 
9. There may be multiple sites for managing fatalities in multiple 
jurisdictions. 
 
10. In the event of widely dispersed mass fatalities, significant damage 
to infrastructure, and/or where the risks posed to fatality 
management personnel outweigh the benefit of conducting scene 
operations, performance of critical tasks will take longer to 
accomplish. 
 
11. Emergency workers, including those necessary for fatality 
management, may choose not report to duty due to evacuating their 
families or because they have been injured or killed. 
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12.  There are federal Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team 
(DMORT) resources to support local mass fatality management 
needs.  There is only one federal DMORT team in the country with 
the capability to decontaminate bodies. 
 
13. A terrorist act will require the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) to be in control of the evidence and investigation. 
 
14. Media will be present on the scene and must be managed. 
 
III. ACRONYMS 
 
DHHS – U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
DMORT – (Federal) Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team  
EMAC – Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
ESARVHP – Emergency System for Advanced Registration of Volunteer Health 
Professionals 
ESF – Emergency Support Function 
FAC – Family Assistance Center 
FCO -  Federal Coordinating Officer 
FHMO – Federal Hazard Mitigation Officer 
HMGP – Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
HSEEP – Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program 
ICS – Incident Command Structure 
NIMS – National Incident Management System 
PPE – Personal Protective Equipment 
RTF – (South Carolina) Recovery Task Force 
SCDHEC – South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 
SCEMD – South Carolina Emergency Management Division 
SEOC – State Emergency Operations Center 
SHMO – State Hazard Mitigation Officer 
SLED – State Law Enforcement Division 
 
IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
  
 A. Activation 
 
1. Activation of this plan will occur when a mass-fatality producing 
incident exceeds local response capabilities.  Depending on the 
nature of the incident, demand on response resources may increase 
gradually, or it may be such that certain local and state resources 
are quickly overwhelmed. 
 
2. The Incident Commander or local Emergency Operations Center 
may activate local or SCDHEC regional mutual aid agreements to 
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obtain access to additional resources, before requesting state level 
assistance. 
 
3. In the instance of a mass fatality event that exceeds state 
capacities, assistance may be sought from other states through the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) or from 
Federal resources through HHS Region IV. 
 
4. Mass fatality incidents that exceed local, regional and state 
resources may result in requests for Federal DMORT assets as 
discussed in the South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan and in 
Section III. E. of the South Carolina Mass Casualty Plan.  DMORT 
does not establish command and control over the fatality 
management operation, but will be integrated into the local ICS 
structure. 
 
5. State level mass fatality management support agencies of ESF-8 
will support the following incident operations as listed: 
 
 B. Support to Tactical Operations 
 
1. Local, regional and state emergency planners will coordinate 
fatality management planning and support; 
 
2. Coordinate assistance for next-of-kin notification and collection of 
ante mortem information; 
 
3. Establish the identification of medico-legal authority; 
 
4. Coordinate assistance from state level public health and the 
medical community; 
 
5. Coordinate with public health and regulatory agencies to develop 
plans, procedures, and protocols to protect fatality management 
personnel from infectious diseases, environmental, radiological, 
chemical and other hazards when handling remains; 
 
6. Identify and catalog resources for staffing ante mortem data 
collection in the Family Assistance Center; 
 
7. Coordinate regional and state level assistance for victim 
identification and mortuary services, and the processing, 
preparation and disposition of remains, to include death 
registration and certification; 
 
8. Request assistance from Federal mortuary/morgue services; 
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9. Provide communications support for the release of information 
related to the mass fatality event to both the public and next-of-kin. 
 
 C. Support to On-Scene Operations 
 
1. Provide support in the gathering of forensic evidence for fatality 
management operations; 
 
  2. Provide support for the decontamination of remains; 
 
  3. Provide additional security support for on-scene operations; 
 
  4. Provide support for personal needs of responders. 
 
 D. Support to Morgue Operations 
 
1. Assist in the identification and establishment of additional morgue 
space; 
 
2. Provide personnel and security support to local morgue operations; 
 
3. Provide additional morgue capacity from state portable morgue 
resources. 
 
4. Coordinate morgue infrastructure support, including, but not 
limited to power, water, equipment, fuel, etc. 
 
 E. Management of Ante mortem Data 
 
1. Establish and identify to responders a state-level ante mortem 
record repository and housing facility; 
 
2. Activate state level resources to support ante mortem data 
collection activities; 
 
3. Provide additional resources to local responders in conducting the 
collection of ante mortem information, including conducting the 
DNA collection of family members; 
 
4. Provide support for entering data obtained in interviews into 
library. 
 
F. Support to Victim Identification 
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1. Provide additional resources to assist local responders in 
conducting forensic identification, including post-mortem 
examination; 
 
2. Provide assistance by coordinating local/state/federal/international 
databases; 
 
3. Provide assistance for the notification of next-of-kin and for the 
returning of effects to next-of-kin. 
  
 G. Death Registration and Certification 
 
1. Coordinate development of a unique numbering system; 
 
2. Initiate teams to provide support for the timely and accurate 
registration of deaths; 
 
3. Initiate teams to provide support for certification and issuance of 
death certificates. 
 
 H. Support to Final Disposition  
 
1.  Provide resources for the final disposition of human remains, 
including cremation, burial, or body donation. 
 
2. Provide support for the identification and re-burial of remains in 
instances in which a large number of gravesites are disturbed, 
either by floods, earthquakes or hurricanes, or by some manmade 
disturbance. 
 
 I. Demobilization 
 
1. Assist in the demobilization of fatality management personnel. 
 
2. Return all assets and resources to pre-incident readiness levels or 
origination points; 
 
3. Participate in the operational review of fatality management 
operations; 
 
4. Assist in the identification of fatality management staff post-
operational needs; 
 
5. Provide information to fatality management personnel on where 
and how to obtain medical, psychological, and financial assistance. 
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 J. Planning, Training, and Exercises 
 
1. Convene all appropriate state level agencies and stakeholders in 
the development of the state level mass fatality management plan 
and standard operating procedures; 
 
2. At least annually conduct one state level exercise that continues 
through the actions needed to manage a state level mass fatality 
incident; 
 
3. Provide information related to mass fatality training opportunities 
as they arise to all state level mass fatality management planning 
partners; 
 
4. Develop a Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP) compliant after-action report following any state-level 
exercise with a mass fatality management component; 
 
5. Incorporate changes resulting from exercise improvement action 
plans into the state level mass fatality management plan, reconvene 
planning partners and stakeholders to review plan changes, then re-
exercise the changes to the state plan. 
 
V. STATE LEVEL ACTIONS 
 
 A. PREPAREDNESS  
 
  1. General 
 
a. Develop, document and maintain mutual support 
relationships with other governmental entities, professional 
associations, volunteer organizations and other private 
services that may assist during a mass fatality incident. 
 
b. Recruit volunteers to register with Emergency System for 
Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals 
(ESAR-VHP) in order to pre-identify, train, coordinate and 
credential personnel necessary to support mass fatality 
incident management, including staffing of family 
assistance centers. 
 
c. Organize and provide training to registered volunteers for, 
including but not limited to, evidence collection, cultural 
considerations, NIMS, ante mortem data collection, as 
appropriate. 
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d. Conduct a state-level assessment of local, regional and state 
resources, equipment and manpower.   
 
e. Develop and maintain a written state plan to support local 
response to a mass fatality incident and provide training 
and exercising of that plan at a state level and including all 
relevant partners and stakeholders. 
 
2. Support to Tactical Operations 
 
a. Provide training and planning support to all appropriate 
stakeholders and support agencies in legal and ethical 
issues related to mass fatality management. 
 
b. Identify, register, and credential mass fatality management 
volunteer staff, including personnel capable of augmenting 
the local coroner’s staff and providing liaison services to 
Incident Command and the ESF-8 desk. 
 
3. Support to On-Scene Operations 
 
a. Establish and implement mutual aid agreements for 
identified family assistance centers; 
 
b. Identify, register and credential behavioral health and 
medical personnel to support responders. 
 
  4. Support to Morgue Operations 
 
a. Identify sites in each Public Health region in the state that 
could be established as temporary morgues, and include 
equipment needed to initiate the site as a morgue.  Identify 
sites which might serve as family assistance centers. 
 
b. Establish and implement written mutual aid agreements for 
identified temporary morgues. 
 
c. Determine number of funeral directors and embalmers 
available to assist in mass fatality management operations. 
 
  5. Management of Ante mortem Data 
 
a. Establish the means to collect ante mortem data, preferably 
electronically.  Consider the use of the federally created 
Victim Identification Program. 
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6. Support to Victim Identification 
 
a. Identify and catalog state resources that may assist with 
victim identification; 
 
b. Identify and catalog state and federal databases that may be 
employed to assist with victim identification data 
collection; 
 
c. Establish one data collection system that will allow a 
statewide, coordinated means of ante- and post-mortem 
data collection and victim identification. 
  
  7. Death Registration and Certification 
 
a. Continue to increase participation in the state-level Web 
Death electronic death reporting system. 
 
b. Provide training to local coroners, funeral directors and 
others in Web Death data entry, policies and procedures. 
 
c. Identify and catalog personnel and assets to support 
additional death record go-teams and provide training and 
exercise opportunities for those teams; 
 
d. Develop procedures for registering presumptive deaths 
when mass fatalities occur. 
 
7. Support to Final Disposition  
 
a. Identify and catalog agencies that may have roles in 
repatriation of remains to other countries; 
 
b. Delineate process by which state would support local areas 
in providing locations for interment; 
 
c. Develop a process to ensure that Burial Removal Transit 
Permits are issued in accordance with South Carolina state 
law for removal and transportation of remains. 
 
d. Develop process to disinter remains and correct death 
certificate to reflect change, if needed. 
 
 B. RESPONSE 
 
 1. General 
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a. Determine the nature and extent of the mass fatality event. 
 
b. Determine if action is needed from the Governor to 
implement a declaration of emergency or to invoke the 
Emergency Health Powers Act.  Implementation of the Act 
may be needed to ensure the safe disposition of human 
remains. 
 
c. Notify and coordinate support agencies and organizations 
involved in the response to a mass fatality incident. 
 
d. Requests for assistance in the form of mutual aid may be 
referred from ESF-8 (Health and Medical Services) to the 
SEOC Chief of Operations, or may come directly from 
communities within the disaster area(s). To reduce 
confusion and duplication of effort, mutual aid should be 
coordinated and delivered in close coordination among 
State EOC Operations Section, ESF-8 and the jurisdictions, 
associations, and organizations delivering the mutual aid; 
 
e. Facilitate the collaboration of county, regional and state 
officials to determine whether to request federal assistance. 
 
 2. Support to Tactical Operations 
 
   a. If needed, initiate support for decontamination of bodies. 
 
b. Establish staging area for body recovery and delivery to 
temporary morgues. 
 
c. Initiate assistance from law enforcement to enable 
perimeter security and security for scene operations and 
evidence collection. 
 
d. Coordinate with epidemiological surveillance and 
investigation to determine if deaths are the result of an 
exposure or disease.  
 
3. Support to On-Scene Operations 
 
a. Establish Family Assistance Center to support local 
operations and mobilize staff.   
 
b. Initiate psychosocial teams to provide psychological aid to 
fatality management workers and families of victims. 
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c. Secure evidence/personal effects collection site. 
 
d. Provide appropriate information regarding the event to 
public information (ESF-15) to support family and media 
communications. 
 
e. Establish a unique numbering system for the tracking of all 
human remains. 
 
  4. Support to Morgue Operations 
 
a. Establish additional morgue operations as needed; 
 
b. Mobilize volunteers to staff temporary morgue sites. 
 
c. Request additional portable morgue, PPE and other 
supplies and infrastructure to support morgues as needed 
from state resources. 
 
d. Initiate assistance from law enforcement (ESF-13) to 
enable morgue security. 
 
  5. Management of Ante mortem Data 
 
a. Initiate system of ante mortem data collection and establish 
ante mortem record repository and its housing facility. 
 
  6. Support to Victim Identification 
 
a. Initiate system to support victim identification, including 
support for forensic identification from partners. 
 
b. Request information from law enforcement databases to aid 
the victim identification. 
 
8. Death Registration and Certification 
 
a. Initiate additional death records teams.  The state’s web-
based electronic death reporting system (WebDeath) will 
be used to collect data for death registration and to monitor 
the surge.   
 
9. Support to Final Disposition  
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a. Determine if final disposition needs may necessitate 
alternative interment or other means of disposition for the 
public’s health, safety and welfare. 
 
 C. RECOVERY 
 
1. General 
 
a. SCEMD will establish/activate the SC Recovery Task 
Force (RTF) within 14 days following a federally declared 
disaster (reference South Carolina Recovery Plan).  
 
  2. Support to Director of Tactical Operations 
 
a. Reconstitute fatality management personnel and equipment. 
 
b. Document mass fatality management matters that may be 
needed for inclusion in agency or state/federal briefings, 
situation reports and action plans 
 
3. Support to On-Scene Operations 
 
a. Evaluate the need to continue state-supported security 
measures at fatality scene and, upon recommendation of 
local coroner,  discontinue if appropriate. 
 
  4. Support to Morgue Operations 
 
a. Reconstitute temporary morgue equipment 
 
b. Reconstitute/decontaminate temporary morgue sites.  
Return to pre-disaster condition as nearly as possible. 
 
  5. Management of Ante mortem Data 
 
Continue to maintain system of ante mortem data as needed. 
 
  6. Support to Victim Identification 
 
a. Ensure that all remains and personal effects have been 
identified and returned to next-of kin as appropriate. 
 
  7. Death Registration and Certification 
 
a. Ensure that death certificates have been issued in 
accordance with state regulations. 
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  8. Support to Final Disposition  
 
a. In instances of floods, earthquakes or other emergencies 
which may disturb established gravesites, assist local 
responders in re-interment of bodies, caskets, etc.  
 
b. Provide for the release of information related to disaster-
related deaths but limit information to those fatalities that 
have been officially confirmed by local government 
officials. 
 
  9. Demobilization 
 
a. Provide continued support to fatality management 
personnel on where and how to obtain medical, 
psychological and financial assistance. 
 
  10. Planning, Training, and Exercises 
 
a. Revise plans to reflect changes in implementing programs 
and procedures, improvements in emergency management 
capabilities, corrections of deficiencies identified in 
exercises. 
 
 D. MITIGATION 
 
1. General 
 
a. Evaluate and update existing mass fatality management 
plans, as necessary. 
 
b. Identify and implement long-term mitigation measures, 
e.g., codes to reduce the risk and magnitude of future 
disaster impacts on loss of life. 
 
c. State Hazard Mitigation Officer (SHMO) (reference SC 
Recovery Plan) The Governor will appoint a SHMO, who 
will be responsible for coordinating, updating, and 
implementing the State Hazard Mitigation Program 
(pursuant to Section 322 of the Stafford Act) and 
implementing and managing the Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program (HMGP) (pursuant to Section 404 of the Stafford 
Act). 
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d.  Federal Hazard Mitigation Officer (FHMO) (Reference SC 
Recovery Plan).  The Federal Coordinating Officer 
(FCO)will appoint a FHMO, who will be responsible for 
managing the HMGP for the specific disaster declaration. 
The FHMO serves as the SHMO’s federal counterpart.  
 
 2. Support to Tactical Operations 
 
a. Review mutual aid agreements for changes; establish 
mutual aid agreements where needed. 
 
b. Evaluate mass fatality operations and prepare review report 
for use in plan revisions. 
 
3. Support to On-Scene Operations 
 
a. Identify training and equipment needs. 
 
  4. Support to Morgue Operations 
 
a. Evaluate additional temporary sites for identified needs and 
appropriateness in future response. 
 
b. Determine areas of equipment and staffing shortages for 
plan review. 
 
  5. Management of Ante mortem Data 
 
a. Evaluate the effectiveness of state ante mortem data system 
and adapt as needed. 
 
  6. Support to Victim Identification 
 
a. Identify gaps that prevented the rapid identification of 
victims and develop action plan to streamline the 
identification process. 
 
  7. Death Registration and Certification 
 
a. Review laws and regulations for adaptations to improve 
response to mass fatality incidents. 
 
 b. Review internal processes for improvements to plan. 
 
  8. Support to Final Disposition  
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a. Review laws and regulations for adaptations to improve 
response to final disposition during mass fatality incidents. 
 
  9. Planning, Training, and Exercises 
 
a. Evaluate and update existing mass fatality management 
plans, as necessary. 
 
b. Conduct training and exercises incorporating improvements 
from action plan. 
 
VI. RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
A. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 
  
1. Develop, document and maintain mutual support relationships with 
other governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and other private services that may assist during a 
mass fatality incident. 
 
2. Recruit volunteers to register with ESAR-VHP in order to pre-
identify, coordinate and credential personnel necessary to support 
mass fatality incident management, including staffing of family 
assistance centers. 
 
3. Coordinate a state-level assessment of local and state resources, 
equipment and manpower.   
 
4. Develop and maintain a written state plan to support local response 
to a mass fatality incident and provide training and exercising of 
that plan at a state level and including all relevant partners and 
stakeholders. 
 
5. Provide training and planning support to all appropriate 
stakeholders and support agencies in legal and ethical issues 
related to mass fatality management. 
 
6. Identify, register, and credential mass fatality management 
volunteer staff, including personnel capable of augmenting the 
local coroner’s staff and providing liaison services to Incident 
Command and the ESF 8 desk 
 
7. Identify and credential behavioral health and medical personnel to 
support  responders. 
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8. Assist the local coroners in identifying sites in each Public Health 
region in the state that could be established as temporary morgues, 
and include equipment needed to initiate the site as a morgue.  
Identify sites which might serve as family assistance centers. 
 
9. Identify state resources that may assist with victim identification. 
 
10. Identify state and federal databases that may be employed to assist 
with victim identification data collection. 
 
11. Work with the Coroners Association to establish one data 
collection system that will allow a statewide, coordinated means of 
ante- and post-mortem data collection and victim identification. 
 
12. Continue to increase participation in the state-level Web Death 
electronic death reporting system. 
 
13. Provide training to local coroners, funeral directors and others in 
Web Death data entry, policies and procedures. 
 
14. Identify personnel and assets to support additional death record go-
teams and provide training and exercise opportunities for those 
teams. 
 
15. Develop procedure for registering presumptive deaths in mass 
fatalities. 
 
16. Identify agencies that may have roles in repatriation of remains to 
other countries. 
 
17. Work with the Coroners Association to delineate the process by 
which the state would support local areas in providing locations for 
interment. 
 
18. Work with the Coroners Association to develop a process to 
disinter remains and correct death certificates to reflect change, if 
needed. 
 
19. Determine if action is needed from the Governor to implement the 
Emergency Health Powers Act, or to declare a state of emergency.  
Implementation of the Act may be needed to ensure the safe 
disposal of human remains. 
  
20. Notify and coordinate support agencies and organizations involved 
in the  response to a mass fatality incident. 
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21. Refer requests for assistance in the form of mutual aid to the SEOC 
Chief of Operations.  To reduce confusion and duplication of 
effort, mutual aid should be coordinated and delivered in close 
coordination between the ESF-8 and the jurisdictions, associations, 
and organizations delivering the mutual aid. 
 
22. Facilitate the collaboration of county, regional and state officials to 
determine whether to request federal assistance. 
 
23. If needed, initiate support for decontamination of bodies. 
 
24. Working with the local coroner, initiate assistance from law 
enforcement (ESF-13) to enable perimeter security and security for 
scene operations and evidence collection. 
 
25. Coordinate with epidemiological surveillance and investigation to 
determine if deaths are the result of an exposure and/or disease. 
 
26. Initiate psychosocial teams to provide psychological aid to fatality 
management workers and families of victims. 
 
27. Establish additional morgue operations as needed. 
 
28. Mobilize volunteers to staff temporary morgue sites. 
 
29. Working with the local coroner, initiate assistance from law 
enforcement (ESF-13) to enable morgue security. 
 
30. Initiate additional death records teams.  The state’s web-based 
electronic death reporting system (WebDeath) will be used to 
collect data for death registration  and to monitor the surge. 
 
31. Document mass fatality management matters that may be needed 
for inclusion in agency or state/federal briefings, situation reports 
and action plans. 
 
32. Ensure that death certificates have been issued in accordance with 
state regulations. 
 
33. Provide continued support to fatality management personnel on 
where and how to obtain medical, psychological and financial 
assistance. 
 
34. Revise plans to reflect changes in implementing programs and 
procedures, improvements in emergency management capabilities, 
corrections of deficiencies identified in exercises, etc. 
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35. Evaluate and update existing mass fatality management plans, as 
necessary. 
 
36. Review laws and regulations for adaptations to improve response 
to mass fatality incidents. 
 
37. Review internal processes for improvements to plan. 
 
38. Conduct training and exercises incorporating improvements from 
action plan. 
 
39. Provide appropriate information regarding the event to public 
information (ESF-15) to support family and media 
communications. 
 
40. Request access to law enforcement databases to aid in victim 
identification. 
 
41. In instances of floods, earthquakes or other emergencies which 
may disturb established gravesites, request assistance for local 
responders in re-interment of bodies, caskets, etc. 
 
B. South Carolina Coroners Association 
 
1. Develop, document and maintain mutual support relationships with  
governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and other private services that may assist during a 
mass fatality incident. 
 
2. Establish and implement memorandum of understanding with 
SCDHEC for assistance in mass fatality events. 
 
3. Organize and provide training to registered volunteers for, but not 
limited to, evidence collection, cultural considerations, NIMS, and 
ante mortem data collection, as appropriate. 
 
4. Coordinate a state-level assessment of local and state resources, 
equipment and manpower.   
 
5. Establish and implement mutual aid agreements for identified 
family assistance centers. 
 
6. Identify sites in each Public Health region in the state that could be 
established as  temporary morgues, and include equipment needed 
to initiate the site as a morgue.   
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7. Identify sites which might serve as family assistance centers. 
 
8. Establish and implement mutual aid agreements for identified 
temporary morgues. 
 
9. Establish the means to collect ante mortem data, preferably 
electronically.  Consider the use of the federally created Victim 
Identification Program. 
 
10. Identify state resources that may assist with victim identification. 
 
11. Identify state and federal databases that may be employed to assist 
with victim identification data collection. 
 
12. Establish one data collection system that will allow a statewide, 
coordinated means of ante- and post-mortem data collection and 
victim identification. 
 
13. Delineate the process by which the state would support local areas 
in providing locations for interment. 
 
14. Develop a process to disinter remains and correct death certificates 
to reflect  change, if needed. 
 
15. Determine the nature and extent of the mass fatality event. 
 
16. Facilitate the collaboration of county, regional and state officials to 
determine whether to request federal assistance. 
 
17. Initiate assistance from law enforcement (ESF-13) to enable 
perimeter security and security for scene operations and evidence 
collection. 
 
18. Establish Family Assistance Center to support local operations and 
mobilize staff. 
 
19. Secure evidence/personal effects collection site. 
 
20. Provide appropriate information regarding the event to public 
information (ESF-15) to support family and media 
communications. 
 
21. Establish a unique numbering system for all human remains. 
 
22. Establish additional morgue operations as needed. 
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23. Mobilize volunteers to staff temporary morgue sites. 
 
24. Request additional portable morgue, PPE and other supplies and 
infrastructure to support morgues as needed from state resources. 
 
25. Working with the local coroner, initiate assistance from law 
enforcement (ESF-13) to enable morgue security. 
 
26. Initiate system of ante mortem data collection and establish ante 
mortem record  repository and its housing facility. 
 
27. Initiate system to support victim identification, including support 
for forensic identification from partners. 
 
28. Request information from law enforcement databases to aid in 
victim identification. 
 
29. Determine if final disposition needs may necessitate alternative 
interment or other means of disposition for the public health, safety 
and welfare. 
 
30. Reconstitute fatality management personnel and equipment. 
 
31. Document mass fatality management matters that may be needed 
for inclusion in agency or state/federal briefings, situation reports 
and action plans. 
 
32. Evaluate the need to continue state-supported security measures at 
fatality scene and, upon recommendation of local coroner, 
discontinue if appropriate. 
 
33. Reconstitute temporary morgue equipment. 
 
34. Reconstitute/decontaminate temporary morgue sites.  
Return to pre-disaster condition as possible. 
 
35. Continue to maintain system of ante mortem data as needed. 
 
36. Ensure that all remains and personal effects have been identified 
and returned to next-of-kin as appropriate. 
 
37. Provide for the release of information related to disaster-related 
deaths that will be  limited to those fatalities that have been 
officially confirmed by local government officials. 
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38. Plan revisions will reflect changes in implementing programs and 
procedures, improvements in emergency management capabilities, 
corrections of deficiencies identified in exercises, etc. 
 
39. Evaluate and update existing mass fatality management plans, as 
necessary. 
 
40. Review mutual aid agreements for changes; establish mutual aid 
agreements where needed. 
 
41. Evaluate mass fatality operations and prepare review report for use 
in plan revisions. 
 
42. Identify training and equipment needs. 
 
43. Evaluate additional temporary sites for identified needs and 
appropriateness in future response. 
 
44. Determine areas of equipment and staffing shortages for plan 
review. 
 
45. Evaluate the effectiveness of state ante mortem data system.  
Adapt the system as needed. 
 
46. Identify gaps that prevented the rapid identification of victims and 
develop action  plan to streamline the identification process. 
 
47. Review laws and regulations for adaptations to improve response 
to mass fatality incidents. 
 
48. Review laws and regulations for adaptations to improve response 
to final disposition during mass fatality incidents. 
 
49. Evaluate and update existing mass fatality management plans, as 
necessary. 
 
50. Conduct training and exercises incorporating improvements from 
action plan. 
 
C. South Carolina Funeral Directors Association 
 
1. Develop, document and maintain mutual support relationships with 
governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and other private services that may assist during a 
mass fatality incident. 
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2. Recruit volunteers to register with ESAR-VHP in order to pre-
identify, coordinate and credential personnel necessary to support 
mass fatality incident management, including staffing of family 
assistance centers. 
 
3. Determine the number of funeral directors and embalmers licensed 
and available to assist in mass fatality management operations. 
 
4. Establish and implement memorandum of understanding with 
SCDHEC for assistance in mass fatality events. 
 
5. Develop process to disinter remains and correct death certificates 
to reflect change, if needed. 
 
6. Determine if final disposition needs may necessitate alternative 
interment or other means of disposition for the public health, safety 
and welfare. 
 
7. In instances of floods, earthquakes or other emergencies which 
may disturb established gravesites, assist local responders as 
needed in re-interment of bodies, caskets, etc. 
 
8. Revise plans to reflect changes in implementing programs and 
procedures, improvements in emergency management capabilities, 
corrections of deficiencies identified in exercises, etc. 
 
9. Evaluate and update existing mass fatality management plans, as 
necessary. 
 
10. Review laws and regulations for adaptations to improve response 
to final disposition during mass fatality incidents. 
 
11. Evaluate and update existing mass fatality management plans, as 
necessary. 
 
12. Conduct training and exercises incorporating improvements from 
action plan. 
 
D. South Carolina Mortician’s Association 
 
1. Develop, document and maintain mutual support relationships with 
governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and other private services that may assist during a 
mass fatality incident. 
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2. Recruit volunteers to register with ESAR-VHP in order to pre-
identify, coordinate and credential personnel necessary to support 
mass fatality incident management, including staffing of family 
assistance centers. 
 
3. Determine the number of funeral directors and embalmers licensed 
and available to assist in mass fatality management operations. 
 
4. Establish and implement memorandum of understanding with 
SCDHEC for assistance in mass fatality events. 
 
5. Develop process to disinter remains and correct death certificates 
to reflect change, if needed. 
 
6. Determine if final disposition needs may necessitate alternative 
interment or other means of disposition for the public health, safety 
and welfare. 
 
7. In instances of floods, earthquakes or other emergencies which 
may disturb established gravesites, assist local responders as 
needed in re-interment of bodies, caskets, etc. 
 
8. Revise plans to reflect changes in implementing programs and 
procedures, improvements in emergency management capabilities, 
corrections of deficiencies identified in exercises, etc. 
 
9. Evaluate and update existing mass fatality management plans, as 
necessary. 
 
10. Review laws and regulations for adaptations to improve response 
to final disposition during mass fatality incidents. 
 
11. Evaluate and update existing mass fatality management plans, as 
necessary. 
 
12. Conduct training and exercises incorporating improvements from 
action plan. 
 
E. South Carolina Department of Public Safety 
 
1. Develop, document and maintain mutual support relationships with 
other governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and other private services that may assist during a 
mass fatality incident. 
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2. Coordinate perimeter security and scene security for scene 
operations and evidence collection.  
 
3. Coordinate assistance to enable morgue security. 
 
4. Revise plans to reflect changes in implementing programs and 
procedures, improvements in emergency management capabilities, 
corrections of deficiencies identified in exercises, etc. 
 
F. South Carolina National Guard 
 
1. Develop, document and maintain mutual support relationships with 
other governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and other private services that may assist during a 
mass fatality incident. 
 
2. Coordinate perimeter security and scene security for scene 
operations and evidence collection.  
 
3. Coordinate assistance to enable morgue security. 
 
4. Revise plans to reflect changes in implementing programs and 
procedures, improvements in emergency management capabilities, 
corrections of deficiencies identified in exercises, etc. 
 
G. South Carolina Department of Mental Health 
 
1. Develop, document and maintain mutual support relationships with 
other governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and other private services that may assist during a 
mass fatality incident. 
 
2. Initiate psychosocial teams to provide psychological aid to fatality 
management workers and families of victims. 
 
3. Provide continued support to fatality management personnel on 
where and how to obtain medical, psychological and financial 
assistance. 
 
4. Revise plans to reflect changes in implementing programs and 
procedures, improvements in emergency management capabilities, 
corrections of deficiencies identified in exercises, etc. 
 
H. American Red Cross 
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1. Develop, document and maintain mutual support relationships with  
governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and other private services that may assist during a 
mass fatality incident. 
 
2. Establish and implement mutual aid agreements for identified 
family assistance centers. 
 
3. Establish Family Assistance Centers to support local operations 
and mobilize staff.  FACs will be set up at locations convenient to 
mass fatality incidents, but removed from the mainstream of 
activities. 
 
4. Revise plans to reflect changes in implementing programs and 
procedures, improvements in emergency management capabilities, 
corrections of deficiencies identified in exercises, etc. 
 
I. Salvation Army 
 
1. Develop, document and maintain mutual support relationships with  
governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and other private services that may assist during a 
mass fatality incident. 
 
2. Establish and implement mutual aid agreements for identified 
family assistance centers. 
 
3. Establish Family Assistance Centers to support local operations 
and mobilize staff.  FACs will be set up at locations convenient to 
mass fatality incidents, but removed from the mainstream of 
activities. 
 
4. Revise plans to reflect changes in implementing programs and 
procedures, improvements in emergency management capabilities, 
corrections of deficiencies identified in exercises, etc. 
 
J. State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) 
 
1. Develop, document and maintain mutual support relationships with 
other governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and other private services that may assist during a 
mass fatality incident. 
 
2. Provide support for forensic identification. 
 
3. Provide support for worker identification and credentialing. 
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4. Revise plans to reflect changes in implementing programs and 
procedures, improvements in emergency management capabilities, 
corrections of deficiencies identified in exercises, etc. 
 
K. South Carolina Dental Identification Team  
 
1. Develop, document and maintain mutual support relationships with 
other governmental entities, professional associations, volunteer 
organizations and other private services that may assist during a 
mass fatality incident 
 
2. Recruit volunteers to register with ESARVHP in order to pre-
identify, coordinate and credential personnel necessary to support 
mass fatality incident management including staffing of family 
assistance centers. 
 
3. Organize and provide training to registered volunteers for, but not 
limited to, evidence collection, cultural considerations, NIMS, ante 
mortem data collection, as appropriate. 
 
4. Provide support for forensic identification. 
 
5. Maintain equipment to support forensic identification in mass 
fatality incidents. 
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